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ABSTRACT 
The international community undertakes complex interventions in states 
emerging from war. These interventions include broad efforts to reform the political 
and institutional structures of the state. After the United Nations took political control 
of Kosovo in June 1999, it embarked on such a reform program, extremely ambitious 
in nature. This thesis examines the efforts to rehabilitate and reform the health sector. 
The immediate post-conflict environment in Kosovo was extremely chaotic. 
Hundreds of millions of dollars poured into the province, funding the operations of 
several hundred non-governmental organisations. The initial efforts of the 
international community in the health sector were focused on coordinating resources 
and the activities of these organisations. 
However, Kosovo' s health system was in clear need of widespread reform. 
The system had been devastated by years of neglect and months of conflict. A reform 
program was undertaken, with the objectives of establishing a primary care based 
system, increasing the quality of secondary and tertiary care, modernizing the public 
health system, and ensuring a cost-effective, equitable health system. By 2004, the 
reform program had largely failed to meet these objectives. 
This study examines the reasons that health reform was so difficult utilizing a 
combination of methods, i.e. a review of literature on peacebuilding, health and 
conflict, and health reform; analysis of the implementation of reform utilizing primary 
evidence such as policy documents and health data; and interviews with key 
stakeholders. 
Results show two important lessons for other post-conflict interventions. First, 
the reform program neglected building the capacity of government institutions. If the 
state does not have the capacity to implement reforms, the sustainability of the health 
reform process will be undermined. And second, the Kosovo reform program failed to 
build the foundation for reform before initiating ambitious projects to modernize the 
health sector. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE PUBLIC HEALTH CHALLENGE OF POST-
CONFLICT HEALTH REFORM 
This thesis was sparked by a puzzle encountered when the author worked in 
Kosovo. The author was one of the thousands of internationals who flocked to the 
province after the war ended in June 1999. The author initially worked for the 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, following humanitarian developments in 
Kosovo from Ottawa. Then the author moved to the province in March 2000 to work 
for the Canadian International Development Agency, coordinating Canadian initiatives 
in the health sector. 
The author's previous field experience had been in Africa, working on the 
borders of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone as a field officer for the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees. The situation was tragic: hundreds of thousands of 
refugees had fled brutal fighting in Sierra Leone. They arrived in Guinea, physically 
weakened from months spent fleeing the violence and hiding from rebels in the bush. 
Many individuals had been subjected to egregious human rights violations. Guinea 
offered them little refuge. The security situation was precarious, as Sierra Leonean 
rebels conducted cross-border raids. The natural environment also posed challenges, 
with the long rainy season making many roads impassable. The refugee population 
was largely unskilled, characterized by high levels of illiteracy. Non-governmental 
organisations and multilateral agencies working in the area lacked sufficient funds and 
skilled personnel. It was an extremely difficult and frustrating implementing 
environment, and because of these constraints, many objectives of international 
humanitarian actors were not met. 
Kosovo was a stark contrast to Guinea, and most other previous humanitarian 
and post-conflict environments. The international community poured hundreds of 
millions of dollars into the province. As a result, Kosovo did not suffer from the 
shortages of funds that plagued other humanitarian emergencies. While it was a post-
conflict situation, the implementing environment was relatively secure with forty 
thousand NATO troops (for a population of roughly two million). Although these 
troops were largely unable to prevent revenge killings and stem the exodus of Serbs 
from the province, the forces were generally able to stabilize the province, and 
organisations operated freely and easily in most areas. The province was governed on 
an interim basis by the United Nations, which meant that multilateral agencies and 
NGOs did not have to negotiate access with local political authorities. The population 
11 
was educated, and largely welcomed the involvement of the international community, 
with Kosovo' s Albanians heralding the arrival of the international community as the 
birth of Kosovo' s independence. l Non-governmental organisations and multilateral 
agencies employed seasoned professionals, and were able to hire skilled individuals 
from Kosovo. In the health sector, organisations applied the lessons learned from 
previous international engagements in post-conflict environments, taking advantage of 
the presence of international money and human resources to initiate an ambitious 
project to reform the health sector. In short, Kosovo provided an extremely enabling 
implementing environment, one in which organisations should have been able to 
operate effectively and achieve their objectives. However, as this thesis demonstrates, 
the ambitious initiative to reform the health sector has been slow to achieve results, 
and reform objectives are far from being met. 
The problematic health reform process in Kosovo presents us with a puzzle, 
which this thesis investigates. Despite the advantages of Kosovo-the skilled 
international and local human resources, the financial resources, the fact that the 
United Nations was the administrative authority, the safe and secure operating 
environment, and the application of lessons learned from other post-conflict settings-
the progress of health reform has been painful and slow, and by 2005, key reform 
objectives had not been met. 
I. RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
There have been few in-depth case studies of post-conflict health reform which 
analyse the process of implementation of that reform, evaluate the reform measures 
assess the success of those reforms, and situate the health reforms within the larger 
context of peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict settings. Therefore, this thesis 
analyses uncharted territory. 
Analysing the health reform effort in Kosovo posed several challenges. 
Literature examining health interventions in conflict and post-conflict situations 
provided useful information on the pitfalls of health interventions as part of the overall 
humanitarian effort, focusing on questions of coordination and sustainability, but gave 
1 The issue of Kosovo's final status was left deliberately ambiguous by the international community. 
While Yugoslavia (which was succeeded first by Serbia-Montenegro, and second, with the 
independence of Montenegro, Serbia) still held de facto sovereignty over the province, the Security 
Council Resolution that established the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo stated 
that the issue of final status would be decided at a later date through a political process, and until a final 
political settlement was reached, the United Nations would have authority in Kosovo and be charged 
with developing autonomous institutions of self-government. 
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little guidance on factors that facilitate or impede the reform of the health system. No 
framework existed to examine post-conflict health reform efforts. The existing 
research on health reform assumed a functioning government and a pre-existing health 
system complete with equipment, human resources, and financial and information 
management structures. Much of the analysis on health reform focused on the reform 
measures themselves, rather than the context within which the reforms are 
implemented. 
The nature of the international engagement in Kosovo was also novel. As part 
of its efforts to consolidate the peace in post-conflict settings, such as Kosovo, the 
international community promotes wide-ranging and ambitious reforms to state 
institutions, including the health sector. At the time, Kosovo was one of the first and 
most ambitious of these international interventions. With international political control 
and significant international investment, the international community saw post-conflict 
engagement in Kosovo as a key window of opportunity to promote dramatic reforms to 
build liberal democratic institutions, reform the state, and build the prerequisites for 
peace. 
Therefore key knowledge gaps exist. First, how should post-conflict health 
reform efforts be analysed? And second, what are the factors that impede the progress 
of reform in a post-conflict environment such as Kosovo, with its massive influx of 
resources, and the intervention governed by a strong political agenda? 
II. RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE AND OBJECTIVES 
In many ways, Kosovo represented the beginning of a new form of 
international engagement in countries emerging from armed conflict. 2 The 
international community's objective in these states is to ensure that these countries do 
not slip back into widespread violence. Therefore the international community 
engages in sweeping reform of the institutions of government. The objective of these 
"peacebuilding" reforms is to make post-conflict governments more stable, more 
accountable, and ultimately more peaceful. 
The term "post-conflict" does not mean that all potential sources of conflict 
have been addressed, or that low levels of violence do not remain, or that the situation 
2 The fonnal definition of anned conflict in the international relations literature is 1 000 battle deaths per 
year. But as the 2005 Human Security Report notes: "Measuring armed conflict is a complex and often 
contested business. Definitions of what constitutes a conflict vary widely, as do data collection methods, 
accuracy and coding rules," THE HUMAN SECURITY CENTRE (2005) The Human Security Report 2005. 
New York, Oxford University Press. 
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may not at some point return to 'conflict' levels. In this thesis, the post conflict period 
refers to the time period following the cessation of violent hostilities, when there is a 
formal ceasefire or a peace agreement between previously warring factions and 
significant international engagement is in place to sustain this ceasefire. In some 
cases, such as Kosovo and East Timor, the international community in the form of the 
United Nations has been granted the authority by the United Nations Security Council 
to administer the territory in question.3 Reform efforts undertaken as part of these 
peacebuilding activities are implemented at the prodding and behest of the 
international community, and they have the objective of building liberal democratic 
institutions of self government. (Paris, 2004, pp.18-19) 
The health sector is part of this overall reform effort. The focus of health 
reform is to change the manner in which health care is delivered to make it more 
efficient, effective, and equitable. A common set of health reform measures are 
typically implemented in post-conflict settings-a heightened focus on primary care, 
an emphasis on the health of women and children, financing reforms including the 
separation of purchaser and provider functions, and human-resource planning. 
Millions of dollars are typically invested in such reform efforts, with short time 
horizons for the dispersal of these funds, typically two to five years. As a result of this 
short time span, rehabilitation programs often become contiguous with reform. 
Despite the millions of dollars invested in reform efforts, few comprehensive 
assessments have been undertaken of the health reform efforts undertaken by the 
international community in post-conflict settings. Much of the literature on health and 
conflict focuses on humanitarian and rehabilitation interventions, and focuses on the 
need to plan the reform process, rather than the successes and failures of reform 
outcomes. 
This thesis has two main objectives. First, new theories or frameworks are 
needed to explain the challenges of health reform in post conflict settings. Therefore, 
the thesis establishes a conceptual framework to examine post-conflict health reform, 
integrating an understanding of health reform efforts, the unique nature of the 
J There is a debate regarding the appropriateness of the tenn "post-conflict" given that the underlying 
root causes of violence have often not been addressed with the fonnal cessation of hostilities, and often 
criminal violence and/or insurgency continues. This debate, while important, is outside the scope of this 
dissertation. Note that the issue of a positive peace was raised by Galtung in his seminal work 
GAL TUNG, 1. (1975) Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding. IN 
GALTUNG,1. (Ed.) Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research. Copenhagen, Christian 
Ejlers. 
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international engagement in the province, and an identification of the key factors that 
could impede reform. And second, the thesis tests this framework by applying it to 
Kosovo's health reform effort. 
III. THE FORMAT 
First, the methodological approach is established. The research questions 
underpinning the analysis are outlined, and the range of methods to address these 
research questions is identified. Through an examination of the strengths and 
weaknesses of these approaches, the methods most appropriate for answering these 
research questions in the Kosovo context are identified. Both social science and public 
health approaches are utilized, and the advantages of each approach are highlighted. 
The key themes from the literature review are also summarized with explanations 
given for the inclusion and exclusion of relevant literature. 
Part One of the thesis then establishes the conceptual framework for analysing 
health reform in post conflict settings in three steps. The foundation for this 
conceptual framework is built by examining the impact of conflict on population 
health and health systems, and outlining the key elements of health reform in Chapter 
One. Chapter Two proceeds to examine key lessons learned from health reform in 
Central and Eastern Europe to identify the impediments to the reform process. Chapter 
Three examines the context of a post-conflict peacebuilding mission and analyses the 
impact of this unique context on the health reform process. The conceptual 
framework, as outlined in Figure One, is then presented in Chapter Four. 
This conceptual framework highlights the factors internal to the health reform 
process as well as those social, political and economic factors external to the reforms, 
which need to be integrated into the analysis of health reform. Utilizing the literature 
review, the thesis then builds a hypothesis on the key impediments to health reform in 
post-conflict states. In Part Two of this thesis, this conceptual framework is applied 
and the hypothesis tested using the case of Kosovo. Chapter Five outlines the socio-
economic and political context in Kosovo after the war; Chapter Six reviews the pre-
reform population health and health system; while Chapter Seven reviews the progress 
of health reform, testing and proving the hypothesis that three key factors impeded the 
reforms: the externally driven reform agenda; the post-war social and political context 
wherein health was extremely politicized and impacted on government capacity; and 
the compressed nature of the reform timetable. 
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The thesis concludes with an overview of the lessons of this health reform 
program for other post-conflict health reform efforts. While a window of opportunity 
exists for reform in post-conflict settings, it is a window of opportunity for incremental 
change, not for dramatic socio-economic and political development compressed into a 
tight timeframe. Much can be learned from development experiences in building 
health systems: the rebuilding and reforming of health systems is development work, 
requiring a strong foundation for success. The timeframe required for development 
cannot easily be compressed. 
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THE METHODS 
This thesis is a case study examining the factors impacting on the outcome of 
the health reform process in Kosovo. As such, it relies on a combination of social 
science methodology and public health methods. Social science methodology 
identifies how to effectively study causation in complex socio-political systems and 
outlines the advantages and disadvantages of undertaking case study research. Public 
health methods provide guidance on how to study and gather data on health related 
events. 
Below, this section outlines the relevant methodological approaches of both 
disciplines, and the range of methods that could be utilized to answer the research 
question. Second, it outlines the methods chosen to analyse post-conflict health 
reform, and provides a rationale for these methods. Third, it discusses the selection of 
the literature analysed to build the conceptual framework. It concludes with a 
description of what factors will not be incorporated into the study and the reasons for 
their exclusion. 
I. SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS 
This thesis presents an in-depth examination of one case study. Below, this 
section outlines the methodological principles underlying single case studies including 
the advantages and pitfalls of case study research, and reviews the five tasks of 
research design. Here, the thesis relies on the authoritative work by Alexander George 
on the methodology of case study research.4 
A. Case Study Research: The Methodological Principles 
Case studies allow for "high levels of conceptual validity" when examining 
difficult to measure variables that are not suitable for large statistical analysis.s Case 
studies allow for the identification of new variables and hypothesis, enable the detailed 
examination of causal mechanisms, and provide a detailed consideration of contextual 
factors. 
4 Alexander George is a Professor Emeritus of International Relations at Stanford University, and has 
written extensively on case study methodology in social science. 
5 George and Bennett argue that "Case studies allow a researcher to achieve high levels of conceptual 
validity, or to identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the 
researcher intends to measure." GEORGE, A. & BENNETT, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory 
De\'e/opment in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, MIT Press. 
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1. The Utility of Focusing on One Case Study 
In the social sciences, most case studies are comparative case studies, involving 
the testing of hypothesis across several cases, a technique known as 'structured 
focused comparison.' Single case studies are relatively rare, as social scientists argue 
that their generalizability outside that specific case setting can be limited. 
However, in Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett argue for the utility of single case studies: the 
detailed examination of one historical episode with the objective of developing and 
testing explanations generalizable to similar episodes in future research exercises. 
(George and Bennett, 2005, p. 5) The objective of case study research is to find "the 
conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which 
they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their 
outcomes arise." (George and Bennett, 2005, p.31) George and Bennett point out that 
an analysis of an individual case can contribute to theory development and testing, if 
the case focuses on "deviant" cases or if the case contributes to building new theories. 
(George and Bennett, 2005, p. 32) As they argue: 
Theory development via case studies is primarily an inductive process. The 
outcome in a deviant case may prove to have been caused by variable that had 
been previously overlooked but whose effects are well known from other 
research ... An inductively derived explanation of a case can also involve 
more novel theories and variables. (George and Bennett, 2005, p. Ill.) 
Application in the Thesis: This thesis utilizes a case study approach to 
examine post conflict health reform. As noted above, a single case study, such as the 
Kosovo case, is methodologically valid in the theory development stage. 
2. Development of the Framework 
When inductively developing and testing theories, researchers cannot utilize the 
same case study to develop the theoretical frameworks or propositions as they use to 
test the theory. Such an approach would bias the findings, and thus jeopardize the 
generalizability of the theory - its applicability to other case studies . 
. . . researchers are frequently advised not to develop a theory from evidence 
and then test it against the same evidence; facts cannot test or contradict a 
theory that is constructed around them. In addition, using the same evidence to 
create and test a theory also exacerbates risks of confirmation bias, a cognitive 
bias toward affirming one's own theories ... " (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 
111. ) 
Application in the Thesis: To avoid the prospect of developing a theory from 
evidence and then testing it against the same evidence, the conceptual or theoretical 
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framework developed for the analysis of post-conflict health refonn in Kosovo was 
derived from a literature review that did not include the Kosovo case. This literature 
review is described in detail below. 
3. Tracing Causality 
Case studies allow for "process tracing" to disentangle and document complex 
causal interactions.6 (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 19-22) Process tracing identifies 
the linkages between independent, intervening variables and the dependent or outcome 
variable. (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 6) It is a critical tool for establishing causality 
in single case studies. 
In process tracing, the investigator explores the chain of events or the decision-
making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case 
outcomes. The cause-effect link that connects independent variable and 
outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator 
looks for observable evidence of each step. (Evera, 1997, p. 64) 
Application in the Thesis: Process tracing was utilized in this thesis to first 
build the conceptual framework and then to test it in the case of Kosovo. Process 
tracing diagrams - tracing the pattern of causality by identifying the relevant 
intervening variables between the independent and dependent variables - were created 
for the development of the framework. These diagrams were also utilized to test the 
framework against the Kosovo case. 
B. The Five Tasks of Research Design 
George and Bennett outline the five tasks of research design in case study 
research. Below these tasks are described, and then their application to this thesis is 
explained. 
1. Specification of the Problem and Research Objectives 
Methodological Principles: George and Bennett argue that the researcher 
should articulate an important research problem or 'puzzle', and make the case that the 
proposed research will make a significant contribution to the field. The research 
objective should also identify if there is a need for testing a theory or competing 
theories, or if new theories are required. 
6 These complex interactions include equifinality (in open systems that the same end state can be 
achieved through a variety of means), complex interactions effects (non-linear results from the 
interaction of different levels of variables often as a result of threshold effects) and path dependency 
(when once a path is selected, there is little deviation or variation from that path). Ibid. 
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They specify six types of theory building case studies: 7 atheoretical case studies 
(descriptive which contribute only marginally to theory building), disciplined 
configurative case studies (utilize established theories to explain a case), heuristic case 
studies (identifying new variables, hypothesis, causal mechanisms and causal paths), 
theory testing (assess the validity and scope conditions of single or competing 
theories), plausibility probes (preliminary studies on untested theories), and building 
block studies (cases that pose tough tests for theories or identifying alternative 
pathways to similar outcomes). (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 74) 
Application in the Thesis: As outlined above, this thesis addresses a puzzle: 
despite the many advantages of Kosovo and the application of 'lessons learned,' the 
health reform effort stumbled. As such, the thesis investigates an under-researched 
area that is a key component of international engagement in conflict-affected societies. 
As outlined above, this thesis has two main objectives. First, the thesis 
establishes a conceptual framework to examine post-conflict health reform, integrating 
an understanding of health reform efforts, the unique nature of the international 
engagement in the province, and an identification of the key factors that could impede 
reform. And second, the thesis tests this framework by applying it to Kosovo' s health 
reform effort. 
In terms of its typology, this study is heuristic, where new variables are 
identified, hypothesis built and tested, and causal mechanisms charted. 
2. Specification of Variables 
Methodological Principles: Researchers should identify the dependent 
(outcome) variable, as well as the independent and potentially intervening variables in 
the study. In single cases (such as this study of post-conflict health reform in Kosovo), 
George and Bennett argue that alternative hypotheses should be considered, to ensure 
that "left out" variables do not threaten the validity of the research design. 
Application in the Thesis: In this case study ofKosovo, as outlined below, the 
dependent and independent variables are the degree to which health reforms have been 
implemented (dependent variable), the reform measures (independent variable) as well 
as social, political and economic factors, the nature of the implementation process -
7 Five of these theory building case studies were identified earlier by Arend Lijphart and Harry Eckstein, 
sec Footnote 3 Ibid. [See Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 
American Political Science Review Vol 65, No 3 (September 1971), pp. 682-693; and Harry Eckstein, 
"Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,: in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds. Handbook of 
Political Science. Vol 7 (Reading Mass, Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79-138]. 
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compressed and externally driven (intervening variables) identified through the 
literature review and integrated into the conceptual framework (outlined below). 
Alternative explanations for this failure are considered - specifically the evidence base 
for the reforms, the possibility of funding shortfalls, and coordination problems. 8 
3. Selection of Cases 
Methodological Principles: Case study selection should be an integral 
component of the research design to achieve the objectives of the study. As outlined 
above, many social scientists argue strongly that the findings of comparative case 
studies have more validity and reliability, and are thus more relevant for both testing 
and building theory. Therefore, one methodological approach for analysing post-
conflict health reform would include comparative methods - for example, a 'structured 
focused comparison' where two or more case studies of post-conflict health reform 
would be assessed. The case studies would have to be of the same' class of events' -
i.e. post-conflict health reform, where the international community has initiated over-
arching efforts to reform, has extensive political control, and one such reform initiative 
includes efforts to transform the health sector. The reforms in the health sector would 
have to be comparable - i.e. the effort to build a primary care based health system. 
The focus should be on assessing similar independent and dependent variables, to 
enhance the comparability across cases. (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 69-70, Evera, 
1997, pp. 56-58.) 
The analysis of case studies conventionally begins with defining the issue 
rather than a specific case. George and Bennett argue that starting with a case study in 
search of a theory is a viable approach, particularly in the early phases of theory 
development. (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 84) 
Application in the Thesis: Given that there has been little examination of post-
conflict health reform, as outlined above, a single case study focus is a useful starting 
point. Once a conceptual framework has been built through a heuristic case study, 
further research comparing cases (plausibility probes) can be undertaken. In the case 
of Kosovo, the author began with a case study, searched for a relevant theory, and then 
inductively developed a conceptual framework to apply to the case study. 
4. Description of the Variance in the Variables 
Methodological Principles: The manner in which variance is described is 
critical to further the development of new theories or the assessment and refinement of 
8 See the Conclusion for the explanation of why competing explanations failed to convince. 
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existing theories. The variance may be described in quantitative or qualitative terms. 
(George and Bennett, 2005, p. 84-85) 
Application in the Thesis: In the Kosovo case study, variance is described 
utilizing primarily qualitative data, but quantitative data is employed where it is 
available. (See section below on triangulation.) 
5. Formulation of Data Requirements 
Methodological Principles: The specific data to be obtained from the case 
study should be specified, and data requirements determined by the research strategy. 
(George and Bennett, 2005, pp.86-87) 
Application in the Thesis: The data requirements - specifically the 
triangulation approach - are outlined in more detail in the section below outlining 
public health methods. 
II. PUBLIC HEALTH METHODS 
While social science methods provide useful guidelines for case study research 
and outline how to identify causality in complex social, political and economic 
systems, they provide less specificity on gathering data and measuring variance of 
health related variables. The thesis now addresses the methodological principles of 
such a case study from a public health perspective. 
Patricia Ulin et ai, outline the following research questions to guide the 
research process, from the perspective of qualitative public health research: 
• What is the general area of inquiry and how is the research problem defined; 
• What are the objectives of the research; 
• What questions will address the research problem; 
• What methods will best address the research question; and, 
• Who should participate, what ethical standards assure the participation of study 
participants, and how should the data be collected and analysed. (Ulin et aI., 2005, 
p.33) 
Below the thesis addresses each of these research design issues, outlining how these 
issues were addressed. 
A. The Area of Inquiry: The Public Health Problem 
Health reform in post conflict settings poses a challenge to public health 
professionals. The health needs of the popUlation are significant, the health sector 
requires rehabilitation, there is often a shortage of health professionals, and the 
capacity of the government is often weak. In addition, health reforms form an 
important component of international engagement to rebuild and reform government 
institutions. In the complex economic, social and political environment that 
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characterizes post conflict environments, a key question remains unanswered: how 
should health reform be undertaken so that it builds an effective, efficient and 
equitable health system? 
B. Research Objectives 
As outlined above, this thesis has two main objectives: establish a conceptual 
framework to examine post-conflict health reform and test this framework by applying 
it to Kosovo' s health reform effort. 
C. Research Questions 
This thesis asks the following research question: Was health reform successful 
in Kosovo? To answer this research question, the thesis also explored several other 
questions. 
• What exactly is health reform, and how should health reform progress be 
measured? 
• How do factors internal to the reforms themselves impede implementation i.e. are 
the reform measures themselves appropriate, and based on solid public health 
evidence of what works? 
• And how do factors external to the reform process-the social, political, and 
economic context, as well as international pressure to implement particular health 
interventions-affect the progress of reform? Specifically, how does government 
capacity - or the lack thereof - impact on the health reform process? 
D. Methods to Address These Research Questions 
Several methodological approaches would have been appropriate to assess the 
success of health reform in Kosovo. Below, the thesis provides an overview of these 
methodologies, and assesses their strengths and weaknesses. 
1. Quantitative Data with Qualitative Input: Assessing Health Data 
One methodological approach which could answer these research questions 
would utilize quantitative health date. To determine if health reform was successful, 
this method would correlate the implementation of health reform and positive (or 
negative) health outcomes. The independent variable would be the health reform 
measures, and the dependent variable would be health outcomes. This quantitative 
analysis would be complemented with an analysis of the health reform measures and 
how they are implemented.9 
9 For more information on this method, please see BOWLING, A. (2000) Research Methods in Health: 
Investigating Health and Health Services, Buckingham, Open University Press .. The utilization of 
health data is common in evaluation of humanitarian interventions, where these interventions are 
specifically targeted to improve dramatically the health of the population. See CHECCHI, F. & 
ROBERTS, L. (September 2005) Interpreting and Using Mortality Data in Humanitarian Emergencies. 
London, Overseas Development Institute., SALAMA, P., SPIEGEL, P., TALLEY, L. & WALDMAN, 
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As outlined in Chapter Five, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
undertook a survey in 1999 to identify health priorities in the immediate post-war 
period. This data would be utilized as the 'baseline.' New health data could be 
gathered in one of two ways: first through routine surveillance - health data gathered 
by the Kosovo health information system. And if that data was not available, the data 
could be gathered through a repetition of the cluster survey method employed by the 
IRC in 1999.10 
The advantages of this approach are in its parsimony - the independent 
variables and the dependent variables are clear. The weaknesses of this approach are 
three-fold. First, the linkage between health reform and health outcomes is indirect. 
It could take a significant period of time for the health reform process to impact on 
health indicators. (Bowling, 2000, p. 181) Second, the objective of reform is broader 
than just to influence health outcomes. As outlined in Chapter One, health reform also 
has the objectives of improving efficiency and equity. And third, the health 
information system was not operating in Kosovo at the time the thesis was researched, 
so therefore such health data was unavailable. 
Given that this health data was not available utilizing the health information 
system, the only option would be to repeat the cluster survey - a very expensive 
undertaking. 11 The author had neither the financial means nor the epidemiological 
expertise to conduct such a survey. 
2. Assessing Management Data 
Another approach to assessing the success of health reforms would utilize 
health sector management and performance data instead of health data. Such 
management data would provide information on the performance of the health system 
- for example, the amount of resources allocated to support reform measures, data on 
consultations with family physicians, and referrals to the secondary and tertiary level 
comparing them to utilization of these services without such a referral. In such a 
study, the independent variable would be the health reform measures, while the 
R. (November 13,2004) Lessons Learned from Complex Emergencies over the Past Decade. The 
Lancet, 364, 1801-1813. 
10 This would be a fonn of longitudinal study utilizing health data. Ann Bowling warns against over-
reliance on longitudinal data for the analysis of change, as underlying changes could be masked. 
BOWLING, A. (2000) Research Methods in Health: Investigating Health and Health Services, 
Buckingham, Open University Press. 
II Such surveys typically cost in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, depending on the complexity of 
the environment, the number of samples selected, and the number of teams deployed. 
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dependent variable would be the implementation of these reforms measured by this 
management and performance data. 12 
The advantages of this approach are that its focus on performance data can 
measure the degree of implementation of reforms. It avoids some of the difficulties 
(the presence of confounding variables) associated with utilizing health data to 
evaluate health reforms. However, management data needed to evaluate health reform 
implementation is available only in health systems with fully functioning management 
information systems. And these information systems were not functioning in Kosovo. 
3. Qualitative: Analyse a Specific Element of the Reform Program 
Another possible approach to assess the success of the health reform program 
would focus on one reform measure and undertake an in-depth examination of that 
particular measure. Examples would include health financing, creation of the family 
medicine program, or efforts to revamp the epidemiological monitoring system. The 
independent variable would be that particular reform measure. The dependent variable 
would be the ability of that reform measure to achieve its stated objectives - for 
example, increase cost effectiveness and efficiency, introduce a family medicine 
system, and produce evidence from public health surveillance. 
This approach is commonly adopted to assess particular donor funded 
initiatives. With the focus on one reform measure, it is easier to identify specific 
indicators of the success or failure of that reform and to identify the factors impacting 
on that success. While parsimonious, it misses the important question of the overall 
context of reforms. What internal (popUlation health and economic efficiency) or 
external (social, economic and political) factors are driving the reform measures? How 
do the specific elements of the reform program interact? And what factors intrinsic to 
the reform process as well as social, political, and economic factors external to the 
reforms are impacting on the reform implementation and success? These are important 
issues impacting on the success of reforms that could be missed in a limited analysis of 
one particular reform measure. 
4. Triangulation Utilizing Mixed Methods - Broad Examination of Reform 
With this method, the dependent variable would be the ability of the reform 
program as a whole to meet its objectives. The independent variable would be the 
reform measures. Key intervening variables - the social, economic and political 
12 See for example BRINKERHOFF, D. (2003) Accountability and Health Systems: Overview. 
Framework and Strategies. Bethesda, PHR Plus. 
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factors impacting on the dependent variable would be identified either by utilizing 
existing theories and conceptual frameworks of post-conflict health reform, or by 
undertaking a review of relevant literature to build that conceptual framework. Data 
would be gathered through the use of triangulated methods, such as interviews, 
document analysis, and the use of the sporadic health quantitative data that existed to 
ensure validity and reliability of research findings. (Bowling, 2000, pp. 361-2) 
The advantage of this approach is that it enables a focus on the broader reform 
process and program - and encapsulates the social, political and economic factors 
impacting on reform. The disadvantage of this approach is its complexity - the lack of 
parsimony.I3 As outlined below, this is the approach adopted in this study. 
E. Who Should Participate, Ethical Standards, Data Collection and Analysis 
Participation in Study: Given the nature of the subject matter - an 
understanding of health reform requires specialized knowledge - "intensity sampling" 
(also known as stakeholder methods) would be most appropriate. Participants should 
be aware of their objectives of the study, and provide consent for participation and 
attribution purposes. 
Data Collection: Data generated through interviews provide key information 
on perceptions of the success or failure of health reform and the reasons for that 
outcome. To ensure comparability of responses, either a standardized open-ended 
interview or a closed, fixed response interview is appropriate. The responses should be 
coded for analysis, with a focus on informing the variables identified in the conceptual 
framework. As outlined below, these principles were followed in this thesis. 
III. SUMMARY: METHODS CHOSEN TO ANALYSE POST-CONFLICT HEALTH 
REFORM 
Case Study Approach: This thesis builds a framework for analyzing health 
reform, and tests that framework in a single case study. In the analysis of the case 
study, process tracing was employed to assess and analyse the relationship among the 
various variables. Triangulated methods - interviews with key stakeholders, document 
analysis, and the use of quantitative data - are utilized to provide information and 
values for these variables. 
Theory Building: The Conceptual Framework: A conceptual framework for 
health reform was built from a literature review. Through this literature review, 
13 To address this complexity, the author utilized process tracing to map the relationships among the 
independent, intervening and dependent variables. 
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independent and intervening variables were identified, which include the health refonn 
measures, and additional factors (political, economic and social context, the external 
pressure and resources for reform, the pre-reform health system and health status, the 
capacity of the government, and the implementation process for reform). The 
dependent variable is the outcome of the reform process, the degree to which the 
reform program met its objectives. This literature review also identified a hypothesis 
to test. 
Theory Testing -The Kosovo Case Study: This conceptual framework and the 
hypothesis were tested on the case ofKosovo. Process tracing was utilized to trace the 
causal pathway between the independent variable (the health refonn measures) and the 
dependent variable (the outcomes of the health reforms). To gather data on variables, 
the triangulation method (primary sources, interviews, and the sporadic health data that 
does exist) was utilized to determine variance. 
IV. THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The conceptual framework was built through a review of several sets of 
literature: an examination of the impact of conflict on health, the general literature on 
health reform, the specific health reform experience in Central and Eastern Europe 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding 
interventions. These sets of literature are analysed in detail in Chapters One, Two and 
Three. 
Ulin et al describe the purpose of a literature review: 
A literature review helps to make a case for the importance of the problem, to 
build it into a conceptual framework, and to avoid duplication of effort. When 
you state the problem and purpose of your research, you usually are describing 
a gap in scientific knowledge, a puzzle to put together, or a mystery to solve. 
(Ulin et al., 2005, p.35) 
Below the thesis outlines why the various sets of literature were targeted for review, 
the process of identifying relevant literature, the potential biases that the literature 
review may have caused, and the main themes that emerged in this literature. 
A. Selection Criteria 
This thesis asked the research question: "Was health reform successful in 
Kosovo?" To address this research question, the thesis also explored several other 
questions, including: what exactly is health refonn, and how should health refonn 
progress be measured? How do factors internal to the reforms themselves impede 
implementation i.e. are the reform measures themselves appropriate, and based on 
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solid public health evidence of what works? And how do factors external to the reform 
process-the social, political, and economic context, as well as international pressure 
to implement particular health interventions-affect the progress of reform? 
Specifically, how does the post-conflict environment and the lack of government 
capacity impact on the health reform process? 
Process: Initially, the author searched for an existing framework that would 
enable the examination of the case study of Kosovo and answer these questions. 
However, as no such framework existed, the author searched specific groups of 
literature to answer these questions. The literature selected included the examination 
of conflict and health, health reform, health reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
post-conflict peacebuilding. The review focused on these four sets of literature to 
understand the nature of contemporary health reform processes; the impediments to 
reform; and the particular nature of post-conflict environments and international 
interventions within those environments. 
As the thesis was written over several years, the literature review was an 
iterative process, focused on answering the key research questions and informing the 
development of the conceptual framework. Table One below summarizes the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria for the four sets of literature, as well as the literature 
that informs the analysis of the case study. 
Potential Bias: The inclusion and exclusion criteria presented in Table One 
focus on answering the research questions posed in this thesis. However, some biases 
may result. 
First, the exclusion of an analysis of developed country reforms, as well as the 
implementation of specific reform measures could have resulted in the exclusion of 
literature that provided details on the pitfalls of the implementation process. Second, 
literature that analysed and assessed peacebuilding in contexts without a significant 
international engagement and mandate was excluded. This literature could potentially 
have provided further insight into the difficulties of the transition from conflict 
(without the influence of the international community). 
Third, if the review had been undertaken in a systematic fashion at one point in 
time, rather than in an iterative fashion, these four sets of literature could have been 
more systematically assessed and evaluated. This would have provided a heightened 
guarantee that relevant literature was not inadvertently excluded. 
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Table One: Literature Review: Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Inclusion Exclusion 
Language English Non-English 
Time Frame Published since 1991 until 2005 Published before 1991 
Post-conflict peacebuilding literature 
- literature published after 199914 
Topics of Health policy in immediate post- Health reforms in developed 
Interest conflict environment; countries 
Transition from relief to Analysis of specific reform 
development in health sector; interventions (i.e. health 
Health reform definition and insurance, health financing, 
frameworks for analysis; health information systems, 
Health reforms in post-conflict health management systems) 
environments; Conflict prevention and 
Post-conflict international peacebuilding; 
engagement - mandate and Ethnic conflict; 
objectives; Health as a bridge to peace. 
Case study literature: 
Impact of the conflict on health in 
Kosovo; 
Health policy post-conflict Kosovo. 
Study Type Peer reviewed journal articles; Reports from Serbian 
Books; government 1990 to 1999; 
Grey literature including reports Editorials, letters to the editor. 
from research organizations, NGO 
reports, and reports from multilateral 
organizations; 
Key documents such as speeches, 
United Nations reports and 
resolutions; 
Key government documents. 
Summary of Searches 
Databases Pub-MedlMedline 
Utilized Health Star 
HMIC 
Google Scholar 
Google Search Engine 
British Library 
Subject Conflict and Health 
Headings Health Policy and Conflict 
Health reform and Eastern Europe 
Health reform and Central Europe 
Health reform and Balkans 
Post-conflict peacebuilding 
Post conflict reform 
14 Note that the 1999 time frame was chosen for the post-conflict peacebuilding literature as Kosovo was 
the first in a series of international interventions where the international community had significant 
international administrative and political control. 
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B. Evaluation of Literature 
Key themes emerged within these four sets of literature. These themes are 
described, and the rationale for focusing on particular analytical works presented 
below. 
1. Post Conflict Health Reform: Conflict and Health Literature 
An important external factor shaping health reform was the post-conflict 
environment. To assess how the literature on health interventions in conflict affected 
states addressed the issue of health system reform in post-conflict environments, the 
literature review included health interventions in post-conflict environments. 
Much of the literature focused on the impact of conflict on health, examining 
humanitarian challenges, and analyzing the key obstacles facing non-governmental and 
multilateral organizations responding to health needs. The dominant theme in the 
conflict and health literature was the need to enhance the health impact of 
humanitarian assistance (reducing mortality and morbidity) through various 
mechanisms: enhanced coordination mechanisms, ensuring evidence based 
interventions, and establishing minimum standards in humanitarian delivery.I5 
The specific findings of the literature are outlined in Chapter One. Few articles 
focused on the specific challenges of the post-conflict environment, and the effort to 
reform the health sector. 16 And the literature that did analyse the post-conflict reform 
15 See for example SALAMA, P., SPIEGEL, P., TALLEY, L. & WALDMAN, R. (November 13,2004) 
Lessons Learned from Complex Emergencies over the Past Decade. The Lancet, 364, 1801-1813., 
LEVY, B. S. & SIDEL, V. W. (1997) War and Public Health, New York, Oxford University Press., 
NOH, E. K. (1997) The Public Health Consequences of Disasters, Oxford, Oxford University Press., 
SCHOOR, V. V. (2005) Reviving Health Care. IN JUNNE, G. & VERKOREN, W. (Eds.) Postconflict 
Development: Meeting New Challenges. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, CHECCHI, F. & ROBERTS, L. 
(September 2005) Interpreting and Using Mortality Data in Humanitarian Emergencies. London, 
Overseas Development Institute., MURRAY, C. L. G., KING, G., LOPEZ, A. D., TOMIJIMA, N. & 
KRUG, E. G. (2002) Armed Conflict as a Public Health Problem. British Medical Journal, 324,346-
349 .. See also the Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Relief, 
http://www.sphereproject.org/, as well as the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative: 
http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org!. 
16 See for example JUNNE, G. & VERKOREN, W. (2005) The Challenges of Post conflict 
Development. IN JUNNE, G. & VERKORN, W. (Eds.) Postconflict Development. Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner., MACRAE, J. (1995) Dilemmas of'Post'-Conflict Transition: Lessons from the Health Sector. 
London, Relief and Rehabilitation Network., MACRAE, J. & ZWI, A. (1994) War and Hunger: 
Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies, London, Zed Books., SCHOOR, V. V. 
(2005) Reviving Health Care. IN JUNNE, G. & VERKOREN, W. (Eds.) Postconflict Development: 
Meeting New Challenges. Boulder, Lynne Rienner., SONDORP, E., KAISER, T. & ZWI, A. (2001) 
Beyond Emergency Care: Challenges to Health Planning in Complex Emergencies. Tropical Medicine 
and International Health. 6,965-970., and WATERS, H., GARRETT, B. & BURNHAM, G. (June 
2004) Rehabilitating Health Systems in Post-Conflict Situations. IN (UNU), W. I. F. D. E. R. W. A. T. 
U. N. U. (Ed.) Ma/..ing Peace JJ"ork. Helsinki, Finland .. 
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process did not place the health intervention into the broader political, social and 
economic context, nor did it evaluate the success of refonn efforts. While the 
literature broadly advocated for health interventions in post-conflict settings to develop 
a policy framework for health refonn, no theoretical or conceptual frameworks are 
utilized, comparative cases are not studied, and there have been few evaluations of the 
success of these efforts. I7 
2. Health Reform Literature 
Recall one of the research questions of this thesis: What exactly is health 
refonn, and how should health refonn progress be measured? To address this 
question, the health refonn literature was examined to establish a definition of health 
refonn, assess the process of health refonn, outline the nature of health refonn 
measures, to assess the internal and external pressures on health refonn, impediments 
to refonn, and how to assess the outcomes of health refonn. 
Much of the literature focused on the economics of health refonn, focusing on 
how to refonn the system to improve efficiency.I8 Very few analyses provided a 
definition for health refonn, there were few cross case examinations of health refonn 
implementation, and only one piece attempted to provide an overarching framework 
for analyzing and assessing refonn efforts. 19 None of the literature reviewed 
investigated the role of the state in overseeing the health refonn process: all authors 
assumed a functioning state. 
The specific findings of the literature survey are outlined in Chapter One. The 
works selected to infonn the conceptual framework defined health refonn, and 
assessed the various components of health refonn. 
17 The one exception was TULLOCH, J., SAADAH, F., ARAUJO, R. M. D., JESUS, R. P. D., LOBO, 
S., HEMMING, I., NASSIM, 1. & MORRIS, I. (2003) Initial Steps in Rebuilding the Health Sector in 
East Timor, Washington, The National Academies Press .. 
18 See for example BENNETT, S. (2000) Reforming state capacity: the demands of health sector reform 
in developing countries. IN MILLS, A. (Ed.) Reforming Health Sectors. London, Kegan Paul 
International Ltd., DIXON, A., LANGENBRUNNER, 1. & MOSSIALOS, E. (2004) Facing the 
Challenges of Health Care Financing. IN FIGUERAS, 1., MCKEE, M., CAIN, 1. & LESSOF, S. (Eds.) 
Health Systems in Transition: Learningfrom Experience. Copenhagen, European Observatory on 
Health Systems., FIGUERAS, 1., MENABDE, N. & BUSSE, R. (2005) The Road to Reform. British 
MedicalJournal, 331, 170-171., FIGUERAS, J., SALTMAN, R., RATHWELL, T. & WALT, G. (2000) 
Implementing successful health care reforms: minding the process. IN MILLS, A. (Ed.) Reforming 
Health Sectors. London, Kegan Paul International., FRENK, 1. (2000) Changing the role of the state. IN 
MILLS, A. (Ed.) Reforming Health Sectors. London, Kegan Paul International Ltd., MILLS, A. (2000) 
Reforming health sectors: fashions, pashions and common sense. IN MILLS, A. (Ed.) Reforming 
Health Sectors. London, Kegan Paul International Ltd., and, MILLS, A., BENNETT, S. & RUSSELL, 
S. (2001) The Challenge of Health Sector Reform: What Must Governments Do?, Houndmills, 
Palgrave .. 
19 See ROBERTS, M., HSIAO, W., BERMAN, P. & REICH, M. (2004) Gelling Health Reform Right: .i 
Guide 10 Improving Performance and Equity, Oxford, Oxford University Press .. 
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3. Health Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Other key research questions included how do factors internal to the reforms 
themselves impede implementation i.e. are the reform measures themselves 
appropriate, and based on solid public health evidence of what works? And how do 
factors external to the reform process-the social, political, and economic context, as 
well as international pressure to implement particular health interventions-affect the 
progress of reform? 
The lack of case studies in the reform literature created a knowledge gap 
regarding these factors that impact on the implementation of these reforms. Moreover, 
very little systematic analysis had been done of the effort to implement primary care 
based reforms, particularly the transition from a Semashko based system to a primary 
care based system. 
The objective of the review of health reform in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) was to identify the key factors/variables impacting on reform progress to inform 
the conceptual framework through a structured focused comparison of reform in 
CEE.2o Cases were selected because they a) had the same pre-reform health system as 
Kosovo; b) implemented the same type of reforms and c) all the cases were 
undertaking this reform process at roughly the same time - after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. 
Examining the health reform effort in Central and Eastern Europe also avoids 
'selection bias' - which can occur when researchers select cases on the dependent 
variable, or among the relevant population of cases. (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 23) 
The specific advantage to the Central and Eastern European cases studies is that they 
did not undergo conflict - so the internal and external factors that have impeded 
reform could be identified, free of the potentially confounding variable of conflict. 
Much of the literature on Central and Eastern Health Reform processes focused 
on the factors internal to the reform process, as well as those social, political, and 
economic factors external to reforms, which affected the progress of reform and 
impacted on reform outcomes. 
20 Recall that George and Bennett argued theory cannot be built (inductively) from the same case study 
to which it is applied. They also argued that structured focused comparisons are important for 
identifying key variables which are reliable and generalizable. Therefore, to identify key variables to 
build the conceptual framework, it was important to examine cases of health reform outside of the 
Kosovo case study. 
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The author assessed the factors across the case studies in Central and Eastern 
Europe to identify the factors internal to the reform process and factors external to the 
reforms that impacted on the ability of the reform program to achieve its outcome. 
This analysis is described in detail in Chapter Two and Appendix One. 
4. Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: 
An important element driving the reform agenda in Kosovo was the fact that 
Kosovo was subjected to an international peacebuilding intervention. Therefore, to 
further investigate how factors external to health interventions-the social political , , 
and economic context-affect the progress of reform, the literature examining post-
conflict political interventions was reviewed to understand the broader political context 
driving the reform process. 
The extensive literature on peacebuilding focuses on how to prevent the 
occurrence of violent conflict in countries emerging from war. 21 Several themes 
dominate, including demobilization of armed combatants, policing and peacekeeping 
mandates, the appropriateness of international political mandates, coordination (or lack 
thereof) among international organizations, the interface between international 
organizations and the local population, the role of the local media, the need to build 
political parties, and the interface between peacebuilding and development.22 
21 Another strand of peacebuilding literature focuses on preventing the outbreak of deadly conflict. 
22 See for example BRAHIMI, L. (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. New 
York, United Nations., CALL, C. (2005) Institutionalizing Peace: A Review of Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding Concepts and Issues for DPA. New York, Department of Political Affairs, United 
Nations., CARLSSON, I., SUNG-JOO, H. & KUPOLATI, R. (1999) Report of the Independent Inquiry 
into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. New York, United 
Nations. PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (2001) Peacebuilding: Towards a 
Comprehensive Approach. New York, United Nations, DOYLE, M. W. (January 2001) The New 
Interventionism. Metaphilosophy, Volume 32, 212-235, GALTUNG, 1. (1975) Three Approaches to 
Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding. IN GALTUNG, 1. (Ed.) Peace, War and 
Defence: Essays in Peace Research. Copenhagen, Christian Ejlers, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF 
THE SECRETARY GENERAL (1992) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking 
and Peacekeeping. New York, United Nations, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL (1999) 
The Fall ofSrebrenica. New York, United Nations, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE 
SECRETARY GENERAL (2005) In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights for All. New York, United Nations, GHOBARAH, H., HUTH, P. & RUSSETT, B. (2003) Civil 
Wars Kill and Maim People - Long After the Shooting Stops. American Political Science Re\·ieH'. 97, 
189-202, GLEDITSCH, N. P. (1992) Democracy and Peace. Journal of Peace Research. 29,369-376, 
JEONG, H.-W. (2005) Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, JUNNE. G. & 
VERKOREN, W. (2005) The Challenges of Post conflict Development. IN JUNNE, G. & VERKORN, 
W. (Eds.) Postconflict Development. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, ORR, R. C. (2004a) Constructing a 
Cohesive Strategic International Response. IN ORR, R. C. (Ed.) Winning the Peace: An American 
Strategyfor Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Washington, Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 
ORR, R. C. (2004b) Governing when Chaos Rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation. IN ORR, 
R. C. (Ed.) Winning the Peace: An American Strateg;for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Washington, 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, ORR, R. C. (2004c) Joint CSIS/ AU SA Post-contliet 
Reconstruction Task Framework. IN ORR, R. C. (Ed.) Winning the Peace: An .~merican Strategy/or 
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Given that the United Nations exercised complete administrative authority in 
Kosovo and had an ambitious reform agenda, this thesis analysed literature focusing on 
cases where the international community held significant decision-making authority, 
and used this control to promote a dramatic reform agenda. 
C. Literature Excluded from the Review 
Two sets of literature - health reform in Bosnia and policy analysis - were 
excluded from the literature review, and therefore not fully integrated into the 
conceptual framework. The reasons for this exclusion are outlined below. 
1. Literature on the Reform Process in Bosnia 
Bosnia appears like the perfect case study to inform the study of health reform 
in Kosovo. Both Kosovo and Bosnia were part of Yugoslavia (although Bosnia was its 
own republic, while Kosovo was an autonomous province of the republic of Serbia), 
largely sharing the same pre-war health system and enduring an international 
peacekeeping presence, an influx of international resources, and significant 
international engagement in the administration of the country. 
But on closer examination, the only commonalities that Bosnia shared with 
Kosovo were the pre-war health system and the influx of donor resources. 
Duration of the Conflict: The Bosnian conflict was of a much longer duration, 
inflicted significantly more casualties and resulted in more damage to infrastructure 
than the Kosovo conflict. 
Ethnic Minorities with a Strong Voice: The Bosnian state emerged from the 
war ethnically divided. While significantly swathes of its territory were ethnically 
homogenous, the total population was more heterogeneous than that of Kosovo, with 
approximately 48% Bosnians and 37% Serb, and 14% Croatian. Kosovo was over 
90% Albanian; while ethnic politics were omnipresent, it did not have the stranglehold 
on legislative reform that it had in Bosnia. 
Degree of International Political Control: While the international community 
was represented by the "High Representative" who had some oversight powers under 
Post Conflict Reconstruction. Washington, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, ORR, R. C. 
(2004d) The United States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction. IN 
ORR, R. C. (Ed.) Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. 
Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies, THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S 
HIGH-LEVEL PANEL (2004) A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. New York, United 
Nations, PARIS, R. (2004) At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, SMITH, D. (2003) The Penguin Atlas of War and Peace, New York, Penguin Putnam 
Inc., COUSENS, E. & KUMAR, c. (Eds.) (2001) Peace building as Politics, Boulder, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. REYCHLER, L. & PAFFENHOLZ, T. (Eds.) (2000) Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, 
Boulder, Lynne Rienner. 
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the Dayton Peace Agreement and the subsequent Bonn Agreement of the Peace 
Implementation Council, the international community lacked the total administrative 
control that they had in Kosovo. 
The Two Entity Structure: The Bosnian state was a federated structure with 
two entities. The Republika Srpska was Serbian dominated and had a more centralized 
structure, while the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was dominated by Bosnians 
and Croatians, with significant power decentralized to the canton level. 
Differing Health Reform Process and Measures: The health reform process 
in Bosnia was different than that conducted in Kosovo: there was no national mandate 
for health - it was the purview of the two entities. Moreover, the administration of 
health care differed significantly between the Federation (decentralized) and the 
Republika Srpska (centralized); the reform process was not as defined or ambitious, 
nor was it initiated at an early stage; and the reform program differed in the two 
entities. And most critically, under the Dayton Accord the international community 
had no jurisdiction in the health sector. Therefore, the High Representative could not 
impose reforms as the United Nations had done in Kosovo. The international 
community maintained its traditional role of coordinator and donor. 
In summary, the Bosnian reform process is not similar on the independent 
variable of health reform measures, the intervening variables of international political 
control, impact of the conflict, political structure, and the implementation of the reform 
measures. Because the health reform program was so different in Bosnia, it is also not 
similar on the dependent variable of the outcome of the health reform program.23 A 
review of Bosnia could not inform the analysis of health reform (given that the lack of 
coherency of the reform program), the peacebuilding context (due to the differing 
mandate of the international community in Bosnia), and the health and conflict 
literature (due to the lack of planning for health reform). 
After the conceptual framework is tested on Kosovo and other similar cases 
(such as East Timor and Afghanistan), Bosnia could form part of a "plausibility 
probe", where the same framework is applied on a small number of cases. To control 
2.1 The other cases of health refonn in Central and Eastern Europe examined through the literature 
review were actually more comparable to the Kosovo case. They had roughly the same pre-war health 
system and the same refonn measures implemented. 
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for the confounding variables identified above, the congruence method could be 
utilized.24 
2. Literature on Health Policy 
Many analysts examining the health refonn programs have utilized theories of 
the policy making process.25 Such theories focus on the process of policy design and 
policy making: how policy initiatives are selected against the backdrop of powerful 
vested interests, the voices of advocates, and competing policy priorities; what issues 
are included and excluded in these initiatives; the major actors both within and outside 
of government who influence this process; and the context within which those policy 
choices are made.26 
This body of literature has contributed to our understanding of policy agenda-
setting. It provides crucial insight into the complex world of policy making, 
illuminating why certain policy initiatives are feasible and why others are not. The 
tools of policy analysis, such as political mapping, multiple streams analysis, and 
analysis of coalition building, have been analytically useful to examine policy choices 
in complex systems such as health care. 
While strong on the analysis of policy choice, the policy analysis literature 
focuses less on the assessment of policy outcomes.27 While some health policy 
literature does discuss implementation, it tends to focus on the conditions for 
24 The congruence method compares cases assessing congruence or incongruence in the independent and 
intervening variables to determine which variables are significant in shaping the dependent variable. 
EVERA, S. V. (1997) Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Cornell, Cornell University 
Press. 
25 See for example COLLINS, c., GREEN, A. & HUNTER, D. (1999) Health Sector Reform and the 
Interpretation of Policy Context. Health Policy, 47,69-83, FRENK, 1. (1995) Comprehensive Policy 
Analysis for Health System Reform. Health Policy, 32,257-277, GLASSMAN, A., REICH, M., 
LASERSON, K. & ROJAS, F. (1999) Political Analysis of Health Reform in the Dominican Republic. 
Health Policy and Planning, 14, 115-126, OKUONZI, S. A. & MACRAE, J. (1995) Whose Policy is it 
Anyway? International and National Influences on Health Policy Development in Uganda. Health 
Policy and Planning, 10, 122-132, REICH, M. (1996) Applied Political Analysis for Health Policy 
Reform. Current Issues in Public Health, 2, 186-191, WALT, G. & GILSON, L. (1994) Reforming the 
Health Sector in Developing Countries: The Central Role of Policy Analysis. Health Policy and 
Planning, 9,353-370, WALT, G. (1994) Health Policy: An Introduction to Process and Power, London, 
Zed .. 
26 See for example KINGDON, 1. (2003) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, New York, 
Longman, SABA TIER, P. (Ed.) (1999) Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder, Westview Press, 
WALT, G. (1994) Health Policy: An Introduction to Process and Power, London, Zed .. 
27 Much of the literature assumes that once policies are selected. the implementation process is a given. 
KINGDON, J. (2003) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, New York, Longman. is particular 
guilty of this. Walt and Gilson discuss implementation, but focus on the actors involved in the 
implementation process, and highlight the importance of the existence or absence of an implementation 
process, not external or internal factors which delay or derail implementation. See W AL T, G. (1994) 
Health Policy: An Introduction to Process and Power. London, Zed, W AL T. G. & GILSON, L. (1994) 
Reforming the Health Sector in Developing Countries: The Central Role of Policy Analysis. Health 
Policy and Planning. 9,353-370. 
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implementation (the ideal conditions for implementation, the potential impact of top-
down implementation), rather than assessing outcomes.28 The literature also assumes a 
functioning government and a relatively stable society. And critically, it does not 
provide a framework to enable a systematic examination of the external and internal 
factors impacting on refonn. 
The direct question of this thesis is: why did the refonns fail to meet their 
objectives? This thesis did not focus on the process of policy agenda setting - i.e. why 
certain policies were selected.29 Instead, given the tremendously favourable 
implementation environment, it asked why the health refonn program was so 
problematic to implement. Specifically what were the factors internal and external to 
the health refonn process which caused it to fail? Was there something particular 
about the post-conflict environment that affected its failure? A review of the health 
policy literature did not answer such questions, nor did it provide a conceptual 
framework to illuminate these issues within the case study. 
v. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THE HYPOTHESIS 
A. The Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework developed through the analysis of the above 
literature is outlined below in Figure One, and further detail is provided in Chapter 
Four. 
"A conceptual framework is a set of related ideas behind the research design. It 
may be a simple list of concepts and their possible associations or a more 
elaborate schematic diagram of key influences, presumed relations and possible 
outcomes of the research problem ... Literature reviews can identify findings 
from previous research that will suggest ways of conceptualizing the current 
problem." (Ulin et aI., 2005, p. 36) 
The framework outlines the process through which health refonns are 
developed and implemented in post-conflict settings, and how the results should be 
measured. Refonn measures are shaped by external pressures, available resources for 
refonn, the local health context (both the efficiency and efficacy of the existing system 
28 Walt does discuss implementation, particularly the disconnect between those that have to implement 
policy and those that make policy choices, particularly when decision makers are members of the 
international community - donors and multilateral organizations. She also highlights the political 
resources as well as the financial, managerial and technical resources needed for the implementation 
process. Of particular interest is her assertion that shorter time frames for implementation may lead to 
better outcomes. See WALT, G. (1994) Health Policy: An Introduction to Process and Power. London, 
Zed. 
29 Such a research question would be valid in the case of Kosovo given the tremendous influence of the 
international community on the programs and policies selected. 
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and population health), and by the socio-economic and political context. The 
implementation of health reforms is affected by government capacity for reform, as 
well as the socio-economic and political context of the post conflict environment. The 
success of the reform process should be measured through the degree to which health 
reforms have been implemented. 
Figure One: Conceptual Framework for Analysing Health Reform 
External 
Pressures/Resources 
for Reform 
Reform Measures 
Health Context 
(system and 
o ulation health 
• Socio-Economic 
and Political 
Context 
B. The Hypothesis 
Implementation -'" 
Process 1-----+ ~ 
t 
Government 
Capacity 
Reform 
Outcomes 
The conceptual framework outlined above highlights several factors that 
impacted on the reform process. First, the socio-economic and political environment 
in post-conflict states impacted on the capacity of the state to oversee and implement 
the reform process. Second, reforms were often externally driven, which undermined 
their legitimacy. And third, the time frame for reforms was quite compressed, with 
ambitious reform agendas implemented within relatively short time horizons. 
Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested in Kosovo was that the post-conflict 
social, economic and political context and its impact on state capacity, the externally 
driven nature of the health reform process, and the compressed timeframe for reforms 
all impacted on the ability of the health reform program to achieve its objectives. 
C. Applying the Conceptual Framework and Testing the Hypothesis: 
Health data and health system performance data on the health system in 
Kosovo were difficult to obtain, and peer-reviewed literature was largely unavailable. 
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Therefore, as outlined above, a process of triangulation was utilized through document 
analysis, stakeholder interviews and the use of the health data that was available. 
Document Analysis: To assess the progress of health reform in Kosovo and 
test my hypothesis, I utilized data from primary sources, such as reports from the 
Kosovo Ministry of Health, as well as information from grey literature-primarily the 
reports of consultants hired to review the reform process and report on the work of 
particular projects. These documents were analysed to understand the social, political 
and economic context of Kosovo, the process of health reform, and forces driving the 
health refonn process. These reports were obtained from donors and from the Kosovo 
Ministry of Health. Convenience sampling was used to obtain these reports; the author 
asked all major donors and the Ministry of Health to share reports they had 
commissioned or received analysing the various elements of the refonn system. The 
exclusion criteria were the availability of these documents in English.3o 
Stakeholder Interviews: In an effort to better understand the complex and 
evolving policy environment, to test my hypothesis on the key impediments to health 
refonn, and to better understand the administrative capacity of the state, the author 
undertook a stakeholder analysis, interviewing 26 key actors active in the health sector 
to understand the key impediments to reform and evaluate the refonn process. Local 
stakeholders were chosen based on their familiarity with the health reform process-
most occupied positions within the Kosovo health system. While the majority of 
stakeholders were from Pristina, care was also taken to incorporate a regional 
perspective, with stakeholders from two ofKosovo's municipalities also interviewed. 
The objective of the stakeholder interviews was to gather and examine data to 
test the hypothesis that the following three factors would impact on the reform process: 
• External pressures for refonn, and the extent to which this impacts on the 
legitimacy of the health-refonn process; 
• The socio-economic and political environment that weakened the capacity of the 
state to oversee refonns; 
• Compressed nature of the refonn process, which impacted on the progress and 
sustainability of reform. 
Stakeholder questions were designed to assess the following factors: 
• External pressures for refonn, which impact on the legitimacy of the reform 
process; 
30 This was not a significant impediment as the vast majority of analysis was \\Titten in English. 
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• The capacity of the state to oversee and implement the reform process, including 
the ability of the government to communicate its vision for reform and respond to 
concerns; 
• The compressed time frame for reform, impacting on the progress of reform and 
perceived sustainability of the reform process; 
• Information on the progress of health reform was also gathered. 
Stakeholders were selected based on the following criteria: 
• Active involvement in the health sector; 
• Senior positions in the health sector; and 
• Impacted by the reform process. 
The structured interviews with stakeholders used a questionnaire developed by 
the author, with the focus primarily on the reform process. Closed questions were 
developed, with an open question at the end to provide for clarification of response and 
explanations of position. The questionnaire was tested on three people prior to 
interviewing stakeholders: one British citizen, one German citizen, and one Albanian. 
Closed questions were selected, with an open question at the end to provide for 
clarification of response and explanations of position. The questionnaire was 
translated into Albanian, then back-translated for verification. Stakeholders provided 
consene 1 for the interviews and were interviewed in Albanian by one physician 
without the author present, to reduce bias. The author met with the physician 
conducting the interview regularly during the interview process to ensure that the 
interviews were going smoothly. The results of these interviews were translated into 
English. The complete listing of stakeholders and the positions that they occupied at 
the time of the interview is contained in Annex Three. This Annex also includes a 
summary of the relevant findings from the data-collection exercise. 
Stakeholder questions were divided into categories, and responses were coded 
accordingly. The results of this analysis are outlined in detail in Annex Three. These 
findings were incorporated into the analysis of the health reform process in Chapters 
Six and Seven, with the objective of complementing and triangulating data and 
information gleaned from grey literature, official documents from the Department of 
Health and the existing health and management data available to ascertain the degree 
to which health reform had been implemented, the capacity of the state to oversee the 
health sector and implement the reform process, and the degree to which key 
stakeholders agreed with the reform process. 
31 See Appendix Three for a copy of the Infonnation Sheet and Consent Fonn. 
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One of the initial objectives of data gathering was to undertake a comparative 
analysis among municipalities. However, no clear difference of opinion existed 
between municipal and central level stakeholders. Moreover, the lack of perfonnance 
and health data made comparisons between the implementation of refonn measures in 
different regions difficult. 
VI. RESEARCH TIMEFRAME 
The research was undertaken over several years. The initial review of the 
health refonn literature (including refonn in Central and Eastern Europe) was 
conducted from September 2000 to March 2001. A supplemental search on literature 
published after this date was conducted from September 2003 to June 2005. 
Documents on the health refonn process in Kosovo were gathered from May 2001 
until the author's departure from Kosovo in August 2003. Some official documents 
from the Kosovo Ministry of Health were received after that date. The questionnaire 
was developed from September until December 2001. The selection of stakeholders 
and interviews took place from February until March 2003. The data was analysed in 
March 2004. The thesis was written in sections, beginning in March 2001 and 
concluding in August 2005. 
VII. WHAT THIS THESIS DID NOT INVESTIGATE 
The thesis describes the ethnic tensions that characterized the Kosovo health 
system and the subsequent establishment of the parallel Albanian "Mother Theresa" 
health network during the 1990s. However, as part of its analysis of health refonn in 
Kosovo, the thesis does not analyse the emergence of a parallel Serbian health 
system, the efforts by the international community to integrate Serbs within the 
health system, and the rejection of the Belgrade government of Kosovo refonn 
initiatives or integration into the larger health sector within Kosovo. Because of 
intransigence from Belgrade, the Albanian community, the Albanian staff within the 
health sector, Albanian officials in both the 'co-governing phase' and in the 
provisional institutions of self-government were the primary actors in the health 
refonn effort. The thesis also does not investigate or examine the potential for 
utilizing health interventions as a tool for peacebuilding to bridge the differences 
between the majolity and minority populations. While both are worthy subjects, the 
investigation of these subjects was outside the scope of the dissertation - a focus 
specifically on the efforts of the international community to refonn the health system. 
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which became (unfortunately) almost the exclusive domain of the Albanian 
community. 
VIII. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF BIAS 
The author worked as a donor (for the Canadian International Development 
Agency) and undertook the professional attachment within the Department of Health in 
Kosovo. In both capacities, the author worked closely with representatives of 
multilateral organisations and Kosovo health officials shaping the reform process. The 
author also worked as the head of the office of the International Crisis Group in 
Kosovo, where she followed political developments and wrote a report on the Kosovo 
Department of Health. While this firsthand experience provided the author with 
extremely valuable insight into both the political environment and the health reform 
process, this involvement may have biased this analysis. 
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PART ONE: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
CHAPTER ONE: CONFLICT AND HEALTH REFORM 
As the first step in building a conceptual framework to examine post-conflict 
health reform, this chapter briefly describes the general impact of conflict on 
population health and health systems. The chapter then focuses on efforts to rebuild 
health systems. Health is a critical component of post-conflict interventions. 
International engagement in the health sector ranges from humanitarian assistance, to 
rehabilitation, to full-scale reform of the health system. Although dramatic health 
reforms are attempted, most analysts have focused on the humanitarian and 
rehabilitation elements of post-conflict health assistance. Health reform in post-
conflict settings needs further examination. 
I. THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON HEALTH 
Civil wars have a devastating impact on the civilian popUlation: civilians are 
deliberate targets, social institutions are undermined or destroyed, and the fabric of 
society collapses. Deaths of non-combatants in wars have increased dramatically, and 
millions of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) struggle to flee violence. 
Approximately 5.5 million people died in wars during the first half of the 1990s, with 
deaths falling to approximately three million between 1997 and 2002. Seventy-five 
percent of those killed were civilians-some killed directly, but many more dying from 
disease and malnutrition. 32 Currently there are 25 million IDPs (one-third of whom do 
not receive international assistance) and a global refugee population of eleven to 
twelve million (United Nations Office of the Secretary General, 2005). 
Wars do not just result in heightened civilian deaths and casualties; they also 
undermine the capacity of societies to function. Infrastructure is destroyed, 
devastating livelihoods and increasing impoverishment. Governments disintegrate, 
public services collapse, and a climate of lawlessness and inequity becomes pervasive. 
The impact of conflict on population health is extensive, and includes direct 
casualties from warfare; heightened impoverishment and food shortages leading to 
malnutrition; increased violence against women; heightened incidence of 
communicable diseases, including sexually transmitted infections; an increase in 
mental-health conditions; and a higher level of physical disabilities (Macrae and Zwi, 
32 In the Democratic Republic of Congo, eighty-six percent of civilian deaths were a consequence of 
disease and malnutrition. SONDORP, E. & PATEL P. (2004) The Role of Health Services in Conflict 
Ridden Countries. Journal of Health Services Research and Policy, 9,4-5. 
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1994, Levy and Sidel, 1997, Noji, 1997, International Rescue Committee, 2003, 
Ghobarah et aI., 2003, Sondorp and Zwi, 2002, Macrae, 1995). 
As a result, there is an increased demand for health services, at the same time 
as the capacity of health systems is being systematically undermined. National health 
systems often suffer extensive damage, which compromises their ability to cope with 
the heightened demand for their services. Health facilities are damaged and looted, 
limited resources are available for the provision of public health services, the training 
of health professionals is disrupted, national health programs such as immunisation are 
interrupted, and health clinics have difficulty attracting and retaining staff. Many 
health personnel emigrate or seek higher salaries working for non-governmental 
organisations in the region. Disease surveillance suffers, as data availability is limited 
and institutional capacity to assess existing data is severely weakened (Macrae, 1995, 
Sondorp et aI., 2001, Waters et aI., June 2004). 
Due to the impact of conflict on popUlation health, health interventions are 
central to the effort to stabilize and reform post-conflict states. First, population health 
is one of the first casualties of contemporary conflict, and humanitarian assistance in 
the immediate period following the cessation of hostilities is critical to limiting the loss 
of life. And second, functioning health systems are crucial for human development: to 
protect against the threat of infectious diseases, to provide a basis for economic 
growth, and to ensure that all have the opportunity to contribute to society (Sachs, 
2005). The importance of health is reflected in the fact that three of the eight 
Millennium Development Goals are related to the health sector. 33 
Health interventions are an important component of peacebuilding missions. In 
Kosovo, approximately 80 million Euro was spent on health between 1999 and 2002, 
which represented the second-largest portion of the Kosovo Consolidated Budget 
(UNMIK, 2000, United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo, 2000). In 
Afghanistan, the government requested donors provide one billion USD to rebuild the 
health sector (Waters et aI., June 2004). In the first two years of the intervention in 
Iraq, USAID committed more than 152 million USD to health care initiatives (USAID, 
2005). And in East Timor, the World Bank and WHO planned for 38 million USD to 
be spent on health in four years (Schoor, 2005). These recent interventions 
3J Health related Millennium Development Goals are Goal 4, Reduce Child Mortality, Goal 5, Improve 
Maternal Health, and Goal 6, Combat HIV/ AIDS, malaria and other diseases. 
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demonstrate that health programs have become an integral part of the international 
community's post-conflict interventions. 
A. Three Phases of Post-Conflict Health Programs 
In the post-conflict period, demands on the health system are high. Post-
conflict environments are characterized by a proliferation of donors, multilateral 
organisations, and non-governmental organisations with their own sets of priorities and 
project objectives. There is a significant risk that in the absence of policy planning and 
donor coordination resources will be wasted (Macrae, 1995). 
There are roughly three phases, outlined in Table Two, in the rebuilding of 
health systems at the end of a conflict: humanitarian, rehabilitation, and reform 
(adapted from (Macrae, 1995, Waters et a1., June 2004)). Humanitarian and 
rehabilitation assistance have long been an important component of post-conflict 
peacebuilding missions. The third phase, the effort to reform and modernize the health 
care system, evolved as a result of reflection on the need to take advantage of the post-
conflict environment to improve health systems. Each of these stages is discussed in 
detail below. 
Table Two: Typical Post-Conflict Health Interventions 
Immediate Humanitarian/emergency services 
Addressing threats to popUlation health • provision of medical treatment 
Medium-term 
Ensuring that the health system can 
function at a basic level 
Long-term 
Modernizing the health system 
• ensuring provision of food, clean 
water, and shelter 
• ensuring that humanitarian projects do 
not undermine health system capacity 
• coordination of donor and N GO 
activity to ensure assistance is 
channelled effectively and is 
approQriate 
Rehabilitation 
• repair of infrastructure 
• short-term training programs 
• gathering preliminary data on 
population health 
• development of a longer-term health 
sector strategy to guide rehabilitation 
and reform efforts 
Reform 
• further development of health care 
strategy and implementation of 
reform goals 
• transition to a system focused on 
primary care 
• reform of system of financing 
• human-resource planning 
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1. Focus on Humanitarian Needs 
In the immediate post-conflict environment, refugees and internally displaced 
people rush to return home, often to find their sources of livelihood shattered and 
homes destroyed. Population health is precarious, as supplies of food and potable 
water are often limited, sanitation systems destroyed, and shelter scarce. The priority 
is ensuring that humanitarian needs-food, clean water, sanitation, and shelter-are 
met, and medical services are available. Therefore, the international community 
typically focuses on meeting the humanitarian needs of the popUlation-access to food 
and drinking water, ensuring proper sanitation, and providing shelter. In regions where 
the national health system is not functional, international organisations often provide 
medical care. Careful coordination is necessary to ensure that humanitarian needs are 
covered and the role of key actors involved in humanitarian assistance carefully 
defined (Shuey et aI., 2003). 
While such projects are critically important to reduce threats to population 
health, humanitarian agencies have been criticized for their failure to ensure that 
humanitarian assistance strengthens, rather than undermines, local capacities.34 Too 
often, humanitarian agencies siphon human resources from the local health care 
system. International assistance can work to build parallel structures rather than 
buttressing local ones. 
2. Rehabilitation of Health Systems 
In the medium term, after the situation has stabilized and immediate threats to 
population health have been addressed, efforts tum to the basic rehabilitation of the 
health care system.35 Post-conflict environments are characterized by a multitude of 
donors. Identifying, coordinating, and ultimately regulating the myriad of health care 
providers-international organisations, the national public system, as well as private 
providers-that emerge during a conflict makes this phase particularly challenging. 
As part of the effort to restore essential health services, projects to repair 
infrastructure, train local medical staff, and gather basic data on population health are 
undertaken. Coordination and planning become crucial to ensure the sustainability of 
the international community's efforts. As agencies prepare to rebuild health care 
34 See the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative http://www .reliefweb.int/ghd/ 
-'5 The ability of the international community to undertake rehabilitation projects depends on the stability 
of the post-conflict environment, which often varies regionally. 
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infrastructure, they must be careful to ensure that the infrastructure in place prior to the 
conflict was appropriate (Macrae, 1995). Facility planning must take into 
consideration population movements after the conflict, including the influx of 
individuals to cities (Schoor, 2005). Extraordinary resources are required to refurbish 
and reequip health care facilities, and train health care workers. Unless the local 
government assumes as much of these expenditures as possible, sustainability and 
ownership are undermined (Macrae, 1995, Waters et aI., June 2004, Sondorp and Zwi, 
2002). 
Recovery after extensive destruction may offer a unique chance to reconsider 
the whole health sector and plan it on a comprehensive, rational basis. In many 
instances, large amounts of capital become frequently available to address 
major allocative distortions; the atmosphere of change may reduce resistance 
aimed at preserving the status quo; massive destruction and dilapidation make 
the abandonment of unwanted facilities easier. Thus building an equitable and 
sustainable (in the long-term) health system may become a realistic target. A 
country emerging from a prolonged crisis cannot afford to miss that chance 
(Pavignani, 2005). 
To help ensure that agencies build, rather than undermine, long-term 
sustainability, analysts recommend that the local government and international 
organisations develop an articulated national health policy strategy to better manage 
and coordinate donor and national level resources (Waters et aI., June 2004, Macrae, 
1995). Such a strategy should be based on rudimentary assessments of health status as 
well as available levels of financing to ensure that health investments address key 
determinants of population health, and that available resources are efficiently 
allocated. This policy process would promote an evidence-based policy debate, even 
at a rudimentary level, and would help build consensus for rehabilitation goals (Waters 
et aI., June 2004, Macrae, 1995, Pavignani, 2005, Sondorp and Zwi, 2002). 
When undertaking rehabilitation projects, a tension exists between the need for 
quick results and the limitations to the capacity of post-conflict governments. One 
analyst described the rebuilding of the health sector in East Timor: "It took time for 
those assisting to understand that the post-conflict development process needed to be 
slowed down so that the East Timorese could grasp the basics in setting up and running 
a country" (Schoor, 2005). Some argue undertaking longer-term policy planning in the 
rehabilitation phase would ensure that the government is strengthened rather than 
undermined by international organisations undertaking vertical programs (Waters et 
aI., June 2004). 
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In order to increase capacity for planning and management in the health sector 
in the long-term it will therefore be important to work with national civil 
servants and health professionals in order to increase the skills base in the 
country. In the transitional period, it will be important to work with civil 
servants, health professionals and community representatives to develop 
consensus on directions for health policy for the future (Macrae, 1995). 
3. Pressure for Reform of Health Systems 
Humanitarian projects and basic rehabilitation of the health sector are 
characteristic of many post-conflict settings. Health programs in post-conflict Uganda, 
Mozambique, and Cambodia focused on the primary care system - the reconstruction 
of health facilities including right-sizing facility numbers, expanding health service 
provision, and upgrading the skills of health professionals (Pavignani, 2005). 
However, as the peacebuilding objectives of the international community have become 
more ambitious, so have the goals of the international community in the health sector. 
As outlined below, post-conflict interventions are seen as a window of opportunity to 
reform public institutions so as to build the foundation for a more peaceful society. 
This reform effort includes the health system. 
One examination of health projects in post-conflict East Timor makes the 
observation that the activities in the health sector were really development activities, 
implemented in an environment with an emergency mindset. The key personnel 
working on health projects had their main experience in humanitarian response, rather 
than health sector reform; donors dispensed large sums of money, had short time 
horizons, and demanded quick results; and a series of independent projects risked 
undermining a sector-wide approach (Tulloch et aI., 2003). 
In the post-conflict period, the demands on health systems are staggering. 
They must meet the health care needs of the population, while undertaking 
rehabilitation and planning for reform. Unfortunately, these demands come at a time 
when the capacity for policy development and the ability of the health system to 
implement reform efforts is low. Moreover, the legitimacy of transitional governments 
may be questioned by some segments of society-a legacy of years of conflict-and 
their ability to undertake reform undermined (Macrae, 1995, Waters et aI., June 2004, 
Schoor, 2005). 
II. SUMMARY: KEy FACTORS EMERGING FROM LITERATURE 
Analysis of health programs in these environments has largely been limited to 
assessments of humanitarian and rehabilitation efforts, and prescriptions for planning 
reform initiatives. Analysts have emphasized the importance of coordination, ensuring 
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local capacities are built rather than undermined, and developing a longer-term health 
strategy in the humanitarian and rehabilitation phases to ensure that critical resources 
are channelled to build the capacity of a more efficient and effective health system 
(Sondorp and Zwi, 2002). While analysis of the post-conflict period emphasises the 
need for a clear health policy framework to be developed, the potential difficulties and 
pitfalls of the health policy process have not been highlighted. 
Figure Two highlights the three forces impacting on the health reform process 
in a post-conflict setting (where the international community has a significant degree 
of input and control) which will inform the development of the conceptual framework 
for the analysis of health reform. First, the tremendous influx of donor resources, the 
need for careful coordination of the activities of donors and non-governmental 
organisations, and the need for these interventions to be sustainable creates pressure to 
have a blueprint outlining how health systems should be developed. Second, specific 
health interventions are favoured, particularly the movement towards a primary care 
based system. And third, the health needs of the population and the state of the health 
infrastructure shape international interventions and the scope of reforms. 
Figure Two: Forces Leading to Post-Conflict Health Reform 
External Political 
Pressures for Reform 
• Influx of donor 
resources 
• Need for coordination 
• Sustainability of health 
interventions 
External Pressures for 
Particular Health Reform 
Measures 
• Prima Care Focus 
Health Context 
• Health Needs of 
Population 
• Health infrastructure 
in need of 
rehabilitation 
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III. WHAT Is HEALTH REFORM? 
The pressures in a post-conflict environment that lead to health refonn-poor 
health status, disrupted health care delivery, and neglected and debilitated 
infrastructure-are clear. Health sector refonn is a broad concept that can include 
many different initiatives to change the way that health systems operate. Health 
refonn is best described as "sustained, purposive change to improve the efficiency, 
equity, and effectiveness of the health sector with the goal of improving health status, 
obtaining greater equity, and obtaining greater cost-effectiveness for services 
provided" (Basch, 1999). Other authors echo this definition (Mills et ai., 2001, Roberts 
et aI., 2004). Refonns differ in two fundamental ways: the number of aspects of the 
health system that are changed, and how radically the changes depart from past 
practise. For refonns to be successful, interdependent and mutually supporting 
interventions must be introduced (Roberts et aI., 2004). 
For states that are not emerging from conflict, there are three distinct sets of 
pressures to undertake health sector refonn (Figueras et aI., 1998). First, refonns often 
have the objective of targeting health interventions to improve population health. 
Second, problems within the health sector-such as escalating costs or poor quality of 
services-force governments and health service providers to rethink the way in which 
health services are delivered. International comparisons have demonstrated that in 
some countries population health is lower than anticipated given available resources 
and technologies. To understand the reasons for this discrepancy, analysts have 
examined the organisation of health care services, the cost-effectiveness of health care 
interventions, the appropriateness of clinical procedures, the quality of services 
delivered, and equitable access to those services (Figueras et aI., 1998, Basch, 1999). 
Refonn measures are based on this analysis. 
And third, economic and political forces outside the health sector also 
contribute to health sector refonn. Popular expectations for health care provision 
fuelled by technological advances are often incongruent with available financial 
resources for health care. The resulting economic pressure to control exploding health 
care costs prompts health refonn initiatives (Figueras et aI., 1998). Policy transference 
can also be a factor in the refonn process, with pressures to implement health measures 
successful in other countries. Countries hoping to accede to the European Union are 
encouraged to reduce public spending, and implement primary care based systems 
(Figueras et aI., 1998). Refonns also have resulted from efforts by the International 
Monetary Fund to address acute financial crises in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. 
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Regional or multilateral agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) can 
also exert influence in the health reform process. In particular, WHO's emphasis on 
primary care has influenced reform agendas throughout the world. 
The goal of health reform is to improve health status and improve the 
performance of the health system by increasing access to health care, enhancing the 
quality of that care, and improving the efficiency of the system (Roberts et aI., 2004). 
Public health experts argue that to achieve these objectives the reform program 
requires clear goals; an accurate diagnosis of problems within the health sector; a 
reform plan developed with the participation of key stakeholders and focused on the 
problems of implementation; and evaluation systems built into the reform process to 
learn from and correct mistakes (Roberts et aI., 2004). To achieve the objectives of 
health reform, reformers have five mechanisms (or' control knobs ') through which 
they can enact change. 
• alterations to the design of financing systems; 
• the adjustment of payments to health care providers and facilities to create 
incentives for change; 
• the organisation of the system-i.e. the mix of providers and their roles and 
functions; 
• the implementation of regulations to support the reform process; and 
• influencing individual behaviour (Roberts et aI., 2004). 
These various reform elements are briefly outlined below. 
A. The Design of Financing Systems 
Financing systems mobilize funds and direct them to particular health-sector 
activities. There are five basic funding mechanisms to support fmancing systems: 
general revenue, social insurance systems, private insurance, direct payments by 
patients, and community financing. The type of funding mechanism that is employed 
determines the origins of that money, the amount of money that is available, the entity 
that controls the funds (private versus public), the ability of the system to manage 
health care costs, how risks are shared, and the inclusiveness of the system-who 
receives health care coverage and for what services. Financing systems often employ a 
combination of these mechanisms. Once funds are mobilized, decisions then should be 
made about how resources are allocated (Roberts et aI., 2004). 
B. Adjusting Payments 
The payment system comprises the methods through which mobilized funds are 
dispersed. The entity that controls the funds makes decisions about the type of health 
care activities to fund, the organisations that will receive funding for these activities, 
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how much they will be paid, and how those payments will be made. Adjusting the 
manner in which organisations receive payments can introduce financial incentives for 
organisational and behavioural change, critical to support reform objectives and 
improve the efficiency and efficacy of the system (Roberts et aI., 2004). 
C. The Organisation of the Health System 
Health reform activities can focus on four characteristics of the health care 
system: the organisations that provide health care, the division of health care services 
among these organisations, the interactions among these organisations, and the 
administrative structure of these organisations. Reforms can focus on all of these 
elements, and common reform initiatives include decentralisation and the transition to 
a primary care based system (Roberts et aI., 2004). 
D. Regulations to Support the Reform Process 
Regulations refer to the full range of legal instruments set and implemented by 
governments to support other elements of the reform agenda. Both the health care 
sector and the health insurance system are the subjects of legal and regulatory 
frameworks, ensuring that the basic conditions are in place for health care systems to 
operate, that the regulatory environment supports the objectives of the health care 
system (ensuring equitable access), corrects for market failures, and provides 
protection from poor quality (Roberts et aI., 2004). 
E. Influencing Individual Behaviour 
Changes in human behaviour can have a profound impact on health system 
performance. Interventions can focus on addressing lifestyle and prevention 
behaviour, treatment-seeking and patient compliance behaviours, as well as the 
behaviour of health professionals (i.e. to be more client-oriented) (Roberts et aI., 
2004). 
F. Evaluating Health Care Reform 
While the objectives of health reform are clear-improving population health 
and the efficacy of health systems-reform analysts have spent less time on how to 
measure and evaluate the success of reform. Roberts et a1. recommend three 
approaches: measuring changes in health status, determining the level of citizen 
satisfaction, and the level of financial risk protection provided to the public (Roberts et 
aI., 2004). 
In post-conflict environments, these evaluation tools may not be effective. 
Evaluating health reform based on changes in population health can be problematic. 
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Valid and reliable data is difficult to obtain in post-conflict environments, and many 
external socio-economic and political factors impact on health status. Moreover, 
depending on the key health problems facing a society, an improvement in the health 
system may not immediately impact and improve health status.36 Measurements of the 
satisfaction of the public with the health system may be confounded by the difficult 
social and economic conditions characteristic of post-conflict environments. The level 
of financial risk protection would also be impacted by the post-conflict social and 
economic conditions. 
The other possibilities for evaluation of health reforms include an assessment 
of the performance of the health system through financial and management data, and 
determining the degree to which the reforms have been implemented. Management 
data needed to assess improved performance of the health system can also be difficult 
to obtain, as this data is also obtained through functioning health information systems. 
Therefore, the one feasible option for evaluation in post-conflict societies is to 
determine the success in implementing reform measures: to what degree were 
reformers successful in establishing the various programmes outlined by health reform. 
IV. SUMMARY: KEy FACTORS EMERGING FROM LITERATURE 
Figure Three summarizes the key factors that emerged from the key literature 
on health reform which inform the conceptual framework to analyse post-conflict 
health reform. Problems within the health care system such as high costs, poor 
performance, and poor infrastructure combine with concerns regarding health status 
and external pressure for reform. Reform measures tend to be composed of 
interventions focusing on financing, payments, organisation of the system, regulations, 
or behavioural changes. And the objective of reform is improved population health 
and improved health system performance (improving public satisfaction and expanding 
risk protection). 
36 High rates of morbidity and mortality from communicable diseases characteristic of humanitarian 
emergencies can, under the right circumstances be reduced quite quickly. However, dramatic health 
improvements in populations with lower morbidity and mortality, with a high burden of non-
communicable diseases can be more challenging. 
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Figure Three: The Basic Health Reform Process 
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While the literature on health refonn describes the pressures for refonn and the 
refonn measures typically implemented and provides another important building block 
in our conceptual framework, it assumes that a strong and capable government exists 
and that the health system is already functioning at a sufficient level to generate health 
and management infonnation. While the literature does mention the challenge of 
implementation, it does not address sufficiently the key obstacles in the 
implementation process such as the challenge of implementing health refonn in an 
environment with low government capacity, damaged infrastructure, dispersed human 
resources, and a difficult socio-economic context. To better understand the challenges 
associated with this type of environment, Chapter Two examines the challenges faced 
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in implementing the health reform process in Central and Eastern Europe, with the 
objective of further developing the conceptual framework for post-conflict health 
reform. 
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CHAPTER TWO: HEALTH REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE 
The countries in Central and South Eastern Europe have witnessed dramatic 
social, political, and economic changes over the past fifteen years. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall precipitated the relatively peaceful collapse of communism throughout the 
region. Post-communist governments allowed political parties to form and hold 
democratic elections. Market-oriented reforms were initiated in formerly state-
controlled economies. People and ideas began to flow freely into the region. These 
sweeping changes included a radical restructuring of health care systems, with most 
countries implementing similar reforms of their health systems. 
The health reform effort in Kosovo was similar in scope to health reform 
programs implemented across Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. Moreover, the health system prior to the conflict in Kosovo and the health 
system prior to the reform effort in Central and Eastern Europe were similar. This 
chapter outlines these reform programs with the view to building the conceptual 
framework to analyse health reform in Kosovo. It begins by describing the context for 
health reform, including problems faced by the pre-transition system and political and 
economic pressures for reform. It then examines the reform program, assesses its 
impact, and outlines the factors that have undermined the reform process. Supporting 
information detailing the nature of the reform program in Central and Eastern Europe 
is contained in Appendix One. 
I. CONTEXT OF REFORMS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
Much of the literature on health reform focuses on the type and sequencing of 
reform measures, arguing for evidence based interventions that are appropriately 
controlled and sequenced. The literature assumes a functioning government, a stable 
political environment, and reform measures that have originated-at least in part-
from stakeholders within society. Little analysis is made of the implementation of 
health reform, particularly in difficult settings. The health reform experience in 
Central and Eastern Europe can add to the conceptual framework by outlining the 
pitfalls encountered during the implementation of reforms in a politically charged 
environment. 
Pressure for health reform in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe began 
after countries in the region began to liberalize their economies. The refOlms 
implemented across the region were largely similar - a reorientation to primary care, 
reforming the role of secondary and tertiary care, strengthening the public health 
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system, decentralization, and financing reforms. Both problems with the health system 
as well as political and economic forces outside the health sector drove health system 
changes. The forces driving reform, the reform measures implemented, and the 
successes and failures of the reform program are outlined in detail in Appendix One. 
As detailed, all countries throughout the region struggled with the reform process, 
particularly with the effort to transition from a specialized to a primary care based 
system and to reform the financing of health care. 
II. FACTORS UNDERMINING REFORM: 
The reform program has not been fully implemented in most countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Many reform programs were derailed by factors external 
to the health system and problems with the reform program itself. While significant 
regional variation existed, there were general trends. Table Three presents the key 
problems associated with reforms and identifies the factors that undermined the 
implementation of reforms. These factors are then explained in detail below. 
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Table Three: K~ Findings from Health Reform in Central and Eastern Eur~e 
Package of Key Problems 
Reform Measures 
Re1~,,-ming the O,.ganisation of the System 
S".engthening ,. Specialists and public alike have resisted changes 
PrImary Care • Gatekeeping function not working: patients bypass I. 
• 
Reform of 
Secondary and 
Tertiary Care 
Strengthening 
Public Health 
primary care based system, or are referred to 
secondary care for problems easily treated at 
primary care level 
• 
• 
• 
• • Referral system does not function well: patients 
returning from hospital do not have follow-up from I • 
primary care doctors 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
While hospitals have been closed, in those that I • 
remain open, the occupancy rate is quite high I • 
Focus of reforms on primary care has meant I • 
important quality issues at the secondary level have I • 
been ignored I • 
Specialist care and hospitalisation pose significant 
financial burden as under-the-table payments are 
frequently demanded 
Public health systems continue to emphasize 
vertical programs like immunisation rather than 
prevention of diseases and injuries 
Unable to respond to significant public health 
challenges exacerbated by transition to liberal 
democracy (alcoholism, substance abuse, 
malnutrition, homicide, suicide, preventable 
injuries) 
Lack of attention to preventable childhood injuries 
• 
• 
• 
• 
L- . extremely problematic 
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Factors Affecting Implementation 
Lack of financial resources (economic instability) 
Lack of political will 
In Albania and Balkans, political instability 
Pace of change too fast 
Poor policy planning 
Financing failures 
Failure to establish effective primary/secondary 
care interface 
Human resource problems-inappropriately trained 
doctors, lack of support for family medicine. 
Lack of financial resources (economic instability) 
Pace of change too fast 
Poor policy planning 
Financing failures 
Failure to establish effective primary/secondary 
care interface 
Unhealthy lifestyles 
Poor policy planning 
Financing failures 
Weak data collection 
Package of Key Problems Factors Affecting Implementation 
Reform Measures 
• Rise of drug resistant strains of tuberculosis 
Human Resources • Training programs in family medicine have not • Poor policy planning 
and Quality of significantly changed the bias against primary care • Weak capacity Care • Little incentive to put clinical guidelines, if • Financing failures 
produced, into practise • Weak data collection 
• Few incentives to change behaviour at patient-
practitioner level 
• Emigration is causing 'brain drain' in some 
countries 
Decentralisation • In some regions, inadequate resources as rich areas • Lack of political will 
are reluctant to allocate resources to poorer areas • Poor policy planning 
• Decentralisation took place only on paper, as • Weak capacity 
capacity did not exist locally to manage resources • Financing failures 
I 
Reforming Financing and Payments 
Health Care • Social insurance schemes suffer from a narrow • Lack of financial resources (economic instability) 
Financing revenue base, with many countries experiencing • Poor policy planning 
high levels of unemployment and low formal • Financing failures 
labour-market activity • Weak data collection 
• Rise in informal payments has generated inequity • Low capacity 
• Private practise often unregulated and siphons 
resources away from public system 
• Inability to identify publicly funded health benefits 
package 
• Effort to set up performance based systems 
inadvertently established perverse incentives to 
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• Contracting undermined by weak data and low 
technical and management cal~aci!Y 
Behaviour 
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A. External Factors Undermining Reform 
1. Economic Instability 
For most of Central and South Eastern Europe, a period of severe economic 
turmoil accompanied the transition to a market economy. Tight fiscal reform policies 
were introduced, economic productivity plummeted, and massive layoffs ensued 
causing high unemployment rates. Price and wage liberalisation led to inflation, as 
well as a widening gap in income distribution. Privatisation of state enterprises often 
resulted in the pillaging of assets, rather than investment in competitive enterprise. A 
breakdown in the distribution system caused supply shortages. Crumbling 
infrastructure also created a disincentive for investment (Kanavos and McKee, 1998, 
Basch, 1999). 
After 1989, the economies of countries in South Eastern Europe suffered 
greatly from this transition as well from instability in the former Yugoslavia. A 
comparison ofGDP in 1989 to GDP in 2000, as outlined in Table Four, demonstrates 
how the economic fortunes of the region fell during the 1990s. 
T bl F a e our: R I GDp· 2000 P ea 10 as t ercen a2e 0 fV I . 1989 a uem 
Country Real GDP in 2000 as % of 
value in 1989 
Albania 101.7 % 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 35 % (in 2001 compared to 
1990) 
Bulgaria 69.6% 
Croatia 80.4 % 
Macedonia 77.4 % 
Moldova 30.6% 
Romania 76.8 % 
Serbia and Montenegro 41.6 % 
ED average 156 % 
Source: (Rechel and McKee, 2003). 
This economic instability placed an extra burden on the health reform process. 
While the costs of health care increased after 1989, because the economy was so weak 
governments were unable to increase their health spending. Capital investments in 
health centres decreased. Hospitals were old and poorly equipped, and capital 
expenditures were unable to support existing facilities or introduce new technology 
(Hinkov et aI., 1999, Kanavos and McKee, 1998). 
Due to resource shortages, many primary care health facilities lacked basic 
drugs and equipment was old and poorly maintained (Ensor. 1993). This financial 
strain slowed and in some cases stalled the implementation of health reforms, and 
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provided impetus for an informal market in health services (Figueras et aI., 2000). In 
Albania, for example, health care spending remained too low to provide quality care 
and make the necessary investments in facility infrastructure and equipment. Total 
spending on health care is approximately only three percent of GDP (Tragakes, 2003). 
2. Unhealthy Lifestyles 
As outlined above, health reforms were introduced to improve the efficiency, 
equity, and effectiveness of the health sector with the objective of improving health 
status, obtaining greater equity, and greater cost-effectiveness (Basch, 1999). The 
focus on health status in the reform program was important. Poor popUlation health 
undermines economic development, and health systems exist to respond to the burden 
of disease in a popUlation (McKee, 2004). 
One of the objectives of reform was to improve health status, but reformers did 
little to implement behavioural change. Efforts to improve population health were 
often undermined by factors outside the health system. Abuse of alcohol, poor diet, 
smoking, narcotics use, and deaths from injury and homicide were key health issues in 
the region (McKee, 2004). Altering individual lifestyles, particularly in a context of 
the turmoil resulting from political transition, is far more challenging than reorganizing 
the health care system (Saltman and Figueras, 1997). Health services can only have a 
limited impact on the causes of ill health (Saltman and Figueras, 1997, Nuri and Healy, 
1999, Hinkov et aI., 1999, Gaal et aI., 1999, Karski et aI., 1999). While these lifestyle 
factors derailed many health benefits from the restructuring of health systems, the 
reform program generally placed too little emphasis on changing individual patterns of 
behaviour. 
3. Lack of Government Capacity: Political Will 
Strong political commitment is required to develop and implement reforms. 
Changes proposed by the reform process were resisted for a variety of reasons. First, 
the status quo is comfortable, and organisational change will always be resisted by 
certain elements within the health care system. Second, reforms threatened embedded 
interests, including the authority and power of state agencies. Ministry officials were 
often corrupt and were reluctant to give up their rent-seeking opportunities (Mills, 
2000, Mills et aI., 2001, Figueras et aI., 2000). Strong commitment from politicians 
was necessary to overcome resistance from these embedded interests. And third. wider 
commitment from the public service was necessary. Ministries of health were part of 
government and did not have the authority to introduce new accounting systems, hire 
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and fire personnel, increase fee levels, or change funding arrangements. Reforms in 
the health sector therefore required overarching reforms within the public sector 
(Figueras et aI., 2000, Mills et aI., 2001). 
Yet political commitment for these reforms was difficult to secure. As seen 
below, the long-term horizon of health reform implementation was at odds with the 
short-term vision of politicians. 
4. Lack of Government Capacity: Political Instability 
The region has been characterized by political instability. The political cycle of 
elections impeded the progress of reforms in many countries in Eastern Europe. 
Therefore, the support of politicians for health reform was not constant. Strong 
supporters of health reform were either voted out of office, or quickly lost their 
appetite for change. In Bulgaria, although health reforms were initiated early on in the 
transition process, the lack of political will for change meant that reforms were not 
implemented until the late 1990s (Koulaksazov et aI., 2003). Frequent turnovers in 
government have been problematic for the consistency and continuity of the reform 
process. Often such changes meant that civil servants at all levels of the policy process 
were fired, undermining the administrative capacity to implement change and 
politicizing the civil service (Nuri and Healy, 1999, Gaal et aI., 1999, Goicoechea, 
1993, Rathwell, 1998). 
Frequent political turnovers undermined initial reform efforts, particularly in 
countries where national-level stakeholders strongly resisted reform measures 
(Figueras et aI., 2004). In Albania, Poland, and Bulgaria, among others, turnovers in 
government have stalled reform progress, halting important reform efforts such as 
decentralisation, regulation of private practice, and stamping out corruption. In 
Hungary, for example, there were nine health ministers from 1999 until 2004. Each 
minister created new reform objectives, and often changed critical staff in health care 
organisations (Szocska et aI., 2005). This lack of political will to support reform 
became a major impediment to health reform and, as a result, change was introduced 
very slowly, if at all (Figueras et aI., 2004). 
While some countries experienced instability in the political arena, civil unrest 
in other countries undermined the reform effort. In Albania, civil unrest in the 1990s 
impeded the implementation of many of its reform measures. Almost a quarter of 
health centres in Tirana and one-third of village health centres were destroyed in the 
civil unrest of 1991 and 1992. In 1997, further unrest resulted in the looting of drugs 
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and equipment. Instability in neighbouring Kosovo and the influx of refugees further 
strained the delivery capacity of primary care health care services (Nuri and Healy, 
1999, Tragakes, 2003). 
5. Lack of Governance Capacity: Weak Administrative Capacity 
Reform programs required strong government administrations, which were 
willing and able to recognize their 'stewardship' role in the health sector (WHO, 
2000b ). Yet governments throughout the region are characterized by weak 
administrative capacity. As part of the overall reform process, entire government 
administrations were fundamentally restructured throughout the region. Ministries of 
health were reorganized to reflect the changing responsibilities of the government in 
the health sector. Reforms, including the decentralisation of responsibility for primary 
care and the division of the purchaser and provider functions, often reduced the role of 
the central government to regulation and monitoring. 
The restructuring of health care administrations reduced the capacity of the 
state to manage the reform process. The goals and objectives of reform were rarely 
defined, as health ministries were stretched by multiple demands to manage the 
administration of the health system while simultaneously reforming it. There was a 
rapid turnover of public-sector personnel with the best people leaving for better-paid 
jobs in the private sector or with international agencies, or emigrating abroad (Figueras 
et aI., 2000, Mills et aI., 2001). This undermined the ability of the state to monitor the 
reforms. Key financial, management, and information systems remained 
underdeveloped. And the technical skills required to interpret the health and financial 
information that did exist were lacking (Figueras et aI., 2000, Mills et aI., 2001, 
Figueras et aI., 2004). 
The analysis of experience in the region shows that the introduction of reforms 
succeeds only when they are accompanied by strong regulatory, managerial, 
and information capacity, which is often lacking in countries. In other words, 
if the stewardship role of the government is weak, regardless of the merits or 
otherwise of particular reform models, they may lead to catastrophic results for 
the society (Figueras et aI., 2004). 
This lack of capacity was particularly true at the local level. Given the 
emphasis on decentralisation as part of the reform package and the implementation of 
primary care at the municipal level, the lack of local administrative capacity was 
extremely problematic for the implementation of the transition to primary care (Nuri 
and Healy, 1999, Hinkov et aI., 1999, Gaal et aI., 1999). The failure to address 
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informal payments, widespread in primary and secondary care settings, is one example 
of how this weak capacity impacted on reform objectives.(Figueras et aI., 2004). 
Donors inadvertently contributed to problems of weak capacity. Mechanisms 
for planning and monitoring assistance diverted government capacity away from 
reform planning and implementation to aid management. Despite the emphasis of 
donors on capacity development, most donors establish their own independent 
enclaves for project implementation rather than building capacity in the system more 
broadly (Mills et aI., 2001). 
Pressures external to health ministries also reduced their capacity. These 
factors included the cultural legacy of socialism where individual initiative was stifled 
and corruption was entrenched. External constraints should have been better 
understood and incorporated into health reform packages, with the understanding that 
certain reforms were not feasible or desirable in the short term (Bennett, 2000, Mills et 
aI., 2001). 
Capacity building is by its nature incremental and slow. Therefore, reform 
objectives should incorporate long timeframes and realistic objectives before 
significant results can be achieved (Bennett, 2000, Mills et aI., 2001, Walt, 1998). 
Above, the thesis examined the external social, political, and economic factors 
that undermined the reform process. Below, the thesis examines factors internal to 
reforms-the implementation of the reform measures-that impacted on the success of 
the reform program. 
B. The Implementation of Reform Efforts 
1. Pace of Change: Too Much Change, Too Fast 
Many advocates of reform argued that the collapse of communism offered an 
important opportunity for introducing new, modem health systems. This was a period 
of intense political and social transformation. Stakeholders with an interest in blocking 
reform had lost their political base of support. Donor investment to support the 
reforms was readily available. And progressive members of the medical community 
and the public supported the modernisation of the health system. Reformers argued 
that to be successful changes to the health system should be introduced as quickly and 
completely as possible, while these facilitating conditions existed. 
As a result, health reforms were introduced very quickly-and, in some 
contexts, too quickly. As one analyst noted: 
Rapid 'big bang' reforms such as in the Czech Republic were effective in 
bringing about change in a short time. However, experience shows that for this 
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to be sustainable and effective in the long term, two prerequisites are crucial: a 
degree of technical 'certainty' as regards the reform model to be introduced, 
and a broad social consensus behind the chosen model. The lack of either one 
of these in some countries that undelWent a 'big bang' reform has resulted in 
major reversals (Figueras et aI., 2004). 
As seen above, reform depends on factors outside the health system such as political 
will and stability, the macro-economic situation, and governance capacity (Figueras et 
aI., 2000). The post-communism period did create a window of opportunity for 
reform, however, the ensuing economic crisis and frequent changes in government that 
occurred in many countries throughout the region weakened government capacity to 
plan for and implement change (Mills et aI., 2001). 
A rapid pace of change is difficult to sustain. While incremental approaches to 
reform allow stakeholders to organize resistance to policy changes, it may be more 
sustainable than radical 'big bang' reform (Figueras et aI., 2004). Incremental change 
facilitates buy-in from stakeholders, and the implementation process is easier to 
manage. Reform programs are most successful when reform measures match the 
knowledge, technology, and resources that already exist in the system, and when the 
change from the status quo is relatively marginal (Walt, 1998). Albania has pursued a 
slow pace of change in financing and organisational reforms, and as a result some 
stability has been preserved (Tragakes, 2003). 
2. Poor Policy Planning 
Reforming the health sector is a difficult process. The health care system is 
complex, composed of heterogeneous actors, and prone to market failure. Reform 
measures often change the role of government from direct provision to regulation and 
enforcement. The process of reform subsequently becomes more complex as the 
government must create incentives for actors outside government to implement the 
reforms (Mills et aI., 2001). 
Many well-intentioned health reforms have exacerbated inefficiencies and 
inequities (Frenk, 2000). As seen above, financing reforms in Central and Eastern 
Europe inadvertently created incentives for physicians to refer patients up to the 
secondary level, when treatment could have been provided at the primary care level. 
In addition, the poor economic situation and the lack of oversight meant that under-
the-table payments for medical services and pharmaceuticals became prevalent, 
undermining equity of access. 
Reforms therefore need to be carefully designed and the implementation 
process planned to avoid such problems. Health reform efforts have largely focused 
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on the technical features of reform policies such as the 'best' method of health care 
financing, the advantages of a system focused on primary care, and the introduction of 
family medicine (Figueras et aI., 2000, Walt, 1998). Although reforms may be 
technically brilliant, their implementation could be difficult or impossible due to 
political, social, and economic realities (Mills et aI., 2001). Planning for the 
implementation of the reform program is a critical yet often omitted step that increases 
the risk of reform failure. 
In designing the reform program, a number of factors need to be taken into 
account. The prior health system and its capabilities, political realities such as multi-
party or coalition governments, the technical complexity of reforms, and the 
interrelationship among different reform elements should be part of the planning 
process (Mills et aI., 2001). Implementers must assess macroeconomic and other 
resource constraints, culture and values, and available technical skills (Figueras et aI., 
2000, Walt, 1998). 
After such an assessment, an implementation strategy should be developed 
which makes reform objectives explicit; establishes management structures; allocates 
responsibility for implementation; assesses available financial, technical, and 
managerial resources; puts in place appropriate information and management systems; 
and develops and enacts enabling legislation for reform (Figueras et aI., 2000, Figueras 
et aI., 2004). 
However, the critical step of implementation planning is rarely undertaken. 
Donors, international organisations, and national policy elites often drive the reform 
process and lack sensitivity to issues that will impede implementation. Civil society, 
such as non-governmental organisations and the media, is rarely consulted on the 
nature of reforms. If they are consulted, such groups are asked to rubber-stamp 
readymade reform programs, rather than contribute to the development of reform 
measures. 
The issue of local ownership of reforms is critical. Too often, reforms were 
developed in western countries and transferred to the region, rather than reflecting the 
local social and historical context (Figueras et aI., 2004). "Unless health sector reform 
strategies are capable of rooting themselves in national cultural 'soil,' they are not 
likely to produce the expected outcomes or to be sustainable over the medium to the 
long term" (Figueras et aI., 2000). 
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As a result of the lack of local consultation, policy makers often ignored 
contextual factors that undermined the reform process, including the legacy of the past 
system, the unrealistic timeframes for reform, and the wider public sector and 
government context. 
Health systems in Central and Eastern Europe were traditionally highly 
centralised, and the informal values, norms and conventions that constituted the 
management culture of these bureaucracies also tended to be centralised. Refonns 
threatened key stakeholders such as politicians, health workers, and health service 
users, yet these were typically the individuals who were expected to carry them out 
(Bennett, 2000, Mills et al., 2001, Walt, 1998). 
This system did not facilitate change, let alone far-reaching refonns. 
Therefore, implementing refonn in such an environment was extremely difficult. 
Many of the difficulties experienced [in implementing refonns] have had more 
to do with the complexity of changing customs and practices than the actual 
content of the reform programmes, and to a significant extent the success or 
failure of refonn has depended on the ability of policy-makers to implement 
and manage change (Figueras et al., 2004). 
To be successful, reforms should have been less ambitious, maintained existing 
structures, and focused on high-priority health issues (Figueras et al., 2004). 
3. Financing Failures 
Health reform efforts were also derailed by a shortage of funds. Because of the 
poor state of the economy and pressure from international organisations such as the 
W orId Bank and the IMF to rein in public spending, governments were reluctant and 
unable to increase dramatically the resources channelled to the health sector. 
Therefore, the refonn program focused on efforts to increase the cost-effectiveness of 
health care services. As outlined above, refonns included efforts to split the purchaser 
and provider functions through the creation of social insurance agencies, but these 
refonns faltered. 
In Albania, health care expenditure was only three percent of GDP in 2000, so 
the government was encouraged to increase health expenditure to meet refonn 
objectives (Tragakes, 2003). However, Albania like most other governments could not 
afford to increase resources to the health sector and therefore worked on refonns to 
make services more cost-effective. Large segments of the population are not yet 
making financial contributions to the health insurance scheme, but are making out-of-
pocket payments for phannaceuticals and services, which have reduced access for 
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lower-income groups (Tragakes, 2003). Money is available-the willingness exists to 
pay for services-but that money is not being channelled into the health system. 
Attempts to split the purchaser and provider functions were problematic due to 
inadequate and unpredictable funding, low provider autonomy, absence of information 
systems, lack of timely information and sparse technical capacity and information 
management skills (Figueras et aI., 2004). In addition, for the purchaser/provider split 
to work properly, the technical and administrative capacity of purchasers must be high 
and they must have access to information and monitoring systems (Figueras et aI., 
2004). Throughout much of Central and Eastern Europe these conditions did not exist. 
Governments throughout the region also pursued efforts to promote cost-
sharing through market incentives such as competition amongst insurers. However, 
such efforts undermined universal access (Figueras et aI., 1998), particularly when 
coupled with the failure to identify a realistic benefits package. Defining such a 
package is a critical step in the effort to balance concerns about equity with limiting 
entitlements so public revenue is spent on cost-effective interventions (Figueras et aI., 
2004). 
4. Lack of Enthusiasm for Organisational Change 
Family medicine, considered a cornerstone of primary care, was a new concept 
for the region. Given the emphasis placed on specialist training in the pre-transition 
period, the quality of general practitioners tends to be quite low. Therefore many 
patients historically have bypassed the 'gatekeeper' role of general practitioners or 
family doctors and have gone straight to specialists (Ensor, 1993, Bladescu et aI., 
2000). Patients resisted primary care reforms and the appropriate point of first contact 
was often contested (Hinkov et aI., 1999). In Bulgaria, because of long waiting times, 
poor quality of services, and excessive cost sharing, polls show that much of the 
population objects to primary care reforms (Koulaksazov et aI., 2003). 
The medical profession also resisted the concept of family medicine; it became 
difficult to introduce it as a specialisation. Most medical schools in Central and South 
Eastern Europe introduced training of family doctors only grudgingly (Nuri and Healy, 
1999). 
In many regions, more than one scheme of primary health care services (i.e. 
specialists performing primary health care functions) led to the duplication of services, 
the waste of resources, and the fragmentation of care (Goicoechea, 1993). In Albania, 
specialists often accept under-the-table payments and have little incentive to buttress 
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the primary care system (Tragakes, 2003) For health reforms to be effective, services 
provided at the primary care level must increase, and family doctors need to have the 
authority to direct patients to the most appropriate level of care (Figueras et ai., 2004) 
5. Organisational Changes: Weak Primary-Secondary Care Interface 
While reforms attempted to strengthen primary care, this effort was 
undermined by the traditional strength of the secondary level of care. This tradition 
has made efforts to cut secondary-care services difficult, made establishment of a 
referral system problematic, and undermined the power of primary care professionals. 
Efforts to transfer resources from secondary care to primary care, including 
cutting hospital beds, often undermined population health. In a system where primary 
care services are weak, hospitals are the main providers of health care. Cutting 
resources to secondary care left patients with few other options (Figueras et ai., 2004) 
Moreover, the establishment of a properly functioning referral system, including how 
and when patients are admitted to hospital and when they are discharged, was 
undermined. Primary care professionals were unable to follow up properly on patients 
discharged from hospital because the interface between primary and secondary care 
was undeveloped (Figueras et ai., 2004) 
The interface between primary and secondary care has been difficult to 
establish because primary care professionals lack authority within the system. For 
medical graduates, specialisation is more prestigious than pursuing a career in family 
medicine. Financial incentives to work at the primary care level also do not exist. 
Family doctors are often reluctant to provide treatment themselves. In most states, 
they receive little financial benefit for retaining patients rather than refer them to 
hospitals (The Monee Project, 2001) 
For the primary-secondary care interface to operate effectively, the services 
provided by primary care level need to be increased. Primary care professionals need 
to have more control over levels of care, be able to direct patients to the most 
appropriate level of care, and monitor patients in hospital and after they have been 
discharged from hospital (Figueras et ai., 2004) 
6. Weak Data Collection 
Health reforms require sophisticated information systems outlining health, 
financial, and other management data to assess the kind of reforms that are needed, and 
whether these reforms are meeting their objectives once implemented (Figueras et aI., 
2004) 
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Unfortunately, in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, data on the 
health system are unavailable or inaccurate. Health information systems in the region 
are often in disarray. Collection of routine data on mortality is not systematic, while 
morbidity data are even more problematic (Rechel and McKee, 2003) Information 
systems upon which to measure the performance of both primary and secondary levels 
of care or to assess whether staff have the right skill sets or are using evidence-based 
interventions are often not available. Therefore, efforts to improve efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of health services often lack the foundation of evidence (Figueras et aI., 
2004) 
Data that does exist on population health is often suspect due to the scale of 
population movements since 1990. Because popUlation size is the denominator when 
calculating rates, the lack of accurate population data casts doubt on many health 
statistics (Rechel and McKee, 2003) Therefore, the accuracy of data from both before 
and after the reform efforts is questionable (Gaal et aI., 1999, Busse, 2000, Nuri and 
Healy, 1999) 
7. Human-Resource Problems 
To meet reform objectives, the quality and quantity of health care professionals 
needs to be improved. The right mix of health professionals in the areas of family 
medicine, public health, specialists, and managers must be achieved. Moreover, the 
prerequisites for maintaining and enhancing skills through continuing education and 
professional standards and accreditation should be developed. Health care 
professionals must also feel motivated through pay, employment security, and working 
conditions to provide health care and to advance health reforms (Figueras et aI., 2004) 
III. SUMMARY: KEy FACTORS EMERGING FROM LITERATURE 
The analysis of the factors-external social, economic, and political factors, as 
well as those internal to the reform process-that impeded the reform program provide 
an important input into the conceptual framework to analyse health reform. Figure 
Three outlined the basic reform process, but the analysis of health reform efforts that 
informed Figure Three assumed a functioning state with the capacity to implement 
reforms. The most critical ingredient to health reform process was the quality and 
sequencing of the reforms-ensuring that the refonn program was evidence-based and 
that the various 'control knobs' were turned the right way. This framework did not 
sufficiently factor in the social, economic, and political circumstances impacting on the 
reform process. 
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The experience of health reform in Eastern Europe points to factors internal to 
the process of implementing reforms: time horizons too short for implementation, poor 
policy planning, the failure of financing reforms, the lack of enthusiasm for the reform 
program, and the difficulty to implement organisational change with weak human 
resources and poor health data. The Eastern European reform program also points to 
economic instability, unhealthy lifestyles, the lack of government capacity to 
implement reforms, and political instability all impacting on the reform program. 
Figure Four incorporates these elements into the Conceptual Framework for analysing 
post-conflict health reform. 
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Figure Four: Factors Impacting on the Reform Process in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE POST-CONFLICT REFORM AGENDA 
One of the key forces driving health reform in Kosovo was the international 
agenda for post-conflict Kosovo: the effort of the international community to build the 
foundation of a liberal democracy. This spirit of international engagement-the desire 
for broad political, economic, and social change-shaped the overarching public-sector 
reform underway in Kosovo, including the reform of the health sector. Understanding 
this peacebuilding context is critical to understanding the external forces driving health 
reform. 
I. THE ERA OF PEACEBUILDING 
From Iraq to Afghanistan, Haiti to East Timor, the international community is 
undertaking more frequent and complex interventions in states that are at war, are 
emerging from war, or are seen as a threat to international peace and stability. Such 
interventions are ambitious, including military engagement to overthrow repressive 
regimes and unprecedented efforts to reform the political and institutional structures of 
the state. The logic behind these interventions, which require significant international 
investment, is that reformed, liberal, democratic states are less likely to relapse into 
internal conflict or go to war with other democratic states, and thus are important for 
regional and international stability. 
One of the first of these interventions occurred in Kosovo. Air bombardments 
carried out by forces operating under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) forced the withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's 
(FRY) troops and police, as well as the withdrawal of Serbian political authority from 
the province.37 The United Nations assumed political and administrative responsibility 
and began a process of building autonomous institutions of self-government. The 
international community subsequently invested over two billion dollars in assistance in 
the effort to build liberal democratic institutions. 
This chapter outlines the forces that led to this new era of interventionism, and 
details lessons learned from the international community's ambitious peacebuilding 
efforts. It argues that the international community attempts "compressed 
development" in post-conflict environments. Massive resources are committed to 
ambitious political, social, and economic reform projects in the effort to avert a return 
37 Kosovo is a province of the Republic of Serbia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which 
dissolved in 2003, included the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. The FRY transformed into the 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
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to violence. These projects often have short time horizons, as policy makers believe 
that the political will and resources of the international community, coupled with the 
fluid political and social dynamics of post-conflict settings, present a window of 
opportunity for rapid reform. However, as the international community is discovering, 
building democratic institutions is a time-consuming and difficult process. 
II. THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 
Although the end of the Cold War stopped the arms race between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the cessation of superpower rivalry contributed to an 
explosion in the number of civil wars throughout the developing world, termed by 
some as an era of "new interventionism". 38 Since the end of the Cold War, more than 
120 wars have been fought worldwide, and more than ninety percent of these wars 
have been internal conflicts (Smith, 2003) 
International intervention in unstable states is not a new phenomenon. During 
the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union spent millions of dollars in 
civilian and military aid supporting proxy regimes. Peacekeeping missions under the 
auspices of the United Nations worked to support the implementation of ceasefires. 
International humanitarian organisations such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (lCRC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), as well as non-governmental organisations such as Medecins Sans 
Frontieres (MSF), CARE, Oxfam, the International Rescue Committee (lRC), and 
many others, provided medical and food aid to civilians fleeing conflicts. 
While the international community's presence in crisis situations is not new, 
the current scale and intensity of international intervention to prevent conflict, halt 
civil wars, and protect civilians from the impact of violent conflict is largely 
unprecedented.39 Although some may believe that the international community 
intervenes more frequently in internal conflicts because the number of civil wars has 
risen, this is actually not the case. The number of civil wars did increase between 1990 
and 1992, but by 2003 the number of internal conflicts declined by forty percent. This 
38 The phrase the 'new interventionism' was used by Michael Doyle to describe the heightened 
engagement of the international community in sovereign states, particularly those that are unstable. 
DOYLE, M. W. (January 2001) The New Interventionism. Metaphilosophy. Volume 32, 212-235. 
39 Some authors compare current levels of international engagement to the situation after World War II, 
where the Allies reformed the state institutions of Germany and Japan. ORR, R. C. (2004d) The United 
States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction. IN ORR, R. C. (Ed.) 
Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Washington, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. 
74 
decline coincided with the rapid growth of United Nations activity in these conflicts 
(The UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel, 2004) Several factors account for the 
heightened engagement of the international community in unstable states around the 
world. 
A. New Opportunities for International Cooperation 
New peacemaking opportunities emerged as antagonism between the United 
States and the Soviet Union diminished, the Berlin Wall fell, the Soviet Union 
collapsed, and a transition to a market economy began throughout most of the former 
Soviet Bloc. The Security Council was able to function more effectively in the 
absence of the enmity between the United States and Russia. The ability of the United 
Nations to supply peacekeeping missions therefore increased. From 1989 to 1999, the 
United Nations initiated thirty-three peace operations, while in the previous four 
decades it had deployed only fifteen (Paris, 2004) 
B. The Legacy of Rwanda and Bosnia 
The failed efforts of the international community, led by the United States, to 
bring peace to Somalia in 1993 increased the reluctance of the international 
community to intervene in civil conflict, particularly in Africa. The Rwandan 
genocide, which occurred just six months after peacekeeping troops left Somalia, 
illustrated in stark terms the costs of inaction. Between 800 thousand and a million 
people were killed under the eyes of United Nations peacekeepers. These soldiers 
were deployed with the mandate of monitoring the implementation of the Arusha 
Accords, not with a mandate to stop widespread violence. The Security Council 
refused to change the mandate of the mission, forcing peacekeepers to become 
witnesses to war crimes. Many people, such as the commander of the failed 
peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, 
argued convincingly that effective international military intervention could have 
averted the genocide and saved hundreds of thousands of lives (Dallaire, 2003) 
During the Bosnian conflict, peacekeeping and the protection of humanitarian 
aid was a substitute for political and military action to stop ethnic cleansing and 
genocide. Despite promises of safe havens and the presence of United Nations troops, 
250 thousand people were massacred on the doorstep of Europe between 1992 and 
1995. Chilling pictures of concentration camps and mass roundups of civilians for 
execution elicited comparisons with the Holocaust. 
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Together, Bosnia and Rwanda provided chilling examples of the costs of 
international inaction in the face of flagrant and brutal attacks against civilians. The 
limitations of traditional peacekeeping missions, with their exclusive focus on 
observing and enforcing ceasefires, became painfully apparent. 
C. Effective Lobbying by International Organisations 
The deliberate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure characteristic 
of contemporary warfare violate the Geneva Conventions. These conventions outline 
the basic rules of law in situations of armed conflict, and serve as a bellwether for the 
depravity of contemporary war. 
Violations of the Geneva Conventions have been well documented by 
humanitarian agencies, human-rights organisations, and the global media. 
Humanitarian and human-rights organisations such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, 
Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International use these violations as a basis to 
lobby the international community for enhanced protection of civilians and 
interventions to stop the bloodshed. Think tanks, such as the International Crisis 
Group, and international commissions of inquiry (most notably commissions 
investigating international inaction in Srebrenica and Rwanda (Carlsson et aI., 1999, 
United Nations Secretary General, 1999) have provided convincing arguments that 
with the right planning and preparations, international interventions can effectively 
thwart the momentum towards widespread conflict. 
The media also brings daily images of the costs of war to television screens 
around the world. This coverage coupled with public commentary by international 
organisations has raised public awareness of the devastating impact of civil war. Their 
efforts to convince governments that the costs of inaction outweigh the costs of action 
have been successful in places such as Kosovo, East Timor, and Liberia. In politically 
sensitive areas such as Chechnya or strategically unimportant regions such as Nepal, 
lobbying efforts for international action go largely unheeded. 
D. The Military Intervention in Kosovo 
The NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 was the 
beginning of a new kind of international intervention: the use of military force to stop 
widespread human-rights abuses. A NATO-led coalition undertook strategic air strikes 
against Yugoslav military forces in Kosovo and key civilian and military installations 
in Serbia to compel the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to stop 
committing war crimes against Albanian civilians. When Yugoslavia acquiesced, the 
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United Nations, through Security Council Resolution 1244, took control of the 
institutions of government in Kosovo, interrupting the ability of the government of 
Yugoslavia to exercise political authority over its southern province. 
Kosovo set a remarkable precedent. First, the international community 
intervened militarily with the objective of protecting civilians; and second, it 
subsequently worked to create democratic institutions of self-government virtually 
from scratch (Judah, 2000, International Crisis Group, 2002b) At the time, the Kosovo 
intervention was the most ambitious experiment in peacebuilding ever undertaken, 
with over forty thousand peacekeepers, thousands of UN civilian staff. and hundreds of 
non-governmental organisations operating in a small area with a population of two 
million. It sparked the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, whose recommendations to use international action to protect civilians 
from violations committed by their governments have recently been endorsed in the 
agreement on UN reform (The UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel, 2004) 
E. September 11, 2001 
The tragic terrorist attacks against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center 
prompted several reactions. First, they provoked feelings of extreme vulnerability and 
fear within developed countries, feelings that had largely vanished after the end of the 
Cold War. 
Second, they prompted the United States to change its security policy from that 
of containment of security threats to pre-emptive action to remove those threats, a 
change that many in the international community strongly criticized. Sanctioned by 
the Security Council, the United States invaded Afghanistan to topple the Taliban 
regime and to destroy the capability of AI-Qaeda to undertake terrorist attacks. It then 
took the contentious decision to attack and invade Iraq without the approval of the 
Security Council. The stated objective of this invasion was to pre-empt Saddam 
Hussein from using weapons of mass destruction against the United States and its 
allies; weapons the United States argued that Iraq already possessed. In both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the American administration has been faced with the difficult 
task of rebuilding the state and creating democratic institutions to avert a return to 
unstable pariah regimes. 
And third, September 11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Bali, Madrid, 
and London have prompted international analysts to reflect anew on the need for 
collective security, as "ours is an age of unparalleled interconnection among threats to 
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international peace and security, and mutual vulnerability between weak and strong" 
(The UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel, 2004). The United Nations 
commissioned a panel of eminent persons to outline a new vision for collective 
security, and to propose reform to make the United Nations more effective. In both the 
High Level Panel Report and the Secretary General's response, post-conflict 
peacebuilding was identified as an area of vital concern (The UN Secretary General's 
High-Level Panel, 2004, United Nations Office of the Secretary General, 2005) 
III. PEACEBUILDING: OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE 
These various forces drive interventions by the international community to end 
violence, create stability, build democratic institutions, and instil a sustainable peace in 
an increasing number of states around the world. The concept of peacebuilding was 
first introduced by Johann Galtung (Galtung, 1975) and gained prominence with the 
release of Boutros Boutros-Ghali'sAgendafor Peace in 1992 (United Nations Office 
of the Secretary General, 1992) However, the complete range of activities that 
encompasses peacebuilding, as well as an analysis of the challenges faced by 
peacebuilding missions, has only emerged as the UN and other multilateral institutions 
gain concrete peacebuilding experiences and learn from their successes and failures. 
Table Five outlines the main peacebuilding missions undertaken between 1990 
and 2004. At the beginning of 2005, the United Nations had sixteen active 
peacekeeping missions, and eleven peacebuilding and political missions. 
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Table Five: UN Peacebuilding and Peacekeeping Missions (1990-2004) 
Mission ACRONYM DATES 
Europe 
Croatia: United Nations Transitional Administration UNTAES January 1996 to 
of Eastern Slavonia January 1998 
Bosnia: United Nations Mission in Bosnia and UNMIBH December 1995 to 
Herzegovina December 2002 
Kosovo: United Nations Interim Administration UNMIK Since June 1999 
Mission in Kosovo 
Georgia: United Nations Observer Mission in UNOMIG Since August 
Georgia 1993 
Africa 
Western Sahara: United Nations Mission for the MINURSO Since April 1991 
Referendum in Western Sahara 
Guinea Bissau: United Nations Peacebuilding UNOGBIS Since March 1999 
Support Office in Guinea-Bissau 
Sierra Leone: United Nations Mission in Sierra UNAMSIL Since October 
Leone 1999 
Congo: United Nations Organization Mission in the MONUC Since November 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1999 
Central Africa Republic: United Nations BONUCA Since February 
Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic 2000 
Ethiopia: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and UNMEE Since July 2000 
Eritrea 
Liberia: United Nations Mission in Liberia UNMIL Since September 
2003 
Cote d'Ivoire: United Nations Mission in Cote UNOCI Since April 2004 
d'Ivoire 
Burundi: United Nations Operation in Burundi ONUB Since June 2004 
Sudan: United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan UNAMIS Since June 2004 
Middle East 
Middle East Peace Process: Office of the United UNSCO Since October 
Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East 1999 
Iraq: United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq UNAMI Since August 
2003 
Central Asia 
Afghanistan: United Nations Assistance Mission in UNAMA Since March 2002 
Afghanistan 
Tajikistan: United Nations Tajikistan Office for UNTOP Since June 2000 
Peacebuilding 
East Asia 
East Timor: United Nations Mission in Support of UNMISET Since May 2002 
East Timor 
Caribbean 
Haiti: United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti MINUSTAH Since June 2004 
Source: (United Nations, 2005) 
Billions of dollars have been invested on these military interventions to stabilize states, 
and on humanitarian, reconstruction, and development aid to assist in the process of 
rebuilding. 
A. Peacebuilding Interventions: Compressing Development? 
Early peacebuilding efforts, such as Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, and EI 
Salvador, were basically extensions of peacekeeping missions. The international 
community focused on monitoring ceasefires, providing humanitarian and 
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rehabilitation relief, and supervising elections (Jeong, 2005) While some of these 
missions were successful, others relapsed into violence. The renewal of fighting is not 
surprising, as in the immediate post-conflict period there is a high risk of societies 
slipping back into violent conflict. In forty-four percent of post-conflict situations, 
violence returns within five years, while fifty percent of post-conflict societies return 
to civil war after ten years (Junne and Verkoren, 2005). Moreover, failed peace 
implementation can lead to even worse violence. If the Angola peace agreement in 
1991 and the Arusha Accords in Rwanda in 1993 had been successfully implemented, 
two million persons might not have died (Call, 2005). 
Establishing a safe and secure environment remains the most critical element of 
these post-conflict operations, particularly the demilitarisation, demobilisation, and 
reintegration (DDR) of former combatants (The UN Secretary General's High-Level 
Panel,2004) Other important security sector reform activities include establishing the 
minimal rule of law, ensuring civilian control over the military, and reforming and 
modernizing the police. 
However, to prevent the recurrence of violence, the objectives of peace building 
missions began to include a conflict-prevention element, attempting to address the root 
causes of violence in society. Interventions are guided by a particular theory of 
conflict management with its foundation in the liberal peace literature: Liberal 
democracies are inherently more peaceful, less likely to go to war, and less likely to 
disintegrate into internal violence (Gleditsch, 1992, Doyle, 1986) As a result, the 
typical menu of peacebuilding activities has grown. In 2001, the Security Council 
affirmed this shift, emphasising that the ultimate objective is to prevent the recurrence 
of hostilities through the establishment of democratic institutions. 
The Security Council recognizes that peace-building is aimed at preventing the 
outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore 
encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human 
rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short and long-term actions 
tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or 
emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable 
governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule 
of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence (President of 
the Security Council, 2001). 
The objectives of more recent interventions in Kosovo, East Timor, 
Afghanistan, and Liberia (2003) reflect this expansion of peace building activities. In 
the effort to address the root causes of conflict and prevent a return to violence, 
transitional justice initiatives as well as socio-economic and political reform have 
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become integral components of these missions (Junne and Verkoren, 2005, Call, 2005) 
The typical menu of activities now undertaken in peacebuilding missions is outlined in 
Table Six. 
T bl S· M· P b ·Id· I t 40 a e IX: am eace UI 109 n erventions 
Security Sector Reform Police Reform 
Demilitarisation, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, 
Civilian Control of Military 
Transitional Justice Prosecuting War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 
Building Local Judicial Capacity 
Reconciliation Activities 
Socio-Economic Economic Development Initiatives 
Health care Provision and Reform 
Education Reform 
Reform of Elected Political Party Development 
Institutions Preparation for Elections 
Building a Civil Service 
Massive resources are invested in these ambitious political, social and 
economic reform projects in the effort to avert a return to violence. 
[T]he primordial task of post conflict development is not just rebuilding or 
reconstruction, because this may lead to the rebuilding of the very structures 
that gave rise to the devastating conflicts. What the situation demands is 
another type of development that addresses these structures and helps to avoid 
violent conflict (Junne and Verkoren, 2005). 
Peacebuilding initiatives often have short time horizons of two to five years. While 
these horizons are short, however, project objectives are extremely ambitious, 
amounting to plans for sweeping socio-economic development and institutional 
reform. Reforming the health system, revitalising the education system, creating an 
impartial judiciary, building regulatory capacity within public institutions, and creating 
conditions for competitive industry to flourish are typical development projects. Such 
initiatives are usually implemented by development agencies, working slowly over 
many years to build consensus for project goals and indigenous capacity to make these 
projects sustainable. In post-conflict settings, for better or for worse, such 
development projects are fast-tracked. 
This expansion of activities undertaken in peacebuilding missions amounts to 
'compressed development.' Ambitious projects are undertaken in the effort to build 
liberal-democratic states. This is in fact an effort at conflict prevention, given the 
belief that democracies are inherently more peaceful. Moreover, policy makers believe 
that critical preconditions-financial resources and a political vacuum-exist for 
40 Adapted from, Ibid. 
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reform: "The immediate aftermath of such conflicts can create a political window of 
opportunity in which all parties agree that basic structures of society have to be 
changed to avoid a repetition of disastrous destruction" (Junne and Verkoren, 2005) 
Analysts argue that the political will and resources of the international community, 
coupled with the fluid political and social dynamics of post-conflict settings, create an 
ideal implementing environment. 
This assumption is flawed. The pursuit of development objectives in a post-
conflict environment is problematic. Projects are conceived quickly, without the 
careful planning, data and evidence gathering, and consultation that occur in traditional 
development planning. 'Truisms' of development, such as spending less of the public 
budget on the military and police, are not applicable (Junne and Verkoren, 2005) The 
precarious security environment and pervasive criminality requires agencies to 
undertake more risk. Field staff recruited to work in post-conflict settings are often 
veterans of humanitarian and rehabilitation missions, lacking the expertise and 
experience to implement development projects (Tulloch et aI., 2003). While a strong, 
transparent, and accountable state is critical to avert a return to violence, states emerge 
from conflict contested and weakened, and development agencies therefore lack solid 
local counterparts. Civil society is fragmented, as many of its key members have fled 
during the conflict, which undermines its ability to effectively contribute to the policy 
process. Moreover, the post-conflict environment is politically charged, such that 
every project is deeply political (Junne and Verkoren, 2005) 
B. Factors Undermining Peacebuilding 
The success of international peacebuilding missions is decidedly mixed. One 
analyst noted, "[A] UN field mission had been established in exactly half of the 54 
conflicts that had ended between 1988 and 2003, but these were just as likely to revert 
to war as countries with no UN presence" (Call, 2005) However, the High Level Panel 
counters that: "in the last 15 years, more civil wars were ended through negotiation 
than in the previous two centuries in large part because the United Nations provided 
leadership, opportunities for negotiation, strategic coordination and the resources 
needed for implementation" (The UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel, 2004) 
Several 'lessons learned' exercises have been undertaken with the objective of 
understanding the perils of post-conflict environments and assessing how 
peacebuilding efforts could be more effectively structured. Early assessments, 
including the August 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations 
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(otherwise known as the Brahimi Report), focused on operational issues such as donor 
coordination, the need for effective disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, a 
comprehensive approach to policing, a clear and realistic mandate, deployment of staff 
to the field, and the relationship between the headquarters and the field (Brahimi, 
2000) More recent analysis focused less on the operational challenges for the 
international community and more on the difficulties of changing social, economic, 
and political dynamics in countries emerging from warfare. 
Some critics contend that post-conflict programs are not sufficiently focused. 
Needs must be prioritised and activities sequenced accordingly. While all 
peacebuilding analysts agree that establishing a secure environment is the highest 
priority, other projects are more contentious (Orr, 2004c) In their effort to radically 
reform societies, every sector tends to be prioritised with wish lists generated for every 
possible problem facing society. As a result, missions are unable to establish and meet 
key strategic goals that would lead to a more stable state. One analyst critiqued 
Liberian peacebuilding efforts for their lack of prioritisation. 
[T]he Liberia Joint Needs Assessment identified twenty sectors as 'priorities' 
listing virtually every conceivable sector including security, the rule of law, 
DDR, governance, civil society, elections, health, education, water and 
sanitation, agriculture and food security, infrastructure, economic management, 
HIV / AIDS, job creation, environment, gender, forestry, and shelter and urban 
management. As of 9 August 2004, only $345 million was available to cover 
these 20 priority sectors-an average of $18 million each. Furthermore 
according to the JNA, reintegration of tens of thousands of ex-combatants was 
not slated to begin until a year after the first several thousands of disarmed 
combatants had demobilized. This laundry-list approach reflects the triumph of 
bureaucracy over strategy, and fails to identify and direct resources to the main 
sources of insecurity and potential warfare (Call, 2005) 
Such criticism reflects unease with the broad reform agenda of many peacebuilding 
missions, particularly among those who believe that international interventions in the 
immediate post-conflict environment should focus on security issues. 
Critics also argue that international organisations must work more effectively 
with local actors, building-not bypassing-local governance structures and 
indigenous capacity. All too often, the views and expertise of national and local 
groups are not effectively incorporated into projects, with international officials 
believing that 'they know best' how to implement programs (Call, 2005, Orr, 2004a) 
Both local and international actors must be in some way accountable to the local 
population for the decisions that they make (Orr, 2004a) 
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Naturally important checks on abuse and corruption are required. However, 
avoiding or undermining local or national state institutions because they may 
be slow, inefficient, or corrupt is not the answer. Instead the hard work of 
building in mechanisms of transparency, accountability and participation are 
required to ensure that state institutions function well (Call, 2005). 
The failure to build this local ownership results in a lack of local buy-in to refonns, 
undennining the sustainability of refonn efforts. 
International organisations are also excessively driven by external deadlines set 
according to their own bureaucratic purposes rather than circumstances on the ground 
(Orr,2004a) Examples include elections being held too quickly, troops downsizing 
before the security situation has stabilized, and a focus on rapid training for police 
officers rather than comprehensive training. Peacebuilding missions also do not 
clearly identify an exit strategy, outline criteria for their departure, and plan for hand-
over of projects to development agencies or regional organisations. Such an exercise 
would focus the efforts of the international community, and could create an incentive 
structure for progress within the local government (Brahimi, 2000, Percival and Lyon, 
2003) 
C. The Critical Importance of Institution Building 
In one' lessons learned' exercise, Roland Paris compared peacebuilding 
interventions across a number of states in several continents. He argues that these 
interventions are guided by a particular theory of conflict management: building liberal 
democracy means creating the conditions for a more peaceful state (Paris, 2004) 
Peacebuilding activities are therefore part of an effort to liberalize the state: 
The typical fonnula for peacebuilding included promoting civil and political 
rights, such as the right to free speech and a free press, as well as freedom of 
association and movement; preparing and administering democratic elections; 
drafting national constitutions that codified civil and political rights; training or 
retraining police and justice officials in the appropriate behaviour for state 
functionaries in a liberal democracy; promoting the development of 
independent 'civil society' organisations and the transfonnation offonnerly 
warring groups into democratic political parties; encouraging the development 
of free-market economies by eliminating barriers to the free flow of capital and 
goods within and across a country's borders; and stimulating the growth of 
private enterprise while reducing the state's role in the economy (Paris, 2004). 
While liberal democracies are more peaceful (Gleditsch, 1992, Doyle, 1986) , 
applying that truism to shape refonn efforts in post-conflict states is extremely 
problematic. Functioning states are taken as a given in much of the liberal peace 
literature. Yet countries emerging from conflict lack even the most basic 
governmental institutions. Intense social conflicts are in place, while natural conflict 
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dampeners such as a tradition of non-violence and cross-cutting social cleavages are 
non-existent. Because the state does not have a monopoly over means of violence, 
social groups face a security dilemma: they are unable to rely on the state to provide a 
secure environment. Paris argues that "by taking the existence of a working 
government for granted, many authors have effectively 'assumed away' one of the 
most difficult and important problems that peacebuilders confront in their field 
operations: namely, how to establish functioning governments and stable non-violent 
politics in conditions of virtual anarchy" (Paris, 2004) 
Paris terms the rapid effort of the international community to undertake 
peacebuilding activities 'shock therapy.' He contends that such efforts to implement 
liberal reforms without the existence of institutional state structures can be 
counterproductive. In their attempt to gain popular support and political power, 
political leaders will often attempt to exploit ethnic divisions. Elections held too 
quickly after a conflict ends can therefore exacerbate tensions between previously 
conflicting groups and legitimise the power of politicians profiting from such 
divisions. Liberal reforms also assume that civil society is virtuous, when in many 
conflict situations some elements of civil society can be extremely pernicious, unable 
to act as an effective check upon politicians or the institutions of the state (Paris, 2004) 
To ensure that peacebuilding efforts do not increase the potential for violence 
in post-conflict settings, Paris advocates "institutionalisation before liberalisation" 
(Paris, 2004) 
Rebuilding effective governmental institutions, managing a phased and gradual 
transition to market democracy, and ensuring that the rule of law is sufficiently 
strong to defend the new state against inevitable challenges (including 
challenges posed by the competitive character of democracy and capitalism 
themselves) require a more interventionist and long term approach to 
peacebuilding than that which has been practised to date. They require 
international peacebuilders to take on the role of nation builders-to serve as 
surrogate governing authorities for as long as it takes to implement the 
liberalizing reforms that the peacebuilders themselves prescribe for war-
shattered states (Paris, 2004). 
According to this model, after security is guaranteed, international officials should 
prioritize the establishment of rudimentary domestic institutions. Once these 
institutions are in place, the reform process should be a series of incremental steps 
taken in tandem with the ability of the government institutions to manage the reform 
process (Paris, 2004) Paris argues, " ... the guiding doctrine of peacebuilding should 
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emphasize the gradual and controlled liberalisation of political and economic life" 
(Paris, 2004) 
Although Paris' 'institutionalisation before reform' argument is compelling, he 
fails to provide details about what institutionalisation means in practise. Democratic 
institutions are incredibly complex, with checks and balances established through 
various political and legal mechanisms. How should institution building be 
implemented? In the absence of elections, what legitimacy does the international 
community have to build these institutions and enact reforms? How should the 
international community determine when institutions are functional? And how does 
the political, social, and economic context impact on the reform process? 
Paris also does not address the priorities of reform in post-conflict settings. His 
main focus is on security institutions, the justice sector, media, and elections. But he 
does not address other key areas where reform is taking place. Although ensuring a 
secure and safe environment is the highest priority, social services such as health care 
and education are also critically important for the wellbeing of a society. As outlined 
below, population health is one of the first casualties of war, and health interventions 
are therefore an important component of the international response to a crisis. 
As part of their peacebuilding efforts, significant resources are invested to build 
a liberal-democratic state in countries emerging from conflict. The international 
community believes that a window of opportunity exists for such radical change, and 
therefore attempts to 'compress development'-to undertake initiatives that would 
normally be characterized as development projects in a shortened time period. 
Analysts of peacebuilding argue that the international community has failed to focus 
sufficient attention on building institutions prior to reforms, ensure local ownership of 
the reform effort, incorporate to the social, political, and economic context for reform, 
prioritize their initiatives, and develop an exit strategy by ensuring their intervention 
was sustainable. 
Despite this emphasis on institution building, the crucial variable of 
government or state capacity has been neglected in the peacebuilding literature. 
Frequently cited, state capacity is rarely defined. One author has attempted to 
disaggregate the various components of state capacity. To function effectively. he 
argues that the state requires the following elements: 
• Human Capital: A sufficient number of well-trained civil servants. 
• Enforcement Capacity: The ability of the state to develop policy guidelines and 
implement this policy. 
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• Coherence: The state's ability to implement reform measures in a reasonably equal 
fashion throughout its territory. 
• Fiscal Resources: Sufficient financial resources to administer the system and 
implement reform programs. 
• Reach and Responsiveness: The reform vision of the state should be accepted by 
key stakeholders, and the state should be responsive to their views and inputs. 
• Legitimacy: The moral authority of the state to govern should be recognized by 
social groups. (Homer-Dixon, 1996) 
Conflict directly impacts on human capital and fiscal resources. Given the highly 
divisive socio-political post-conflict context, the state's legitimacy, 
reach/responsiveness, and coherence are also impacted. The state is often unable to 
enforce its policies through the territory. While weak government capacity 
necessitates the focus on institution building, it also means that the international 
community lacks a strong institutional foundation for these reforms. 
IV. KEy FACTORS EMERGING FROM LITERATURE 
The examination of the recent series of international interventions in post-conflict 
countries is relevant for the conceptual framework to examine post-conflict health 
reform for several reasons. It demonstrates that health reforms are one component of a 
larger international intervention in post-conflict societies, designed to build liberal-
democratic institutions. Health reform needs to be seen as part of this larger wave of 
reform efforts, and significant pressure exists for donors and international agencies to 
use this opportunity to improve institutions, rather than simply refurbish the old ones. 
This dynamic creates significant pressure for health reform-and the time period for 
reform as outlined above is compressed. Within this compressed time frame, reformed 
institutions are to be created, while little effort has gone into analysing the process of 
institution building. Figure Five outlines the key factors emerging from an analysis of 
peacebuilding literature that inform the conceptual framework for analysing health 
reform. The socio-political and economic context is characterized by highly divisive 
politics, a weak economy, and weak government capacity. The international 
community's involvement in the post-conflict environment is extensive, with reform 
measures externally driven and determined. Given the risk of returning to conflict, 
donor time horizons are short, and efforts are made to build liberal democratic 
institutions which the international community believes will be more stable. The 
implementation agenda is therefore very ambitious, and very compressed. 
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Figure Five: Key Factors Emerging from the Examination of Post-Conflict 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A FRAMEWORK FOR HEALTH REFORM 
The conceptual framework to analyse and assess post-conflict health reform 
was built in Chapters One to Three by examining bodies of literature on health and 
conflict, health reform, the health-reform process in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
peacebuilding. The analysis and conclusions in each set of literature adds critical 
elements to our understanding of how various pieces of the post-conflict reform puzzle 
fit together. Table Seven provides a summary of the major conclusions from the 
examination of the health and conflict literature, the literature examining health reform 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe, as well as examinations of contemporary 
peacebuilding efforts. 
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Table Seven: Relevant Points fi Literat forK, C Stud 
HEAL TH AND CONFLICT HEAL TH REFORM LITERATURE REFORM IN CENTRAL AND POST-CONFLICT I 
LITERATURE EASTERN EUROPE PEACEBUILDING LITERATURE 
LITERATURE 
Major Conclusions Major Conclusions Major Conclusions Major Conclusions 
• There are three stages of • Focus on how pressures for • Many Central and Eastern • Increased international 
health interventions after a reform from within and European countries began engagement in societies that 
conflict is over. outside of the health system, health reform programs after are unstable, at war, and 
• In the immediate post- as well as population health the collapse of communism emerging from war. Such 
conflict period, the status force policy-makers in the early 1990s. These engagement results from 
international community to reflect on the efficacy and reform programs were several factors, including 
attempts to address basic efficiency of the health strikingly similar-the the changing geopolitical 
threats to population health system and to contemplate reorientation of the health landscape, the legacy of 
and ensure that the health reform. system to primary care, Rwanda and Bosnia, 
assistance flowing into the • Reform programs should hospital reform, health care lobbying by international 
region is coordinated and ensure clear goals and financing, strengthening of organisations, the growing 
appropriate. Critics have undertake careful planning public-health systems, success of international 
argued that coordination is of reforms based on an human-resource programs, engagement, and the 
often lacking, and that accurate diagnosis of the and decentralisation. terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
NGOs, multilateral key problems plaguing the • Reforms have been plagued • The international 
agencies, and donors do not health sector. by external challenges-the community engages in 
work enough at • Reforms should focus on economic instability in the peacebuilding activities-
sustaininglbuilding local five mechanisms ("control region, the lack of political programs to stabilize 
capacities during this knobs") for change: will and general political societies and introduce 
period. 0 Financing Systems; instability, as well as liberal market reforms. 
• As the situation stabilizes, 0 Adjusting payments; unhealthy lifestyles. Such reforms are based on 
cfforts focus on repair of 0 The organisation of the • There have also been the finding that liberal 
infrastructure, short-term health system; serious problems with the democracies are more 
training programs, and 0 Regulations; and, reform process itself. peaceful. 
gathering basic data on 0 Influencing individual Reforms were often • Reforms includc efforts to 
population health. Critics behaviour. introduced too quickly, the establish security and 
argue that to avoid • Reform plans should be implementation of the reform security institutions; 
rebuilding inefficient or developed with the reforms was not planned, transitional justice 
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inappropriate services and to participation of stakeholders governments had little initiatives; socio-economic 
ensure proper coordination and focused on the problems capacity to introduce and reforms in health and 
of resources, during this of implementation. manage these complex education; and efforts to 
period a longer-term health- • Evaluation systems should changes to the health establish elected institutions 
sector strategy should be be built into the reform system, and efforts to and build political parties. 
developed outlining what program to learn from and implement health-fmancing • Peacebuilding missions 
facilities should remain correct mistakes. models suffered from a have suffered from several 
open and which ones should shortage of funds and shortcomings, including 
close, essential equipment problematic efforts to split lack of prioritisation, failure 
lists, and human-resource the purchaser/provider to establish local ownership 
planning. functions. There was also of the reform program, 
• As the international little enthusiasm for family external agendas driving 
community engages in long- medicine, a weak interface reforms, and timeframes for 
term development, an between the primary and reform that amount to 
overarching health reform secondary care systems, efforts to "compress 
program is implemented. weak data collection, and development." They have 
This includes the transition inappropriately trained also failed to build 
to a system focused on health professionals. institutions of government 
primary care, reform of before initiating ambitious 
health-financing methods, programs of reform. 
and efforts to improve 
public health and human-
resource planninz. 
Research Gaps Research GUJ2s Research Gaps Research Gaps 
• Donors are implementing • No reflection on the • Failure to identify the • Unclear what is entailed in 
similar sweeping reform administrative capacity lessons from failed reform building institutions of 
programs in post-conflict needed to undertake health efforts. What reform government. What does 
settings. However, little reform. measures should receive institutionalisation mean in 
assessment has been made • The literature assumes a priority? How can issues practise? How long does 
of thc success of these functioning state with such as weak political will this take? How to ensure 
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reforms, and existing health and economic instability be local ownership? When are 
appropriateness of infrastructure. overcome? How can institutions functional? 
attempting reforms in such • Insufficient numbers of case capacity be built as part of What are the priorities of the 
settings. The lessons studies have been the reform effort? reform program? 
learned from broad-based undertaken to examine the • Not enough emphasis is 
, 
examinations of health reform process. placed on understanding 
peacebuilding missions have how the political, social, and 
not filtered into the health economic context impacts 
community. on reforms. 
Key Lessons Key Lessons Key Lessons Key Lessons 
• In the immediate post- • The reform plan requires • Careful attention should be • While undertaking 
conflict period, emphasis clear goals, and accurate paid to the political, social, peacebuilding reforms, it is I 
should be placed on diagnoses of the problems and economic environment important to prioritise 
coordinating resources, plaguing the health sector, to ensure that the reform reform efforts and establish 
identifying key actors, and the participation of effort is in harmony with local ownership of reform 
ensuring that humanitarian stakeholders, a focus on the these external factors. efforts. 
assistance, where possible, implementation process, and • The implementation of • Focus should be on building 
builds local capacities. evaluation systems built in reforms should be planned; institutions of government 
• A longer-term health to monitor the impact and ambitious reforms should to support reform process, 
strategy should be success of reforms. not be attempted without rather than implementing 
developed to ensure that building concomitant reforms per se. 
critical resources are not government capacity; care • Careful attention should be 
wasted. should be taken when paid to social, political, and 
• Few assessments have been introducing health-financing economic context for 
done of health reforms in reforms (i.e. social reform-reforms should not 
post-conflict situations. insurance) that the economy be driven by external 
is strong enough for such agendas. 
reforms, and efforts to • Careful attention should be 
introduce a system focused paid to the timeframes for 
on primary care must reform to ensure that they 
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address the problems of a are not attempting to 
lack of enthusiasm, the compress development 
primary/secondary care projects requiring longer 
interface, training, and data timeframes into one or two 
collection. 5 ears. 
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The conceptual framework for health reform is outlined below in Figure Six. 
This conceptual framework is built from key variables identified in the literature 
review, with the relationships among these variables highlighted in Figures Two, 
Three, Four, and Five. The summary of these findings in outlined in Table Seven. 
Below, the thesis describes how the variables identified through the analysis of the 
literature are integrated into the conceptual framework in Figure Six. 
Forces Leading to Post-Conflict Health Reform: Recall that Figure Two 
highlighted the external political pressures for reform (to ensure sustainability of 
resources), the pressures for particular reform measures (to heighten the efficiency of 
the system), and the health context (health status and infrastructure), lead to the effort 
to reform the health system. These variables are effectively integrated into the 
"External Pressures for Reform", "Reform Measures" and "Health Context" variables 
highlighted in Figure Six. 
Health Reform: Figure Three highlighted that problems within the health 
system (inequities, inefficiencies in the system), population health status, and pressures 
for reform (popular expectations for health care services, pressure from regional or 
multilateral organizations) led to reform being undertaken. Reform measures are 
focused on five key areas: financing, payments, organization, regulation, and efforts to 
shape behaviour. The objective of these reforms is to successfully implement reforms 
to improve population health and system performance. These variables are represented 
in Figure Six (health context, health status, pressures for reform, the implementation 
process, and reform outcomes). This analysis provides an insight into the particular 
challenges facing health reform. 
Health Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Figure Four summarized the 
key variables that emerged from the implementation of health reforms in Central and 
Eastern Europe. These key variables include the socio-political and economic context, 
which combined with external pressure for reform and the resulting implementation of 
specific reform measures. This analysis highlighted the particular challenges 
associated with health reform implementation. One of the key variables that emerged 
in this analysis - the issue of weak government capacity - is incorporated into the 
conceptual framework as an element impacting on the implementation of reforms. 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: While the other sets of literature were directly 
focused on the health sector. this literature provided insight into the particular 
circumstances surrounding post-conflict peacebuilding interventions by the 
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international community. Figure Five highlights the highly divisive socio-political 
context, economic weakness, and the weak government capacity that characterizes this 
environment. These variables are represented in Figure Six ("Socio-Economic 
Context" and "Government Capacity"). The analysis also focuses on the extensive 
involvement of the international community, focusing on initiatives to prevent conflict 
and undertake reform measures to build liberal democracy. Figure Six also 
incorporates these factors in "External Pressures for Reform" and "Reform Measures". 
The short-time horizons for reform and the belief that the post-conflict period and the 
significant engagement by the international community present a window of 
opportunity for radical reform lead to an ambitious development agenda and a 
compressed time frame for reform. These variables are represented in Figure Six with 
the variable "Implementation of Reform." 
To summarize the conceptual framework, while reform programs are launched 
as a result of health status and the need for rehabilitation of health infrastructure, 
external pressures for reform and the socio-economic and political context also shape 
the type of reforms selected, with the health reform process forming part of the 
international community's effort to build liberal democratic states. (See the specific 
references to health context/status in Figures Two, Three and Four. The external 
pressures for reform are outlined in Figures Two, Three, Four, and Five. The socio-
economic and political context for reform is outlined in Figures Four and Five.) Socio-
economic and political forces also affect the capacity of the state to oversee and 
implement reform measures. (The specific reference to state capacity is found in 
Figures Four and Five.) Short donor horizons coupled with an ambitious reform 
agenda, lead to compressed time frames for reform. (See Figure Five for reference to 
this compressed time frame for development). As outlined in Figure Three, in a post-
conflict society, the success of reforms can best be analysed through an examination of 
the extent to which health reforms are implemented-efforts to examine health status 
and performance indicators can be difficult due to absence of operating health and 
management information systems. 
The advantage of this framework is that it outlines the pressures for reform 
(both health factors, socio-economic and political factors, as well as external 
pressures), the reform measures themselves, and the factors impacting on the 
implementation of reform, including the quality of the reform measures, external 
pressures and resources for the reform process, the socio-economic and political 
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context and the challenges of the health context. Importantly, it integrates the capacity 
of the government into the analysis of health reform. 
This framework will be applied in the case ofKosovo. Using this framework, 
the thesis will test the hypothesis that the post-conflict social, economic, and political 
context, the externally driven nature of the health reform process, and the compressed 
timeframe for reforms undermined the progress of health reform. 
Figure Six: The Conceptual Framework for Analysing Post-Conflict Health 
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To apply this conceptual framework and to test the hypothesis outlined above, 
Chapter Five provides background information on Kosovo, including the pre-war 
health system, the civil war, the international intervention, and the broad post-conflict 
reform agenda. Chapter Six describes the status of the health system and population 
health after the war, the socio-economic context, the weak capacity of the government, 
external pressures for reform, and the nature of the reforms. Chapter Seven assesses 
the progress of reform, including the degree to which health reform was implemented. 
The Conclusion outlines how the case study of Kosovo supports the research 
hypothesis that the post-conflict social, economic, and political context, the externally 
driven nature of the health reform process, and the compressed timeframe for reforms 
all impacted on the ability of the health reform program to achieve its objectives, and 
sets out an agenda for future research. 
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PART TWO: APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO KOSOVO 
CHAPTER FIVE: INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO 
In 1999, the international community undertook a militarily intervention in 
Kosovo with the objective of ending widespread human-rights violations by the police 
and military forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against the province's 
Albanian population. This intervention, and the subsequent establishment of a UN 
Mission to govern Kosovo, was notable for three reasons. First, the principle impetus 
for action was humanitarian: the need to confront a brutal aggression by the state 
against a weak and vulnerable minority. Second, under the aegis of the United 
Nations, the international community was given sweeping powers to build autonomous 
self-government and undertake political, social, and economic reform. And finally, 
unlike other post-conflict states such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the implementing 
environment in Kosovo was favourable: high levels of donor assistance were 
dispersed, the majority of the popUlation supported the military intervention and the 
presence of the international community, and the province was small, with reasonably 
high levels of human capital and a historical, economically important industrial and 
natural resource base. As a result of these factors, Kosovo is in many ways a 
laboratory case study for examining the efficacy of peacebuilding efforts, including 
health reform. 
Annex Two outlines in detail the roots of the conflict. This chapter provides 
the backdrop for the reform process: it outlines the history of the healthcare system, 
briefly addresses the impact of the conflict on the health system, and the ambitious 
intervention by the international community. It concludes by outlining the initial 
efforts of the international community to provide humanitarian and rehabilitation 
assistance. 
I. HEALTHCARE UNDER SOCIALISM, HEALTHCARE UNDER WAR 
A. The Health System Prior to 1989 
The health system in Kosovo, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, was largely 
based on the Semashko model of healthcare delivery. Yugoslavia adapted the 
Semashko system to reflect its version of socialism-a system of self-management. 
Decision-making was decentralized in enterprises and service institutes such as 
hospitals and health centres. While some argued that such decentralisation was 
inefficient, the healthcare system did succeed in expanding the provision of healthcare 
to people who would not otherwise have been able to afford it (Kunitz, 2004). 
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Primary care was organized around polyclinics in small communities and 
health houses in larger communities. Although these clinics did include general 
practitioners, patients used these physicians as a referral mechanism to specialists, who 
often worked in the same clinics (UNMIK, 2001). 
Hospital capacity in Kosov()---as measured by the number of hospital beds-
was low by regional or European averages. Even so, hospitals were quite large, with 
mUltiple buildings, resulting in inefficient duplication of administrative and other 
services. Moreover, few linkages existed between hospital care and primary care 
(UNMIK, 2001). 
The health system was financed from a combination of social insurance, tax 
revenues, and out-of-pocket payments. The health insurance fund (HIF) was organized 
as a 'self-managing community of interest' (SIZ) located in Pristina, with twenty-nine 
'elementary units' (OZs) operating as the municipal branches of the HIF. Eighty 
percent of the HIF's revenue was derived from a compulsory employee contribution of 
nine percent of gross salary. To ensure that pensioners also received benefits, the 
pension fund made contributions amounting to fourteen percent of pensioners' 
incomes. Farmers and small businesses were also expected to contribute twenty 
percent of their total incomes, but collection at this level was never achieved. The HIF 
provided healthcare and benefits, including sick leave, disability, funeral benefits, 
eyeglasses, and orthopaedics to those who contributed (World Bank, 2001). Over four 
hundred thousand government employees and factory workers received coverage. 
In the 1980s, average per capita health expenditure was U.S. $55 per annum, 
which amounted to approximately 3.6 to four percent ofGDP. By 1989, the insurance 
fund was in debt, with healthcare expenditures (U.S. $89.8 million) exceeding 
revenues ($68.9 million) by 24.5 percent. While physicians were salaried, facilities 
were reimbursed using the fee-for-service system, which encouraged higher numbers 
of hospital-bed days. Prices were not based on any true estimate of cost and were 
adjusted according to available funding. Payments for services declined, and facilities 
faced shortfalls in funding. As a result, under-the-table payments by patients became 
more common. Doctors also received such payments as supplements to their low 
salaries (World Bank, 2001, UNDP, 2002). 
Under the decentralized Yugoslav version of the Semashko system, the 
Ministry of Health was the regulator of the health system. Health organisations, such 
as hospitals, major health houses, the Institute of Public Health, and the Institute for 
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Occupational Health, elected their directors and boards independently. These 
organisations reported to the Kosovo parliament (UNMIK, 2001). Pristina University 
founded a medical faculty, which provided medical training in Albanian and became 
the focal point of medical research in Kosovo (Tolaj, 1999). 
Health indicators improved significantly over this period, following on 
improvements in living and education standards in the population. The mortality rate 
declined from 46 per 1,000 in 1956 to 29 per 1,000 in 1990. Diphtheria, typhus, 
endemic syphilis, and trachoma were eliminated, and the number of cases of pertussis, 
rubella, and abdominal typhus declined every year. No cases of poliomyelitis were 
registered between 1983 and 1990. Immunisation rates rose, and in 1988, 86 percent 
of the population was immunised against polio, 83 percent against diphtheria, tetanus, 
and pertussis, and 80 percent against measles, mumps, and rubella (Tolaj, 1999). 
B. The Health System as Battleground: 1989 to 1999 
1. Serbs Take Control 
The health system was highly valued in communist societies, and the 
favourable health statistics of Central and Eastern Europe were often cited as a sign of 
the success of communism. Many physicians in Yugoslavia were involved in politics. 
As a result, healthcare was highly politicized, and the health sector therefore became a 
natural arena for political wrangling and disputes. When Kosovo lost its autonomy in 
March 1989, the health sector became a battleground for the conflict between 
Albanians and the federal government in Belgrade. 
The Belgrade Ministry of Health assumed control of the health system in 
Kosovo, and the decentralized 'self-managing' system was abolished. Directors and 
boards of health institutions were forced to report directly to Belgrade. Pristina 
University's medical faculty was closed, and the medical training of many students 
was interrupted. The dean of the Medical School, Dr. Alush Gashi, who protested the 
closure by chaining himself to a radiator, was beaten, handcuffed, and taken away by 
police (Tolaj, 1999). 
Many Albanian health professionals were forced out of the healthcare system, 
either directly fired or through harassment. Sixty-four percent of ethnic Albanian 
health workers (an estimated 2,400 people) left their jobs; some were fired while 
others were subject to vicious smear campaigns (UNMIK, 2001). Four hundred and 
forty of those dismissed were specialist physicians. The gynaecology and maternity 
clinics were particularly hard hit, with all Albanian doctors working in these units 
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dismissed from their positions. Those healthcare workers that remained in the system 
were ordered to speak Serbian and to write in Cyrillic (Tolaj, 1999). 
Access to healthcare suffered as a result of these dismissals, and also because 
many Albanians lost their entitlements to healthcare. Many ordinary Albanians were 
fired from their jobs after 1989, and as a result, lost their insurance coverage. During 
the 1990s, more than fifty percent of Albanians lacked a social insurance card needed 
for healthcare (World Bank, 2001). 
2. The Albanian Response 
In conjunction with the parallel government that was established in the early 
1990s, Albanians organized a parallel primary healthcare system. This system, known 
as the Mother Theresa Society, operated ninety-six clinics throughout Kosovo, many in 
remote areas. Healthcare workers volunteered their services, with financing for 
supplies and medicines provided by a parallel tax system (World Bank, 2001). Many 
Albanian health professionals-who had been dismissed from their jobs-also 
established private healthcare facilities, including clinics and laboratories, during this 
period. 
Because Albanians were no longer able to receive medical training in their own 
language at Pristina University, they created a parallel system of medical education. In 
the 1990s, 600 doctors and 1,200 nurses graduated from this parallel system. While 
this system provided students with a high degree of theoretical knowledge, given the 
lack of access of medical students to healthcare facilities, clinical training was 
problematic (World Bank, 2001). This left a generation of Albanians with uncertain 
expertise and unrecognised qualifications. 
3. The Health Impact of the Loss of Autonomy 
Despite these efforts to establish parallel healthcare services and training, 
popUlation health deteriorated in the 1990s. The incidence rate of infectious diseases 
rose, with increases in the rates of intestinal typhus, tuberculosis, brucellosis, and 
neonatal tetanus. Immunisation rates declined, with vaccination coverage for children 
against polio, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, measles, mumps, and rubella falling below 
sixty percent, with some areas falling below thirty percent coverage. Polio reared its 
ugly head, with fifty-two cases reported between 1990 and 1997 (Tolaj, 1999). 
C. 1998: The Outbreak of War and Its Impact on Health 
When armed conflict broke out in 1998, it caused massive population 
displacements in rural areas of Kosovo. In the fall of 1998, UNHCR estimated that 
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two hundred thousand Albanians were displaced. While many civilians fled to 
neighbouring Albania and Macedonia, others left their villages and took refuge in the 
hills of Kosovo. Food shortages and a lack of potable water undermined population 
health. While no formal health surveys were undertaken, humanitarian agencies 
working in the region cited heightened incidence rates of Hepatitis A, diarrhea, 
respiratory problems, and skin infections among those displaced. Particularly 
vulnerable were children, pregnant women, and those with chronic conditions such as 
diabetes (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 1998, UNHCR, 1998). 
Albanian healthcare professionals attempted to assist those displaced and 
wounded by war. However, this resulted in health professionals themselves becoming 
targets. Healthcare workers were frequently interrogated and harassed. Numerous 
doctors were abducted, arrested, or killed by the Yugoslav police, army, or 
paramilitary forces. Once in custody, they were often brutally interrogated. To extract 
confessions of complicity with the KLA, prisoners were physically beaten, given 
electric shocks, or subjected to other methods of torture (Physicians for Human Rights, 
1998). Others were killed while on the job, the victims of landmines while traveling to 
or from healthcare facilities, or hit by stray bullets (Tolaj, 1999, Medecins Sans 
Frontieres, 1998, Physicians for Human Rights, 1998). Medical facilities operated by 
Albanians were also targeted. Clinics were searched and property confiscated. In 
areas of heavy fighting, some facilities were burned to the ground. Jennifer Leaning of 
Physicians for Human Rights described this campaign against Albanian doctors: 
The Serbian authorities have defied the principle that civilians and combatants 
alike are entitled to medical treatment in times of conflict. Instead, Serb police 
have branded medical practices as acts of 'terrorism,' and abused physicians 
and patients, calling them 'terrorists.' Further, by attacking community leaders 
such as these physicians, and creating fear throughout the population, the 
Serbian authorities are conducting a campaign against ethnic Albanian society. 
(Physicians for Human Rights, 1998) 
The health crisis escalated dramatically during the NATO bombardment. 
Police, paramilitary, and army officials escalated their attacks on Albanian villages and 
stepped up their campaign of ethnic cleansing. Almost a million Albanians were 
displaced from their homes. While many were housed with relatives in Albania or 
Macedonia, others took refuge in camps in neighbouring countries, while some 
remained displaced within Kosovo. 
The displacement, as well as the violence against Albanian civilians, took a 
devastating toll on population health. Between February 1998-roughly when the 
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conflict between the KLA and Yugoslav authorities began-and June 1999, when 
NATO forces entered Kosovo, the crude mortality rate was 2.3 times higher than the 
pre-conflict baseline. War-related trauma was the major cause of death, with an 
estimated twelve thousand deaths directly related to the war. The second leading cause 
of mortality was chronic disease (Spiegel and Salama, 2000). 
II. AFTER THE WAR: OF HUMANITARIANS AND CHAOS 
When UNMIK and KFOR arrived on June 11,1999, the security situation was 
precarious, with extensive looting and crimes of revenge and retribution. There was a 
vacuum of authority that the KLA was exploiting to establish its own provisional 
government. Kosovo' s indigenous civil service (overwhelmingly Serb) had fled, 
leaving few trained officials to administer the province. Some with the KLA-led 
provisional government exploited their positions to dismiss political rivals, as well as 
for personal financial gain. 
Albanian refugees and those displaced within Kosovo quickly returned. Over 
ninety-five percent of those who had been displaced returned to their homes after six 
months. Once back in Kosovo, they found their livelihoods destroyed, their houses 
damaged, and public services obliterated. Meanwhile, hundreds of international 
organisations, funded with millions of dollars from donor agencies, poured into 
Kosovo and began implementing a wide range of projects. Donor agencies spent over 
a billion U.S. dollars on humanitarian assistance, and over two billion on rehabilitation 
projects. Three-quarters of these rehabilitation funds were spent within the first two 
years of the international community's presence in Kosovo. In the health sector, 
twenty-one donors spent more than U.S. $100 million (European Commission and 
World Bank, 2001). 
A. Kosovo under International Administration 
After two and a half months of bombing, the Yugoslav government agreed to 
the deployment of NATO troops in Kosovo and to the United Nations administering 
the province. On June 10, 1999, NATO ended its aerial bombardments and the United 
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which provided the legal foundation 
for United Nations political control over the province. The long-term status of 
Kosovo-i.e. whether it would become independent or whether it would remain part of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-remained purposively unclear. 
The United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was 
formed, charged with building autonomous institutions of self-government. It created 
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four 'pillars': humanitarian assistance (run by UNHCR), institution building (run by 
the OSCE), civil administration (run by the United Nations), and reconstruction (run 
by the European Union). The mandate ofUNMIK was to administer the province, 
while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional self-governing 
institutions (United Nations Security Council, 1999). The NATO-led KFOR (the 
Kosovo Force) provided security. 
The Yugoslav army, Serbian police and paramilitary forces left Kosovo, and 
NATO forces, as well as United Nations police, arrived. The vast majority of 
Albanians refugees and internally displaced persons rapidly returned home. Many 
found their houses destroyed and/or looted, their livelihoods ruined, and their futures 
uncertain. 
B. The Exodus of Serbs 
While the vast majority of Albanians returned to Kosovo, another exodus began. 
After the arrival of KFOR and UNMIK, extremist Albanians carried out crimes of 
revenge and retribution against the province's minority Serb and Roma populations. In 
one particularly brutal incident on July 23, 1999, fourteen Serb farmers were gunned 
down with AK-47s while harvesting their crops in Gracko, a small village south of 
Pristina (OSCE, 1999). 
As a result of this violence, approximately 250,000 people, including Serb, Roma, 
Ashkali, and other minorities, fled the province after June 1999 (International Crisis 
Group, 2002a, International Crisis Group, 2002d) due to fear, intimidation, and direct 
physical violence (International Crisis Group, 2002a, International Crisis Group, 
2002d, Human Rights Watch, 2001). Some fled to Serbia and Montenegro, while others 
remained within KFOR-guarded enclaves in KoSOVO.41 Hundreds of murders took place, 
with Serbs forming a disproportionate number of the victims. From KFOR's arrival in 
June 1999 until the end of November (five months), there were 379 murders, including 
135 Serb victims (Human Rights Watch, 2001). These attacks were conducted with 
complete impunity; the justice system has not been able to find and punish the 
perpetrators (International Crisis Group, 2002a). 
41 lOP estimates were obtained from UNHCR. These figures include all displaced ethnicities: Serbs, 
Albanians, Roma, Ashkali, and other minorities. UNHCR emphasizes that, in the absence of a complete 
registration process, such numbers remain estimates. 
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C. The Humanitarian Phase and the Challenge of Coordination 
UNMIK's immediate priorities in the summer of 1999 were to establish its 
presence, build a safe and secure environment, coordinate the hundreds of international 
agencies and non-governmental organisations, ensure that the population's basic 
humanitarian needs were met, and avert a humanitarian crisis by preparing for the 
upcoming winter. 
Eighty-seven percent of the Albanian population had been displaced at some 
point during the war, and by September 1999, twelve percent remained displaced. Due 
to the extent of damage to housing, ensuring that those returning had access to shelter 
was a challenge. Nine percent of dwellings provided shelter for two or more 
households (Spiegel and Salama, 1999). The international community began an 
extensive winterisation campaign to repair houses before the onset of winter. This 
effort was quite successful; despite an unusually harsh winter in 1999-2000, there were 
no deaths from exposure to the cold. 
While malnutrition rates were relatively low in July 1999 (with 3.1 percent of 
children acutely malnourished) food security remained fragile. The conflict had 
disrupted food supplies: the planting of crops was interrupted and much of the 
livestock had been looted and taken to Serbia (Spiegel and Salama, 1999). While 
shops filled relatively quickly, many Albanians had lost their jobs during the war, as 
well as their savings during their flight from Kosovo, and initially lacked the ability to 
feed their families. In the summer of 1999, more Albanians utilised food assistance 
than the World Food Program (WFP) had planned for, partly because more people 
returned than the international community had anticipated. 
UNMIK also faced the mundane but critical challenge of getting essential 
public services such as electricity, water supplies, and garbage collection operational. 
These services had largely been run by Serbs, most of who fled Kosovo in the summer 
of 1999. Although many Albanians returned to public-sector jobs they had held before 
being dismissed in 1989 and were supported by international experts, the turnover in 
staff led to significant disruption of these services. The infrastructure itself-the 
electricity grid, water mains, and telephone lines-was old and few investments had 
been made over the years. These systems ran precariously, if they were functional at 
all, and were subject to frequent failure. 
While UNMIK officially held authority throughout Kosovo, the situation on 
the ground was very different. As noted above, the KLA rapidly set up a provisional 
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government, creating government departments, municipal administrations, and 
appointing staff at public institutions such as health centres and schools. Competing 
governance structures from the LDK were also in place, remnants of the parallel 
structures of the 1990s. In Serb-controlled enclaves, Belgrade's authority continued, 
with local officials reporting to Belgrade, and staff and teachers receiving instructions, 
pay, and supplies from their central ministries in Serbia. 
D. Immediate Challenges in the Health Sector 
Before NATO and the UN established control in Kosovo, UNHCR together 
with NOOs that had been operational in Kosovo prior to the NATO bombardment 
outlined geographic areas of responsibility for NOO activities. Medecins Sans 
Frontieres was responsible for the north of Kosovo, International Medical Corps for 
the Southwest Region, and Medicins du Monde for the Pristina region. These areas of 
responsibility were initially respected, which enhanced coordination among medical 
NOOs and greatly facilitated the initial delivery of health services. 
However, hundreds of other NOOs arrived in Kosovo in June 1999, many 
undertaking activities in the health sector. As a result, coordination became a critical 
priority. The WHO office in Kosovo, in collaboration with the Kosovo Institute of 
Public Health, held weekly coordination meetings for NOOs and donors. 
Representatives from UNMIK's Department of Health were key participants in these 
coordination meetings. Although coordination and collaboration was far from ideal, 
these meetings helped ensure that major program initiatives were communicated, 
information sharing enhanced, and duplication of activities minimized. 
Non-governmental organisations initially provided direct healthcare through 
mobile clinics, often working alongside local health professionals in health clinics to 
support their re-establishment and build capacity. Training programs were also 
established, particularly in the area of reproductive health, to ensure that local health 
professionals were better equipped to address population-health issues. Despite these 
efforts to build local capacity, international organisations also created a brain drain, as 
the salaries of the local health system could not compete with those being offered by 
international agencies. Many English-speaking physicians found lucrative work with 
international medical NOOs or outside the health sector. 
The health system had been seriously weakened by years of political and 
economic turmoil and by several months of conflict. Over ninety percent of the clinics 
of the parallel Mother Theresa Network were damaged or destroyed during the war, 
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and many private clinics of Albanian health professionals had also been damaged 
(Shuey et aI., 2003). Most public-health facilities were spared war-related damage, as 
Serbian doctors had staffed these clinics. However, the vast majority of facilities had 
been looted of supplies and equipment, and the infrastructure reflected years of 
neglect. The general collapse of public-service infrastructure-particularly water and 
electricity-deeply affected the health sector. Many hospitals lacked running water 
twenty-four hours a day (WHO, 1999a). 
Just as control of health facilities was an important priority for the Yugoslav 
government during the 1990s, it became equally important for Albanian leaders in the 
summer of 1999. The health system experienced a dramatic turnover in staff. While 
in June 1999 the majority of the staff and patients at Pristina Hospital were Serb, by 
August 1999 the hospital staff and patients were almost exclusively Albanian. 
Serbian healthcare workers joined the general exodus of Serbs from Kosovo. A 
Physicians for Human Rights investigator found that fear of Albanian extremists 
caused this flight: 
Recent interviews with the few remaining Serb physicians and patients [in 
Pristina Hospital] revealed that there is a general fear of Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) and other Albanian hard-liners both inside and outside the 
hospital. One physician was threatened by a KLA member admitted as a 
patient. 'I must say I am afraid. But, I am not afraid of my Albanian 
colleagues. I had an incident with an UCK (KLA) patient who attempted to 
beat me and (my Albanian colleagues) protected me. It is even more dangerous 
on the street and at market places where there is no one to protect us. ' 
(Physicians for Human Rights, 1999) 
Those Serbs who chose to remain in Kosovo lived in Serbian enclaves and worked in 
the parallel Serbian health system that was funded and administered by the Serbian 
government in Belgrade. 
While UNMIK appointed international managers at hospitals, the KLA in tum 
appointed local managers-a process that further politicized these health facilities. 
Many of those Albanians who returned to the system had spent ten years working in 
the parallel system, with little access to professional development. Others were 
educated in the parallel system and lacked official certification, and their clinical skills 
were uncertain. Doctors and nurses spent months without receiving salaries, as 
UNMIK was slow to establish payroll systems and register facility staff.42 
42 When payroll was established, many health clinics-particularly minority clinics-inflated the 
numbers of those working. Thus, the healthcare system acted as a social-welfare system to minority 
communities. 
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Accurate data detailing the major health issues in Kosovo was almost non-
existent, as health-information systems had largely broken down during the 1990s. 
Therefore, the International Rescue Committee (lRC) undertook a rapid 
epidemiological survey to guide health interventions. The IRC study discovered that 
mortality rates were relatively low, largely because the majority of the population was 
between the ages of fifteen and fifty (Spiegel and Salama, 1999). The IRC's 
examination of hospital mortality showed that communicable diseases accounted for 
only twelve percent of all causes of death. However, the survey produced disturbing 
results regarding infant and child health. 
Infants accounted for forty percent of all hospital deaths, disproportionately 
high given that they comprised only two percent of the total population (Spiegel and 
Salama, 1999). Children suffered from a high rate of diarrhea and acute respiratory 
infection. This was a reflection of poor sanitation, lack of access to clean drinking 
water, and inadequate shelter. More worrying was the lack of knowledge regarding the 
appropriate treatment of diarrhea. Many mothers surveyed (54.6 percent) said they 
stopped breastfeeding when their child had diarrhea. Moreover, significant numbers of 
children had not completed their full course of vaccinations (Spiegel and Salama, 
1999). 
Another agency examining infant health in hospitals found equally disturbing 
results. In the Pristina hospital, the number of premature births had increased in the 
summer and fall of 1999, primarily as a result of high levels of stress and poor 
nutrition. Half of the infants born died prematurely due to a lack of care (medicine and 
incubators) or poor hygiene (Agence France Press, 1999). 
E. Governance Structures 
UNMIK initially competed with parallel Albanian institutions, including those 
established by the KLA, for control of municipalities, health facilities, schools, and 
other public-sector institutions. The KLA appointed officials to public institutions, 
which generally refused to acknowledge the UN's authority. Other Albanian political 
parties such as the LDK also clamoured for control of institutions, and in many areas 
tension between the KLA and the LDK became violent, resulting in assassinations of 
key LDK figures. A power-sharing agreement was reached in December 2000 in 
which the United Nations agreed to govern with Albanian authorities.-l3 This included 
appointing co-directors in UNMIK-led departments such as health. The respective 
43 This agreement also included representatives from minority groups. 
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political parties nominated these co-directors, with UNMIK government departments 
divided among the parties. 
Therefore, Kosovo's initial post-war period had two phases of governance. The 
first (failed) phase, with exclusive international authority, is represented in Figure 
Seven. The second phase was the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS), 
where the United Nations maintained political authority, but included formal 
representation and consultative mechanisms with Kosovo political parties. This phase 
is represented in Figure Eight. The JIAS structure was maintained until Kosovo-wide 
elections were held in November 2001. 
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Figure Seven: Initial UNMIK Structure 
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44 Note that both the SRSG and the Commander of the NATO Forces continue to maintain their reporting relationships to the Security Council and the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, and the NATO Council and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. 
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III. THE BEGINNINGS OF REFORM 
A. The Vision of WHO's Blue Book 
Examinations of other post-conflict health interventions (outlined in Chapter 
One) emphasized the importance of building a longer-term strategy to ensure that 
assistance is directed towards sustainable activities and is channelled to meet the 
objectives of the health sector. This lesson was successfully applied in the case of 
Kosovo. The local WHO office, reporting to the WHO regional European office in 
Copenhagen, played a critical role in Kosovo's post-conflict health coordination and 
planning. The Kosovo office of the WHO worked to support UNMIK's Department of 
Health, although there was no reporting relationship between UNMIK and WHO. One 
of the WHO's objectives was to establish a policy framework that would maximize the 
use of the extensive resources available in 1999 and ensure that health interventions 
were not harmful to future health-sector development (Shuey et aI., 2003). Dr. Dean 
Shuey, a veteran of Uganda's post-conflict reconstruction process, led the task of 
developing these health guidelines, and was assisted by an Albanian physician, Dr. 
F atime Qosaj. 
By mid-July 1999, only a month after the international community arrived in 
Pristina, the WHO released some basic guidelines for health projects (Shuey et aI., 
2003). After a summer of further consultations with both local and international 
experts, the "Interim Health Policy Guidelines" were released in September 1999. 
These policy guidelines, known informally as the "Blue Book," included eight 
objectives: 
1. Primary care would be strengthened with the development of family-medicine 
teams; 
2. Specialist care would be provided through referral from primary care; 
3. The size and location of facilities would be established through the identification of 
popUlation catchment areas-which meant that some facilities would be closed, 
while services in other facilities would be reduced; 
4. No expansion of services should be undertaken to ensure sustainable financing. 
Public financing would be maintained, but other financing models would be 
studied; 
5. Public provision of services would predominate; 
6. Regulated private practise would be allowed; 
7. An essential drugs program and a regulatory agency would be introduced; and 
8. The provision of health care and employment within the system would be non-
discriminatory. (WHO, 1 999b) 
The Blue Book was a critically important step in policy development in 
Kosovo. While it was non-binding on donors and NGOs, it established an important 
framework and point of reference for donor activity, guiding many donor 
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interventions. Given the vast amount of donor resources available, the commitment 
not to expand services was critical to ensure that donor-funded projects and programs 
were dedicated to sustainable activities that could realistically be supported in the 
future under the Kosovo budget. The WHO also produced a facility plan, which 
determined what facilities would remain open, the services provided, equipment lists, 
and staffing requirements. This plan was basically followed. Efforts to provide 
healthcare for minorities meant that some facilities remained open that were not on the 
facility plan, and one hospital facility funded by the United Arab Emirates was built 
despite protests from the Department of Health and the WHO. 
The Blue Book also established the basis for a further policy-planning exercise, 
which took place in the summer of 2000 and is described below. This exercise would 
lay the foundations for wide-ranging health reform in Kosovo. 
B. Lessons Learned, Lessons Applied 
Examinations of post-conflict interventions in the health sector outlined in 
Chapter One generated three key recommendations. First, in the immediate post-
conflict period (humanitarian phase), emphasis should be placed on coordinating 
resources and defining the role of key actors. Second, humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance, where possible, should build local capacities rather than detract from them. 
And third, a longer-term health strategy should be developed to ensure that resources 
are channelled towards activities that will benefit the long-term development of the 
health sector. 
As outlined above, the WHO quickly assumed a coordination role in the 
chaotic post-conflict environment. The sheer number ofNGOs and the scale of 
humanitarian assistance pouring into the province made this task extremely difficult. 
While renegade donors and some uncooperative NGOs frustrated coordination, the 
WHO maintained a basic overview ofNGO activity and worked to influence donor 
and NGO interventions. The WHO worked to ensure that health interventions did not 
create recurrent expenditures that the future health system would be unable to support. 
A facility master plan was established, outlining what facilities would remain open and 
the services they would provide, as well as what facilities would be closed. WHO was 
initially supported in this role by the Department of Health, which gradually took over 
this coordination function. 
While activities were coordinated, no sector-wide planning approach was 
implemented. Donors consulted the WHO, but made their own decisions regarding 
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funding priorities. Time horizons were short; most donors implementing projects in 
the summers of 1999 and 2000 had budgets to cover project work for two years. 
Project priorities were more often based on donor objectives rather than needs on the 
ground. For example, donors funded projects in the geographic areas where their 
troops were deployed. Donors were also risk-averse, fearful that the precarious 
security environment and political tensions would disrupt attainment of project 
objectives. Because of donors' short funding horizons and their aversion to risk, they 
focused on high-cost projects with quantitative outputs, such as clinics rebuilt, 
personnel trained, and wells cleaned. Long-term capacity building, such as 
development of management and information systems, was initially neglected. 
The record of the international community was mixed in the area of capacity 
building during the humanitarian period. While NGOs implemented training 
programs, limited the number of mobile clinics, and often worked out of local health 
clinics (functioning as a form of on-the-job training), they also siphoned off local 
health professionals with salaries that far exceeded what they would have received 
from the Kosovo health clinics. This particularly affected the Department of Health, 
which paid its staff out of the Kosovo Consolidated Budget and was unable to attract 
sufficient numbers of highly skilled administrators. 
A key lesson that the international community applied in Kosovo was in the 
area of health-policy development. The initial policy guidelines established by the 
WHO helped ensure that projects in the emergency phase did not undermine the long-
term sustainability of the health system.45 And, as outlined below, these guidelines set 
the stage for wide-ranging health reform. 
45 While projects did not undermine the sustainability of the system, much more could have been done 
in the early post-conflict period to undertake projects that would support the development of an 
efficient, effective, and equitable system. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE PATH TO HEALTH REFORM IN KOSOVO 
By the spring of 2000, the situation in Kosovo had nonnalized. For the 
majority of the population, the humanitarian phase of the international intervention had 
been a success. Most people had access to healthcare, adequate shelter, food, and 
water. Mistakes had been made, and overlap and duplication of humanitarian projects 
had occurred. However, the immense amount of resources that poured into the 
province, combined with the hard work of the local popUlation and international 
organisations, meant that Kosovo quickly moved into its peacebuilding phase. 
Rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and efforts to refonn key sectors began in earnest. 
Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, one of the objectives 
of the mission in Kosovo was to refonn governance structures and build autonomous 
institutions of self-government. As described in Chapter Three, this meant that the 
United Nations was charged with building liberal democracy in the province under the 
assumption it would create the foundation for peace and prosperity. UNMIK therefore 
undertook the following ambitious activities: 
• Security-sector refonn, including building a Kosovo police service, and 
demilitarisation and demobilisation of the KLA; 
• Refonn of elected institutions, including development of political parties, holding 
elections, and creating governing assemblies at both the local and central levels; 
• Transitional justice issues, such as investigating and prosecuting war crimes, and 
building local judicial capacity; 
• The creation of a market economy through planned privatisation of socialist 
enterprises; and 
• Refonn in key social sectors such as health and education. 
UNMIK adopted a three-pronged approach to this task. First, it set up and managed 
administrative departments, outlined above in Figure Eight. In some areas, these 
departments were led by internationals, but staffed in the majority with national 
personnel (such as health), while other departments (such as the police) were almost 
completely staffed by internationals while national staff members were being trained. 
Second, UNMIK worked to reform institutions according to European standards. For 
example, the education curriculum was rewritten and new laws confonning to 
international human-rights nonns were promulgated. And third, UNMIK worked to 
build an indigenous capacity capable of administering these refonned institutions after 
the international community left (International Crisis Group, 2002b). The challenge 
was Immense. 
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The conceptual framework for post-conflict health reform is applied to the 
Kosovo health-reform process below. With the application of this conceptual 
framework, the hypothesis that the socio-economic and political context, the externally 
driven nature of the reform process, and the compressed timeframe for reform 
undermined the ability to the reform program to achieve its objectives can be tested. 
Figure Nine once again presents the conceptual framework for health reform. 
As noted above, the advantage to this framework is that it provides an analytical tool to 
trace the various inputs into the reform measures, the measures themselves, as well as 
the factors impacting on the implementation process. The framework also necessitates 
identifying the concrete outcomes of reform, rather than the reform process in 
isolation. The various elements of the conceptual framework that will be applied in the 
first part of this chapter are highlighted in bold and shaded in Figure Nine, namely the 
health context, the socio-economic and political context, the external pressures and 
resources for reform, and the capacity of the new Kosovo government to administer 
and oversee the reforms. Chapter Seven will examine the implementation of the 
reform program and the outcomes of reform efforts. 
Figure Nine: Application of the Conceptual Framework to Kosovo Case 
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I. HEALTH CONTEXT: HEALTH SYSTEM AND POPULATION HEALTH 
A. The Health System 
After the war, the healthcare system had more than 10,000 workers at the 
following facilities: 
• Tertiary hospital (Pristina): 2,500 beds 
• Five Regional hospitals: approximately 450 to 550 beds each 
• 30 Main Family Health Centres 
• 173 Smaller Family Health Centres 
• 162 Punctas (primary care outposts) 
• Institute of Public Health: Central 1, District 6 
• Institute of Transfusiology: 1 
• Institute of Occupational Health: 1 
• Institute of Rehabilitation: 2 
These facilities were generally in a state of disrepair, with poor sanitary conditions and 
crumbling infrastructure. Much of the equipment was outdated, non-functional, or had 
been taken during the war (UNDP, 2002). Health clinics in rural areas suffered from 
an acute lack of personnel and equipment. Access to emergency and after-hours care 
was variable; while these services were often accessible in large cities, they were not 
available in rural areas (Shuey et aI., 2003, UNMIK, 2001). The availability of services 
through private practise had increased dramatically. After the war, the parallel Mother 
Theresa Network was virtually abandoned. Most Albanian health workers returned to 
public-health institutions, but those that had developed private practises during the 
1990s maintained them (Shuey et aI., 2003, UNMIK, 2001). While no official registry 
of private practise existed, the Ministry of Health estimated that there were 
approximately fifty private paediatric clinics, thirty-seven gynaecology clinics, fifty-
nine internal medicine clinics, forty-eight surgeries, and nineteen orthopaedic clinics. 
They charged anywhere from ten Euros for an ultrasound to 750 Euros for a caesarean 
(Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2003). 
The quality of the public healthcare system was compromised by several 
factors. Access to primary care was variable and consistent levels of care were not 
provided. Shortages of health personnel in rural areas, the specialised nature of 
healthcare in Kosovo, and the lack of a functioning referral system undermined the 
quality of care. Moreover the efficiency of services was minimal. Hospitals were 
composed of several separate buildings, which contained separate clinics with their 
own laboratories, intensive-care facilities, and operating theatres. Services among the 
buildings were not shared, which resulted in duplication and inefficiency (Shuey et aI., 
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2003, UNMIK, 2001). Maternity services were also far from satisfactory. Sanitation 
of the maternity wards was suboptimal, proper hygiene etiquette was often not 
followed by maternity staff, privacy was minimal, and rooming-in of babies was not 
promoted, interrupting bonding and breastfeeding. 
Kosovo also faced a shortage of physicians. The,number of doctors was less 
than 2,500-or on average thirteen doctors for every ten thousand inhabitants (the 
European average is about thirty-five doctors per ten thousand inhabitants). Many 
doctors had trained in the parallel system and required skills upgrading (Shuey et aI., 
2003, UNMIK, 2001). The exodus of Serb doctors in 1999 exacerbated this shortage. 
The number of doctors willing to work in rural areas was minimal, and rural residents 
often had to travel long distances to receive treatment. 
While the shortage of physicians and the poor state of health facilities 
contributed to variable access to healthcare, economic factors greatly impacted on the 
ability of individuals to access health services. The World Bank found that the main 
barrier to healthcare was cost-despite the fact that healthcare was supposed to be free. 
Twenty-eight percent of those surveyed reported that they could not access healthcare 
because of cost. Over ninety-five percent of Albanians reported buying healthcare 
services, paying approximately three Euros for general expenses and five Euros in 
'gifts' to healthcare providers. The average household spent thirty-five Euros annually 
on drugs (Simpson and Maxhuni, 2003, World Bank, 2000b). These costs were 
particularly debilitating given the high rate of poverty in Kosovo (which is outlined in 
further detail below). 
After the war, the healthcare system was funded by revenue out of the Kosovo 
Consolidated Budget. This budget was a combination of donor funds and locally 
collected revenue (Shuey et aI., 2003, UNMIK, 2001). In the summer of2000, the 
Department of Health also instituted a co-payment system to fill a financing gap and 
support the primary care system (a financial penalty was incurred if patients bypassed 
the primary care system) (Shuey et aI., 2003, UNMIK, 2001). These funding sources 
were largely inadequate, unsustainable, and regressive. Donor contributions were 
waning, and both co-payments and under-the-table payments placed a heavy burden on 
the poor (lHSD, 2003b). 
B. Population Health Status 
Kosovo suffers from a lack of basic demographic data, as there has been no 
reliable census in decades: the last census that included full Albanian participation 
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was conducted in 1981. The population of Kosovo is quite young; the mean age is 
estimated to be just 24.6 years. Twenty-three percent of the popUlation is under 14, 
while 52 percent is between the ages of 15 and 49. There has been a clear preference 
for male children, with selective abortion in favour of boys. As a result, the overall 
population balance is skewed: 50.3 percent of the population are male, while 49.7 
percent are female, and the ratio of newborn male babies to females is 106: 100. The 
last-born child in a family is more likely to be a boy than a girl, and there are three 
times as many male-single-child families as female-single-child families (Kosovo 
Ministry of Health, 2005). Life expectancy at birth for children born during 1995-96 
was projected to be 71.45 years for males and 76.64 years for females (Simpson and 
Maxhuni, 2003). Women of childbearing age (between the ages of 15 to 45) 
constituted 56 percent of the female population and 26.2 percent of the total population 
(UNMIK, 2001). 
The validity and reliability of health data is similarly problematic, and as a 
result the epidemiological situation was uncertain in 1999 and 2000. Estimates for the 
crude mortality rate for deaths due to natural causes varied between 4.5 and 5.4 deaths 
per 10,000 population (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). Hospital mortality studies 
showed that 12 percent of deaths were from communicable diseases, 53.2 percent from 
non-communicable diseases, three percent from maternal conditions, 29.1 percent from 
neonatal conditions (0 to 28 days of age), 3.4 percent from injuries, and 0.6 percent 
from nutritional illnesses (UNMIK, 2001). 
Health surveys taken immediately after the war indicated that reproductive 
health, as well the health of infants and children, was a major concern. In 1999, 15 
percent of pregnant women did not see a healthcare worker, 47 percent had less than 
two medical visits during their pregnancies, 20 percent gave birth at home, and 17 
percent delivered their babies without professional help, while 5.4 percent of new 
mothers were undernourished. Fewer than 20 percent of women report were using 
contraception, while 12 percent of women reported never having heard of any method 
of contraception (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). As a result, the maternal 
mortality ratio was 509 per 100,000 live births (Simpson and Maxhuni, 2003). 
In 1999, the infant mortality rate was 45 per 1,000 births (UNMIK, 2001). 
Infant mortality was the highest in Europe, about two or three times the rate of other 
South Eastern European countries. Perinatal mortality was also high. In 2000, Pristina 
Hospital had a perinatal mortality rate of 44 per 1,000. This compares to a rate of 22 
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per 1,000 in 1988 (Gloeb, 2001). These numbers are particularly troubling when 
compared with surrounding countries. In the same year, Slovenia had a perinatal 
mortality rate of 4.09 per 1,000; Croatia's rate was 9.37 per 1,000; Serbia and 
Montenegro's was 10.31 per 1,000; and Macedonia's was 15.82 per 1,000. The 
average rate of European Union countries was 6.78 per 1,000 (WHO, 2000a). 
Many factors contributed to these disturbing statistics, including poor obstetric 
standards, inadequate medical services, poverty, and malnutrition-as well as health 
conditions such as prematurity, asphyxia, congenital anomalies, respiratory diseases, 
and diarrhea (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). Breastfeeding rates for babies up to 
the age of six months were low, at 12 percent, which contributed to poor infant health 
(Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). Pristina hospital had on average 43 deliveries per 
day in the spring of 2000, and was hit by a staphylococcus infection resulting from a 
lack of sanitation. 
Serious public-health issues faced children. Childhood vaccination was 
disrupted by the war, and was not universal; only 88 percent of children were fully 
immunised against polio and DPT, and 89 percent against measles (Simpson and 
Maxhuni,2003). Improper nutrition was also a concern. Among children aged 5 to 59 
months, a UNICEF survey reported stunted growth among 10 percent of children and 
mild and moderate anaemia in 16 percent of children. More than 50 percent of 
children between 6 and 12 years of age showed symptoms of iodine deficiency 
(Simpson and Maxhuni, 2003). Access to clean and safe drinking water was 
problematic, as some water sources suffered from faecal contamination (UNMIK, 
2001). While no data existed on the rate of childhood accidents, elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe accidents were the leading cause of childhood death and injury (Rechel and 
McKee, 2003), so accidental death and injury among children was most likely 
significant. 
Non-communicable diseases such as cardiovascular, renal, and lung diseases 
and chronic back pain and ulcer/gastritis were the most common adult health 
conditions. Because of the high smoking rate, the incidence of cancer and heart 
disease was increasing. Tobacco was a major contributor to morbidity and mortality 
(Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). Communicable diseases were also problematic. 
The incidence of tuberculosis remained high at 60 to 70 cases per 100,000. There was 
a high case-fatality rate for some communicable diseases such as bacterial meningitis, 
haemorrhagic fever, viral meningo-encephalitis, shigellosis, and diarrheal diseases. 
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HIV / AIDS was also a looming health threat. According to the Institute of Public 
Health, 42 cases of AIDS had been reported between 1986 and 2003. But these 
numbers are known to be underreported, as risk behaviours for HIV such as unsafe sex 
and sharing of needles among intravenous drug users are widespread (Simpson and 
Maxhuni, 2003). 
While health data on adult health issues was lacking in the post-conflict period, 
significant numbers of individuals self-reported ill health in a World Bank survey. 
Over 15 percent of Albanians and 25 percent of Serbs reported having a limited illness, 
while 10 percent of Albanians and 34 percent of Serbs self-reported they were in poor 
health 46 (World Bank, 2000b). 
Mental-health issues were also significant, as much of the population 
experienced severe trauma during the war. In a mental-health survey, a high 
percentage of those surveyed experienced trauma during the war: 66 percent of 
respondents reported having been denied food and/or water and 66 percent reported 
having been caught in a combat situations (Cardozo et aI., 2000). 
Figure Ten presents the health context in the post-conflict environment. 
Access to healthcare was variable for a number of reasons. Health facilities were in a 
general state of disrepair, had been looted of equipment, and were inefficient. These 
facilities clearly needed to be rebuilt and re-equipped. Hidden costs such as under-the 
table payments meant that significant numbers of individuals could not afford to access 
health services. These factors, combined with the shortage of physicians and the need 
for updated training for health care workers, led to a variable quality of care. 
The poor state of the health system contributed to generally low health status in 
Kosovo, in comparison to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Kosovo' s 
health status was also undermined by high rates of mate mal mortality and infant 
mortality, caused by poor maternal health, inadequate medical services, and socio-
economic factors such as poverty. While precise data on child and adult health was 
not available, risk factors for communicable diseases (low vaccination rates and poor 
water quality) and non-communicable diseases (high smoking rates and risk 
behaviours for STDs) were high. This generally low health status, combined with 
46 The World Bank questionnaire surveyed 2,800 households. For health status, the questionnaire 
provided respondents with 5 options to identify their health status: very good, good, fair, poor, and very 
poor. The significant differences in self-reporting between Albanians and Serbs were probably a result 
of the demographics of the Serb population, who were generally older than the Albanian population. 
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significant urban-rural migration and the ensuing pressure on urban health facilities, 
led to an increased demand for health services. 
Comparison on these specific health indicators with other post-conflict 
countries is difficult given the context specific nature of each conflict, and the fact that 
Kosovo was part of the former Yugoslavia, and as such had a higher level of 
development than many other conflict areas.47 Bosnia could be an appropriate point of 
comparison with the caveat that the conflict was of a longer and more intense duration 
than Kosovo. In 1995, Bosnia's infant mortality rate was 14 per thousand births, 30 
percent of Bosnia's health professionals were lost to death or migration,48 and one-
third of Bosnia's medical facilities were thought to be destroyed (Walsh, 1997). 
Figure Ten outlines pressure for reform generated by the poor state of the 
health infrastructure and popUlation health. The majority of regional-level 
stakeholders identified health issues as a key factor driving the reforms. The 
efficiency, equity, and effectiveness of the health sector needed improvement, and the 
system was unable to respond adequately to the health needs of the popUlation. 
47 While specific comparisons are difficult, Kosovo did follow the pattern of many post-conflict 
countries: significant percentage of health infrastructure destroyed or damaged, shortages of human 
resources for health, and low population health status - elevated mortality rates with higher elevations 
among vulnerable groups such as women and children. 
4R Prior to the war, there were 7,032 medical doctors, 18,257 nurses and 1,408 dentists in Bosnia. 
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Figure Ten: Health System and Population Health Challenges in Post-Conflict 
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Health Facilities 
Disrepair, Looting, 
Inefficienc 
Hidden Costs of 
Health Care Services 
Shortage of 
Ph sicians 
Need for Updated 
Training of 
Healthcare Workers 
Poor 
Maternal Health 
Water and Sanitation 
Problems 
High Risk Factors 
Communicable 
Diseases 
High Risk Factors 
Non-Communicable 
Diseases 
Rural Urban 
Migration 
Variable Access 
to Care 
Variable Quality 
of Care 
High Maternal 
Mortality 
High Infant 
Mortali 
Child Health 
Concerns 
Largely 
Unknown Adult 
Health Burden 
Increased Pressure 
on Urban Health 
Facilities 
122 
Need to Rebuild and 
Re-Equip Health 
Facilities 
Generally Low 
Health Status 
High Demand for 
Health Services 
II. SOCIo-EcONOMIC AND POLITICAL FORCES IMPACTING ON REFORM 
PROCESS 
A. The Socio-Economic Context 
Kosovo was the poorest region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and its 
economy had been further battered by ten years of discrimination, economic sanctions 
against Yugoslavia, and the outbreak of hostilities in 1998. While the ethnic animosity 
and discrimination is outlined in detail in Chapter Six, rural-urban migration and 
widespread poverty were also significant challenges. 
The post-conflict period saw a massive influx of people from rural areas to 
cities. The population of Pristina almost doubled in the years following the war, and 
IDPs made up eleven percent of the urban population. This was a result of both 'push' 
factors (houses in rural areas were badly damaged or destroyed during the conflict) and 
'pull' factors (the promise of a better life in the city) (UNDP, 2002). In 2000, the 
World Bank estimated that thirty-six percent of the population still lived in damaged 
housing and seven percent in temporary housing. These households were twice as 
likely as the rest of the population to be extremely poor (World Bank, 2000b). The 
massive influx of people into cities put enormous strain on health facilities. The 
interface between primary and secondary care was problematic, and no clear referral 
pattern existed. Patients referred themselves to specialist care, which heightened the 
burden on secondary and tertiary care (UNDP, 2002). 
Unemployment was a serious problem in the post-war environment. In a 
World Bank survey undertaken in 2000, only fifty-five percent of individuals of 
working age (21 to 65) were actively employed. Moreover, earnings were very low 
(W orld Bank, 2000b). Many Albanians had left Kosovo to live and work abroad in the 
1990s. Remittances from these relatives were a critical source of income for many 
families in the post-war period. Almost fifty percent of Albanian rural households 
received remittances, while Serb households received minimal assistance from 
relatives abroad (World Bank, 2000b). 
Poverty was widespread. Fifty percent of the population exhibited 
consumption levels just below the poverty line, and a significant percentage of 
households subsisted just above the poverty line (World Bank, 2000b). Eight percent 
of households had received social assistance, with sixty-three percent of Albanian 
households and fifty-eight percent of Serb households surveyed receiving food aid in 
2000 (World Bank, 2000b). Twelve percent of Kosovars lived in extreme poverty in 
the immediate post-war period (World Bank, 2000b). 
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Those living in extreme poverty were predominantly Albanians, with large 
households and a high dependency ratio (many children and elderly). Extremely poor 
households tended to be those directly affected by conflict (displaced with housing 
destroyed) and those lacking resources (salary, pension, remittances, savings, or 
property). The conflict increased extreme poverty among the urban poor due to its 
disruption of urban economic activities. 
In Table Eight, below, the characteristics of extremely poor and poor 
households, as found by the World Bank, are outlined. 
T bl E· ht Ch t . f fE t P dP H h Id a e Igi . arac ens ICS 0 x reme oor an oor ouse 0 S . 
Extreme Poor Poor 
Overall • Rural Albanian households with • Eight members (three 
seven members, at least half of adults) 
which are < 15 or >60. • Household head has 
• Household head around fifty years of secondary education. 
age, with low level of education. • Higher asset value than 
• Formerly IDP. extreme poor. 
• Live in damaged dwellings. 
• Have < 1 hectare of land and no 
machinery. 
• Use latrines. 
Urban Same as 'overall,' except that: • Smaller households with 
• Head has higher education one or no children. 
attainment. 
• Head is not participating in the 
labour market. 
• Better sewage (flushing toilet). 
Serb • Rural households concentrated in • Equally likely in urban and 
North and Southeast Regions. rural areas. 
• Three-member households with • Larger and younger 
elderly head and no children. households. 
• Head has low level of education and • Head has secondary 
works in agriculture. education. 
• Did not move during the conflict. 
Source: (World Bank, 2000b) 
B. The Political Context 
While the international community had been reasonably successful in 
addressing the post-war humanitarian crisis, the challenge of building administrative 
structures was enormous. 
With the exception of run-down buildings, UNMIK found little of the previous 
administrative structure intact when it arrived in Kosovo. In contrast to this 
bleak inheritance, their mandate to provide 'civil administration' was sweeping. 
To fulfil its mandate, UNMIK had to reconstruct all the institutions of self-
government, appoint international and local staff to these institutions, manage 
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the running costs and equip the facilities while at the same time contending 
with complicated UN procurement and staffing procedures. (International 
Crisis Group, 2002b) 
Several key factors undermined UNMIK's effort to establish civil administration and 
build autonomous institutions. The United Nations, as well as the European Union, 
was slow to deploy personnel. Those that arrived were of mixed quality, often without 
experience or expertise for the positions they held. The turnover rate for key staff was 
also high, causing discontinuity and confusion. Critical institutions, such as the 
judiciary and the police, were not operational as quickly as they were needed. And 
UNMIK continued to compete with parallel institutions of the KLA, the LDK, and the 
Serbian government (in Serb enclaves and in the north of the province). 
In an effort to build autonomous institutions of self-government, UNMIK 
established the Joint Interim Administrative Structure in January 2000 (outlined in 
Figure Eight). This structure created co-governance between UNMIK and local 
representatives, with the objective of building these autonomous self-government 
institutions. Departments were established, including the Department of Health, which 
were designed to become the basis of future Kosovar government ministries (see 
Figure Eleven, below). However, these institutions lacked staff and struggled to 
undertake even basic administrative tasks such as establishing a payroll, procuring 
goods and services, and providing transparent accounting systems. Moreover, many 
international staff lacked experience working in ministries in their countries of origin. 
While providing valuable technical advice, they did not have the expertise to train 
local officials in how government departments should function. Local Kosovar 
officials were often political appointees, most of who encountered language barriers in 
dealing with internationals. Their ability to provide substantive input into policy 
depended on the receptiveness of their international counterpart.49 
Despite the scale of resources that flowed into Kosovo in the first years of the 
mission, UNMIK did not develop a serious, overarching development strategy. Little 
was done to assess how far Kosovo was from reaching basic standards, what activities 
and training were necessary to meet these standards, what funds were required and the 
time horizon required to develop autonomous functioning institutions. 50 
49 This was not the case in the Department of Health. The international head of the department, Dr. 
Hannu Vuori, had a very good working relationship with his Albanian co-head, Dr. Pleurat Sejdiu. 
50 UNMIK's Department of Reconstruction, run by the European Union, attempted such a strategy in its 
document, "Reconstruction 2000." However, this was more a wish list of projects than a serious 
development strategy. Such a strategy was not produced until 2003/2004, when one was developed in 
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UNMIK held elections at the local level in October 2000 and at the central 
level in November 2001. These elections paved the way for democratic structures 
such as the legislative and executive bodies of government. Figure Eleven outlines the 
structure of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (pISG), including the 
Ministry of Health, and the relationship between the PISG and UNMIK, namely 
UNMIK's responsibility for oversight of the new ministries. Although the 
international community reserved the right to intervene in cases of corruption and 
where minority rights were not respected, local officials became responsible for the 
vast majority of administrative tasks. While they were democratically elected, both the 
executive and legislative branches of government at the central and local levels 
remained weak, a reflection of the lack of experience of politicians and the continuing 
deep split between the two major Albanian political parties. 
conjunction with local institutions to meet international benchmarks. When these benchmarks were 
reached, discussions on Kosovo's final status would begin. 
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Figure Eleven: The Post-Election Period-Provisional Institutions of Self-GovernmentS1 
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51 ZWI, A., PERCIVAL, V. & CAMPBELL, J. (2001) Hospital Policy in Post-conflict settings, Site of Care and Struggle. Eurohealth, 7,54-56. 
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The civil service was also weak. It was not established until after elections 
were held, which was a missed opportunity to begin the process of building a strong, 
independent public service prior to the election of elected officials. Moreover, civil-
service salaries were extremely low, and government departments lacked the ability to 
compete with international agencies for recruitment and retention of staff. 
Figure Twelve describes how these political issues combined with economic 
factors to create a low capacity for implementing reforms. Politics in the post-conflict 
period were highly fragmented, a result of the lingering divisions within the Albanian 
community because of activities during the war. The Albanian political leadership was 
experienced only in the politics of defiance, not in the skills of governance. The KLA 
was struggling to transform itself from a guerrilla movement to a political party, and 
was vying for political control with the LDK. This competition for power occasionally 
turned violent, with the assassination of some LDK leaders. Serb leaders had to adjust 
to a complete reversal of fortunes: from the politically dominant group in Kosovo to 
almost complete disengagement from the governing structures of Kosovo. Serbs 
remained dependent upon UNMIK and KFOR for protection and for access to essential 
services, but few Serb leaders actively participated in politics in Kosovo, and instead 
relied on direction from their political masters in Belgrade. 
The contentious nature of politics in the immediate post-conflict period 
undermined Kosovo's administrative capacity. This capacity was already weak due to 
the consequences of the disruption of government during the 1990s, the inexperience 
ofKosovo's politicians, the sluggish rate of the UN's establishment of government 
administration, and Kosovo' s economic weakness. 
Figure Ten outlined the need to improve the efficiency, equity, and 
effectiveness of health services and made a serious argument for health reform. Figure 
Twelve sounds a cautionary note about the environment within which this reform 
program was to be implemented. 
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Figure Twelve: The Impact of Social, Economic, and Political Context on 
Administrative Capacity 
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Low Capacity to 
Implement Reforms 
III. EXTERNAL PRESSURES FOR REFORM: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Donors flooded Kosovo with billions of dollars of assistance, and the massive 
influx of donor resources in the immediate post-conflict period provided essential 
humanitarian relief and greatly assisted the process of reconstruction. Between 1999 
and 2002, donors spent approximately eighty million Euro on the health sector, which 
represented the second-largest portion of the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (UNMIK, 
2000). 
However, the assistance effort was also plagued by a number of problems. 
Donors had short time horizons and dispersed most of their programming funds in the 
first two years of the mission. While this ensured that immediate humanitarian needs 
were met, it undermined efforts to achieve longer-term development goals. These 
short time horizons made donors risk-averse, as they had to achieve certain objectives 
within a limited period of time and were reticent to take chances with projects. Donors 
often had specific national objectives for their money, including support to national 
non-governmental organisations and specific national projects ('planting their flag'). 
They often focused on quantitative outputs, such as the number of houses rebuilt, 
health clinics re-equipped, and schools refurbished. Projects that would contribute to 
the reform process were secondary considerations. While donors coordinated their 
activities, they did not engage in a sector-wide approach. Most donor funds went to 
hundreds ofNGOs (not UNMIK or the new government). Donors did not report to the 
UNMIK Department of Health or its successor, the Ministry of Health. Coordination 
and collaboration was strictly voluntary. The vast majority of health organisations 
were professional and veterans of international work. These NGOs worked 
tremendously hard, particularly during the first year ofUNMIK's mission, to deliver 
healthcare and ensure that the system would be functional. But the government was 
left woefully under-resourced. 
By the summer of 2000, the health sector was no longer in its 'emergency 
phase' and the international community began to plan for ambitious reform of the 
health system. The WHO's 'Blue Book' provided the foundation for the reform effort, 
but it was a generalized health strategy designed to ensure that the humanitarian 
resources were spent in a manner that ensured that a more modem, sustainable health 
system was built. The Blue Book did not include much detail on the specific elements 
of that system, such as financing, human resources, and the role of the government. 
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In the summer of 2000, the WHO decided to build on the momentum created 
by the Blue Book to develop a broader, more ambitious health policy for Kosovo. 
WHO officials believed that a window of opportunity existed for reform of the 
healthcare system for four main reasons. 
First, while humanitarian spending was declining, most donors had allocated 
large sums of money for rehabilitation assistance in the period of 2000-0 1. Therefore, 
resources to support the reform effort would be more readily available than if the 
reform effort was postponed. Second, consensus existed among key actors-both local 
and international-that the previous health system needed to be upgraded. The WHO 
argued that unless a policy reform document was developed donors and NGOs might 
invest in unsustainable projects. Third, whatever the final political status ofKosovo, 
its health system needed to be modernized according to European standards. And 
fourth, during the period of political transition, the international community had full 
authority. Interest groups were less organized and entrenched. Therefore, those 
opposing change would be less able to derail the reform process (Shuey et aI., 2003). 
Moreover, because the international community was implementing health reform in a 
territory that it governed, problems that plagued other reform efforts in Central and 
Eastern Europe, such as the inability to enact legislation and regulation issues, would 
theoretically be avoided. 
This belief in a window of opportunity for reform was echoed by the World 
Bank in its health-planning document: 
There is a relatively brief window of opportunity during which donors and 
international experts can have a significant impact on restructuring systems and 
reformulating policy before these systems and institutions become entrenched 
and resistant to change. A strong emphasis should be put on aid coordination 
to ensure complementarity in donor initiatives and a priority focus in view of 
limited implementation and policy development capacity in Kosovo. 
Development support should be conditioned on policy and structural changes 
aimed at providing efficiency incentives and ensuring the long-term 
sustainability of effective institutions and programs. (World Bank, 2000a) 
However, WHO officials in Kosovo were also keenly aware of the potential 
pitfalls of pursuing an ambitious reform agenda so early in the post-conflict period. 
They acknowledged that local actors are less organized in post-conflict periods, and 
therefore establishing local ownership of reforms becomes more difficult and national 
groups have less ability to resist reforms. Successful, sustainable reform requires 
social consensus. Such a consensus is difficult to build in post-conflict environments 
where civil society is divided and enmity exists among groups that were previously in 
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conflict. Because information systems have been disrupted, inadequate health data is 
available to guide policy. Local capacity to manage the reform process is also limited. 
Moreover, mechanisms to communicate policy or debate the future system are lacking. 
And the skills of international agencies in immediate post-conflict environments are 
better suited to relief work, whereas reform is a development activity (Shuey et aI., 
2003). Despite these concerns, the WHO assessed that the benefits of pursuing a more 
comprehensive health policy outweighed the costs, and in the summer of 2000, WHO 
officials began planning a more ambitious policy document. 
There were three main inputs into the reform plans. First, the WHO assessed 
major population-health issues based on the available health data. Second, they 
considered the vision of European healthcare systems, as outlined in the WHO's 
Health for All 21. And third, they undertook consultations with Albanian physicians. 52 
A health-policy working group met regularly in Pristina, while WHO officials 
travelled throughout Kosovo to solicit the views of physicians practising in other cities 
and towns. 
Despite this effort at consultation, the majority of central stakeholders 
interviewed believed that UNMIK, the WHO and international donors were behind the 
reforms, with only moderate local input into the reform process. While half of 
stakeholders responded that the opinions of Kosovars were incorporated into the 
health-reform policy, no stakeholder indicated that the opinions of Kosovars 
effectively altered health policy. Moreover, almost half indicated that the opinions did 
not significantly alter the health policy. 53 Many stakeholders believed that the strategy 
was pre-formulated and 'sold' during the working-group meetings. Some participants 
of this working group complained that "the policy framework was already ready, and 
we were brought into the final act.,,54 However, others were more sanguine: "The 
content was defined by internationals and the decision makers were internationals. 
This is not something wrong-it was positive as we did not have a brighter vision. ,,55 
However, the externally driven nature of the reforms may have undermined the 
legitimacy of the reform process. The majority of central-level stakeholders 
52 Efforts were made to consult with Serbian physicians, but they refused to engage in the planning 
rrocess . 
. 3 See Appendix Three, Questions 9 and 10. 
54 Dr. llir Begolli, Head of Social Medicine Department, National Institute of Public Health, Interviewed 
in Albanian by Fatime Qosaj, March 24, 2003. 
55 Dr. Fekrije Hasani, Development of Nursing Program (NGO), Pristina, Interviewed in Albanian by 
Fatime Qosaj, March 5, 2003. 
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interviewed expressed doubt that the Kosovars working in the health system were 
. d C 56 comnlltte to relorms. 
This working group developed a set of health-policy guidelines, which were 
submitted to the UNMIK Department of Health. The guidelines were officially 
adopted by UNMIK in February 2001 in a document known as the 'Yellow Book' 
(Shuey et aI., 2003). The UNMIK Department of Health-which became the Ministry 
of Health after the province-wide elections-assumed responsibility for implementing 
the vision set out in the Yellow Book. 
When asked if reform was introduced too quickly, central-level stakeholders 
were evenly divided in their opinions. However, when responding to the open-ended 
question to explain their views, only two out of the eight central-level stakeholders 
who provided an explanation of their response provided positive feedback. The others 
stressed that change was too rapid: the system was in chaos, insufficient data existed to 
take decisions about reform, and little preparation was undertaken for reform 
implementation. 57 
Despite acknowledging external pressure for reform, most stakeholders 
expressed concern that the international community was only somewhat or not very 
committed to the reform process-particularly in the long term. 58 
IV. THE REFORM MEASURES: THE YELLOW BOOK'S PLAN 
The health-policy document outlined an ambitious vision for the health system 
in Kosovo: 
The health care system will be organized on the principles of equity, 
acceptability, effectiveness, flexibility, sustainability, non-discrimination, 
appropriateness, and affordability. It is recognized that some of these goals are 
conflicting, particularly in respect to equity and affordability. Every attempt 
will be made to balance the competing principles of organisation. The system 
will offer universal access to all residents of Kosovo to a basic set of primary, 
secondary, and tertiary care health services, as well as public health protection. 
In line with WHO's HEALTH21 policy, it will aim to achieve full health 
potential for all by promoting and protecting health, reducing the incidence of 
disease and injury, and alleviating suffering. Access to health care is seen as a 
basic human right with the means affordable by that society. An emphasis on 
access for vulnerable groups is to be maintained. (UNMIK, 2001) 
The basic components of the health-policy document are outlined below. 
56 See Appendix Three, Question 13. 
57 See Appendix Three, Question 3. 
58 See Appendix Three, Question 14. 
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A. Primary Care 
The Yellow Book maintained a commitment to a primary care-focused health 
system. Family medicine teams operating in primary care centres would provide initial 
diagnoses and curative care, with the objective of treating eighty to ninety percent of 
presenting problems. The location of health clinics would be determined on the basis 
of population: facilities would have catchment populations of approximately 10,000 
individuals. Larger communities would have more extensive primary care facilities 
known as 'family medicine centres,' while smaller communities would have small 
clinics known as 'punctas.' No expansion of public clinics was deemed necessary. 
(UNMIK, 2001) 
Family medicine centres would be responsible for diagnoses and curative care, 
including minor surgery and drug management; emergency care and stabilisation of 
emergency patients; maternal and child healthcare; and reproductive health services, 
including antenatal and post-natal care, as well as family planning and treatment of 
sexually transmitted diseases and violence. Individuals would choose their family 
doctor, who would be responsible for coordinating specialist and tertiary-care services. 
Patients who bypassed the referral system would face a financial penalty. Family 
medicine centres would also include basic dental services. Prevention activities such 
as health education and immunisation would be run out of these centres, as would 
services such as home visits, palliative care, community rehabilitation, and community 
mental-health services. 
Private practise and private institutions would be allowed, but such institutions 
must be approved and regulated, and private practitioners regulated and licensed. The 
policy document also accepted the reality of physicians working in both public and 
private practise. Many Albanian doctors who had been forced out of the public system 
in the 1990s had invested in private clinics, and were reluctant to forego their 
investment and this source of income. The policy document specified that, while 
doctors in the public system could have private practises, clear-cut regulations would 
be established to limit abuse, and these doctors would be required first to meet their 
public obligations. If not, public privileges would be revoked (UNMIK, 2001). 
As previously noted, early health data identified maternal and child health as 
critical issues that needed to be addressed. The infant mortality rate was estimated to 
be among the highest in Europe. Maternal mortality was also unnecessarily high -
estimated at 509 per 100,000 live births (Simpson and Maxhuni, 2003), a result of 
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maternal malnutrition, poor antenatal care, and short intervals between pregnancies. 
Therefore, the Yellow Book emphasised the importance of addressing maternal and 
child health. Maternal delivery services would be provided at six hospitals and twelve 
additional maternities located in family medicine centres throughout Kosovo. 
Approximately 1,500 to 2,000 deliveries per year would be needed before a facility 
could justify the opening of a maternity service. 
B. Secondary and Tertiary Care 
The Yellow Book outlined a system whereby patients would receive specialist 
care and hospitalisation upon referral only, except in emergencies. Specialists who 
were not working in family medicine would be hospital-based. Outpatient specialty 
care would be provided at hospitals and selected family medicine centres on referral. 
Six hospitals would provide secondary care, and tertiary care would be provided at 
only one or two sites in Kosovo upon referral only (UNMIK, 2001). 
Hospitals in Kosovo were not cost-effective, operating at seventy-five percent 
capacity with unnecessarily lengthy patient stays. Their physical structure was 
cumbersome, with mUltiple buildings and much duplication of services. The Yellow 
Book specified that hospital master plans would be written, outlining how to increase 
the efficiency of hospital services. The number of beds would be reduced in most 
hospitals. In addition, future budget allocations to hospitals would be based upon 
performance contracts and service agreements (UNMIK, 2001). 
C. Mental Health 
The foundation ofKosovo's mental-health program would be community-
based mental-health care, organized out of family medicine centers. In acute cases, 
inpatient psychiatric care would be provided in hospitals (UNMIK, 2001). 
D. Public and Environmental Health 
Kosovo's Institute of Public Health (IPH) consisted of one central institute with 
five regional offices. These institutes were not well connected with the rest of the 
health system, their equipment was obsolete, and health-information systems were not 
functioning. Under Kosovo's health policy, the IPH would be modernized and would 
concentrate on three areas: communicable disease control, health promotion, and water 
and food safety. It would also function as the technical arm of the Department of 
Health, providing it with timely and accurate information on public-health issues. The 
IPH would also guide and supervise public-health activities at the district and 
municipal levels (UNMIK, 2001). 
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E. Financing 
No specific fmancing provisions were outlined in the Yellow Book. It 
contained a pledge that the Department would study various funding sources. Options 
included tax revenues, social insurance, voluntary contributions, private insurance, 
community insurance, co-payments, and a fee-for-service system, with the likely 
system being some form of pre-payment (through compulsory or voluntary health 
insurance). Co-payments would remain in place, as they were important sources of 
income and could support health-policy goals (such as the referral system) (UNMIK, 
2001). 
F. Organisation and Governance 
The Yellow Book outlined the role of the Department of Health, which would 
later be transformed into the Ministry of Health. Under the Kosovo health guidelines, 
it would be responsible for policy, strategic planning, regulation and standard setting, 
monitoring to ensure adherence to regulations, human-resource planning, licensing, 
quality assurance, and budgeting. Several institutes, including the Institute of Public 
Health and the Pristina University Hospital, would report directly to the department. 
In line with the European Union's principal of subsidiarity, oversight of primary care 
would rest with the municipality, but the Department of Health would ensure that 
municipalities adhered to central guidelines and standards (UNMIK, 2001). 
G. Other Key Health Issues 
The health-policy document highlighted the need to upgrade the skills of 
Kosovo's health professionals to support the modernisation of the health system. This 
included family-medicine training for doctors, as well as the upgrading of the skills of 
nurses and paramedical professionals. The policy document confirmed that access to 
essential pharmaceuticals, rationally prescribed, used, and financed, would be provided 
by the public system. And a commitment was made to modernize areas such as 
emergency services, prevention, and rehabilitation of disability. Services for those 
with learning disabilities and occupational health were also addressed by the Kosovo 
health policy (UNMIK, 2001). 
Below, the capacity of the new Kosovo government to implement reforms is 
outlined. 
v. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT REFORMS 
UNMIK relied on Kosovo's health policy-both the Blue and Yellow books-
to guide donor investment and NGO activity. These documents established the vision 
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of what the health sector should be, but contained little detail on how to realize that 
vision. The WHO deliberately left the implementation strategy to the Department of 
Health (later the Ministry of Health). While the U.K. Department for International 
Development seconded a health consultant to the Department of Health to develop an 
implementation plan for the Yellow Book, this plan never materialized. The 
consultant ended up working on hospital management issues, neglecting the task of 
policy planning. As a result of the lack of focus on policy development, the largest 
healthcare donor decided to spend significant resources on equipment rather than 
programs to support reform due to the lack of an implementation plan at the 
Department of Health (Stevens, 2000). 
Most international staff in the Department of Health worked tremendously long 
hours, and made significant inroads into building a ministry. Regulations were written 
(although the Department had little capacity to enforce them), a payroll was 
established, procurement of medicines and supplies was undertaken, and rudimentary 
oversight of local institutions was provided. Although the Department was successful 
in putting in place a basic administrative structure and a rudimentary regulatory 
framework, it did not have the capacity to plan for or undertake reforms. No one 
within the UN Department had experience working in a Ministry of Health, donors did 
not provide the Department with the necessary support, and the Department was 
woefully short-staffed. The staff who were in place were preoccupied with the basic 
tasks of administering the healthcare system, coordinating donorlNGO activity, and 
beginning the gradual process of transferring responsibility for healthcare functions to 
local control. This process began first with the transfer of primary care from the 
Department of Health to municipalities, a transfer that took place after the municipal 
elections in October 2000. This process continued as authority for the health sector 
was shifted from international officials to a Minister of Health, following the central-
level elections of November 2001. 
The Ministry of Health did not communicate its vision for healthcare. The 
majority of stakeholders indicated that discussion of the reforms with Kosovo health 
professionals was moderate or infrequent. The majority of stakeholders expressed 
concern with the lack of discussion surrounding reforms-particularly after the initial 
consultations that the WHO had undertaken after the Yellow Book was formulated. 59 
All but one stakeholder indicated that discussion with health professionals in female-
5'1 See Appendix Three, Question 5. 
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dominated sectors (nurses and midwives) had been moderate or infrequent.6o While 
the majority of stakeholders also stated that the reforms were not sufficiently 
communicated to the public, some noted that extensive public communication was not 
possible at that time, given the weak media.61 
The new Ministry of Health had little time or human resources to develop an 
implementation plan for the health policy. The majority of stakeholders interviewed 
believed that the Ministry did not act sufficiently to implement reforms. This view 
was particularly marked among central-level stakeholders.62 As one stakeholder 
stated, "The Ministry did not have the capacity or will to implement the policy. They 
designed regulations as they needed, but they did not have any systematic plan in place 
to promote health policy. The right people were not in the right places.,,63 
Stakeholders believed that national standards for professional qualifications 
were enforced, and that the national facility standards that were established (not 
necessarily implemented) did reflect the objectives of the reform program. However, 
the majority of stakeholders did not believe that the services available at primary 
healthcare facilities met the objectives of the reform program, and the vast majority of 
stakeholders agreed that the Ministry of Health was not able to enforce its standards in 
private healthcare clinics.64 
In Chapter Two, health reform was described as "sustained, purposive change 
to improve the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness of the health sector with the goal of 
improving health status, obtaining greater equity, and obtaining greater cost-
effectiveness for services provided" (Basch, 1999). The impetus for health reform 
comes from both problems within the health sector, as well as economic and political 
forces outside the health sector that influence the type and pace of reforms undertaken. 
Figure Thirteen outlines the implementation process, highlighting the important 
role of the international community in health reform, and the problematic lack of state 
capacity to administer and undertake reforms. The WHO was the driving force behind 
the reform process. While an analysis of problems within the health sector and 
consultations with Albanian physicians contributed to the types of reforms suggested, 
the reform program was influenced by the WHO's premise that primary care based 
60 See Appendix Three, Question 6. 
61 See Appendix Three, Question 7. 
62 See Appendix Three, Question 12. 
63 Dr. Driton Ukmata, Head of Mission, Handicap International (NGO), Interviewed in Albanian by 
Fatime Qosaj, March 17,2003. 
64 See Appendix Three, Questions 17,21,22, and 23. 
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health systems are the most efficient and effective. The timing and pace of the reform 
process was driven by the belief (held by the WHO and donors) that a window of 
opportunity existed for such dramatic reforms in the post-conflict period. 
The WHO facilitated the consultations and produced the draft of the health-
policy document, and the UNMIK Department of Health was responsible for 
implementing the suggested policy. But the Department of Health was unable to 
develop its planning function due to staff shortages, the tremendous demands of 
administering the system, and lack of experience. UNMIK neither took the critical 
step of developing an implementation plan, nor developed any sector-wide planning 
document effectively to guide the investments of donors. The new Kosovo Ministry of 
Health had even less capacity than UNMIK, inheriting a weak structure from UNMIK 
and operating within the charged post-conflict political context. 
Figure Thirteen: Government Capacity and the Implementation Process 
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The context for implementing health reform was therefore daunting. Chapter Seven 
examines progress made in achieving the goals and objectives of health reform. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE PROGRESS OF HEALTH REFORM 
Much has changed in Kosovo since the United Nations established 
administrative control of the province. In 1999, the health system was in crisis. 
Facilities were in a state of disrepair. Access to healthcare was variable, and the 
quality of care was problematic. UNMIK suffered from weak administrative capacity, 
the economy was weak, and the political environment was highly charged. 
In 2005, the situation was dramatically different. While economic weakness 
continued to plague the province, Kosovo' s institutions had democratically elected 
officials at both the local and national levels. The Ministry of Health was under the 
purview ofKosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), and was 
staffed with civil servants who provided advice to an elected minister. The 
international community had established standards by which they judged whether 
Kosovo was ready to begin discussions regarding its final status. One of those 
standards included the health sector: "The PISG and municipalities ensure the 
availability of basic public services, such as health care, utilities, and education, 
without discrimination, to all communities in Kosovo" (UNMIK, 2003). 
This chapter continues to apply the Conceptual Framework to the Kosovo case 
study, focusing on the implementation of the reform program and the progress of 
reforms as outlined in Figure Fourteen. 
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Figure Fourteen: Application of the Conceptual Framework to Kosovo Case 
(Continued) 
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In 2005, it was too early to fully evaluate the implementation ofKosovo's 
health reforms or make final judgements as to their success or failure. Health systems 
are extremely complex and often resistant to change, the behaviour of the system is not 
easy to control, and the outcomes are not always predictable (Roberts et aI., 2004). 
However, basic trends in the implementation of health-reform measures could be 
assessed, the factors impacting on reform analysed, and judgements made on the 
degree to which the health-reform program had made progress towards achieving its 
objectives. 
I. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HEALTH REFORM 
There was no official, sector-wide strategy beyond the ambitious goals of the 
Yellow Book and Blue Book to aid in the coordination process. As the WHO scaled 
down its coordination role, UNMIK lacked the capacity, as well as the control 
mechanisms, to coordinate NGOs in the effort to build autonomous, sustainable 
institutions. 
However, according to the Ministry of Health, successful implementation of 
Kosovo's reform program was underway: 
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These health care reform attempts have helped Kosovo to streamline the health 
care system from the small punctas through the main health centers to the 
Pristina University Hospital. The main groups of health workers have modern 
job descriptions. The training of family doctors and health care managers is in 
full swing. New health records are in use and key components of a new 
management information system are ready. Earlier vertical structures are now 
an integral part of the health care system. Most health facilities have been 
refurbished and re-equipped. The public and the professionals are slowly 
beginning to accept family medicine approach in primary healthcare system. 
(Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005) 
Below, we assess progress made on various elements of the reform process. 
A. Primary Care 
The basis ofKosovo's health-reform plan was the reorientation of the health 
system away from the specialized Semashko model towards a system built on a 
primary care foundation. Patients would access the health system through physicians 
trained in family medicine, and would register with a family doctor. Primary care 
health centres would coordinate the healthcare needs of these patients by providing 
diagnoses and curative care, undertaking prevention activities, and coordinating 
community services such as home visits, palliative care, community rehabilitation, and 
community mental-health services. Responsibility for primary care would rest at the 
municipal level. Physicians would be able to work in both the private and public 
sectors. 
This was an ambitious policy, which required the introduction of the family-
medicine concept; the establishment of a strong interface between primary and 
secondary or tertiary levels of care; the management of the decentralisation process to 
ensure that this led to increased responsiveness to local needs rather than a 
deterioration in the quality of health services provided; and careful oversight by 
authorities to ensure that physicians did not abuse their ability to work in both the 
public and private sectors. 
The concept of family medicine became part of the health-system lexicon. The 
Kosovo Health Law enshrined family medicine as the "essential form for provision of 
overall health care services at the primary care level for individuals and their families" 
(UNMIK, 2004). Training programs for both physicians and nurses were initiated. 
The WHO initially developed the family-medicine program in 2000 with a fast-track 
training course, which included training in family medicine, child health, reproductive 
health, mental health, common illness in primary care, and common emergencies in 
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primary care. One hundred doctors attended the first course. Fifty of these doctors 
became trainers (HLSP, 2004, Hedley and Maxhuni, 2005). 
This curriculum was expanded to a two-year specialisation program in family 
medicine. Training included management of Kosovo's health priorities: maternal and 
child health; prevention of heart and lung disease; tuberculosis; mental health; quality 
of care; and patient prescriptions (HLSP, 2004, Hedley and Maxhuni, 2005). To build 
support for family medicine within the medical establishment, family medicine has 
been introduced into the curriculum of undergraduate medicine. Students are supposed 
to have six hours of lectures introducing them to family medicine in their sixth year (as 
seen below, this has yet to be implemented) (Hedley and Maxhuni, 2005). 
Nurses were also trained in family medicine. Eight hundred nurses were 
trained, which represented about half the primary care nurses. In addition, a nursing 
college was established whose curricula includes the concept of family medicine 
(Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2004). 
The Ministry of Health established the main Centre for the Development of 
Family Medicine in Pristina in September 2002, along with eight regional Centres for 
Family Medicine Training (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2004). These centres 
functioned as continuing-education centres and were developing clinical guidelines 
and a clinical audit for family-medicine physicians (Hedley and Maxhuni, 2005). 
Clinical guidelines had been established for STDs, heart failure, hypertension, 
depression, asthma, pneumonia, respiratory-tract infections, anaemia, urinary-tract 
infections, and renal colic (HLSP, 2004). 
The Centre for the Development of Family Medicine opened at Pristina 
University, and was responsible for advancing family medicine as an academic 
discipline, while institutional ising family medicine in primary care centres across 
Kosovo. An Association of Family Physicians was also formed, which oversees 
continuing professional development. Doctors will be revalidated every five years, 
and to renew their licenses they must undertake continuing professional development 
(Hedley and Maxhuni, 2005). 
Despite these advances, a family-medicine system is not in place. The majority 
of stakeholders indicated that family medicine had either been "tolerated" or 
"resented"; only five out of twenty-three who responded to this question indicated that 
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it had been received "enthusiastically.,,65 While some patients have registered with 
their local health centres, this practise is not widespread. Patient lists have not been 
universally created. The gate-keeping role of primary care is still underdeveloped. As 
one doctor complained, "There is no continuity of patient follow-up, patients come and 
get the referral from the family medicine doctor and just go to the specialist. ,,66 It is 
estimated that up to eighty percent of the attendances at Pristina University Hospital 
could be successfully addressed at the primary care level. Family medicine still faces 
resistance from specialists, who believe that they are in competition with family 
doctors. One stakeholder stated, "Non-family medicine specialists oppose the health 
strategy as it is based on family medicine. This is due to a conflict of interest-less 
patients for specialists.,,67 These specialists often redirect those arriving at hospitals to 
their private clinics. The dean at the Medical School (appointed in May 2004) is also 
reluctant to support family medicine, refusing to implement changes incorporating 
family medicine in the undergraduate curriculum (Hedley and Maxhuni, 2005). 
Because of the difficulties experienced in implementing family medicine, those 
working on its development fear that support is waning. 
If a change process is seen as too quick it can result in rejection as the 
individuals may feel threatened by the speed of change. Similarly if too slow, 
people may lose interest. This is the danger with the institutionalisation of 
family medicine. About 400 doctors have now or are being trained in family 
medicine, however family medicine as a concept has not been institutionalised 
so their learning is not being fully used to best effect. There is a danger that 
they will become disillusioned with their training if family medicine is not 
introduced soon. In hindsight, it would have been better if some of the 
principles of institutionalisation had been implemented even before this project 
had begun. For example, a personal doctor, zoning and the gate keeper role 
could have been introduced ... alongside the development of family medicine 
systems. (HLSP, 2004) 
While these analysts do not dispute that the introduction of family medicine is an 
important component of the effort to build a more efficient and effective health 
service, they believe that the program should have been implemented more slowly and 
carefully (HLSP, 2004). Members of family-medicine teams complain that although 
they received training, once back in health clinics, they returned to their old methods 
65 See Appendix Three, Question 24. 
M Mrvete Sopi, Main Nurse, Main Family Medicine Centre, Pristina, Interviewed in Albanian by Fatime 
Qosaj, March 3, 2003. 
67 Fekrije Hasani, Development of Nursing Program (NGO), Pristina, Interviewed in Albanian by 
Fatime Qosaj, March 5, 2003. 
144 
ofwork.68 The majority of regional stakeholders stated that family-medicine teams did 
not function in their areas of responsibility.69 A consultant assessing the system noted 
that critical reforms had not been implemented, and existed only on paper. 
There are no standardised protocols, little evidence of team-working and a lack 
of continuity of care. Medical records are not used systematically. There are 
few health promotion and disease prevention activities and little or no 
continuing education. (Centre for Administrative Innovation in the Euro-
Mediterranean Region, 2004) 
Financing for the training programs has been provided by donors, but these funds are 
drying up. If donor support for family medicine is not maintained, its sustainability 
will truly be tested (Hedley and Maxhuni, 2005). 
The effort to ensure that physicians did not abuse their ability to practise in 
both the public and private sectors also proved difficult. The average salary of doctors 
was extremely low, with primary care doctors earning only two hundred Euros per 
month. This created an incentive to go into private practise, where doctors could earn 
many times that amount (Hedley and Maxhuni, 2005). 
The Ministry of Health lacked the regulatory capacity to administer these 
private clinics. Stakeholders indicated that the quality of health care in the private 
sector was of serious concern because regulations were not respected. 70 
The initial analysis ... suggested that the regulation process for the private 
sector could take up to two years to complete and implement. It is considered 
that the current uncontrolled and unregulated development poses a serious 
threat to the stability of the public health care system. This is not to deny a 
proper role for private sector services. However, the present uncontrolled 
approach poses a threat to the operation of the public services and also presents 
serious issues of ethical practise, public safety, and consumer protection. 
(lHSD, 2003b) 
The private sector had been created during the 1990s, when Albanian physicians were 
largely expelled from the official state system. As outlined in Chapter Six, the number 
of private clinics was extensive, they were often well equipped, and would not 
disappear. Given the poor state of Kosovo' s health facilities and the shortages of 
physicians, the Ministry could better harness the capacity of the private sector and 
formalize its role through incentives and regUlation. The contracting process could be 
68 Myrvete Sopi, Main Nurse, Main Family Medicine Centre, Pristina, Interviewed in Albanian, March 
3,2003. 
69 See Appendix Three, Question 25a. 
70 Dr. Abdullah Hoti, Family Medicine Specialist, Director, Pristina Family Medicine Centre, 
Interviewed in Albanian by Fatime Qosaj, March 5,2003; Dr. Rrahman Hajdari, Clinical Director, 
Gjilan Hospital, Interviewed in Albanian by Fatime Qosaj, March 20, 2003; Dr. Retki Selaj, Internal 
Medicine Specialist, Prizren Hospital, Interviewed in Albanian by Fatime Qosaj, February 24. 2003. 
145 
a key mechanism for providing incentives for private-care providers to become a 
formal part of the healthcare system (IHSD, 2003b). 
B. Secondary and Tertiary Care 
The reform program proposed that the secondary level of the health system 
would receive patients upon referral only. Hospitals in Kosovo would improve their 
efficiency and effectiveness by reducing the number of beds, and future budget 
allocations to hospitals would be based on performance contracts and service 
agreements. By all accounts, however, efficiency and effectiveness in the hospital 
sector has not improved (IHSD, 2002a). 
Hospital provision is compromised by poor facilities, lack of equipment, and a 
lack of adequately trained staff. In general, hospitals are overwhelmed with 
large numbers of inappropriate outpatients due to the lack of a referral system 
from PHC and self referral by patients themselves. Hospital capacity in 
Kosovo, measured by total bed numbers, is low by regional or European 
averages. However, the average length of stay is 12 days, and there is a low 
average bed occupation rate of 69.5 percent, suggesting inefficient use of 
existing resources. (Centre for Administrative Innovation in the Euro-
Mediterranean Region, 2004) 
Reform to the secondary and tertiary levels of the health system received 
significantly less attention and financial support than primary healthcare reforms. One 
specialist complained, "there is not enough information about the future of the 
secondary and tertiary levels of care. No strategic plan has been created to determine 
how reform should progress.,,71 Efforts were made to improve the training of 
specialists with new curricula for post-graduate specialities of internal medicine, 
surgery, paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology, and radiology (HLSP, 2004). 
Hospital master plans were developed, but the funding to implement these plans was 
consistently lacking. 
The Ministry failed to fully support the secondary and tertiary levels of 
healthcare in spite of the population's continued reliance on hospitals. The health-
sector budget in Kosovo was evenly split between primary and secondary care 
services, even though secondary and tertiary care were much more expensive (Zwi et 
aI., 200 I). Although budgetary allocation is an important lever of change, and this 
distribution supports the future of primary care, it leaves hospitals under-funded for 
their level of activity, with little resources to maintain hospital infrastructure. 
71 Dr. Blerim Qosaj, Orthopaedic Surgeon, University Clinical Centre, Pristina, Personal 
Communication, March 24. 2003. 
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The referral system was not yet fully functioning. The Kosovar public still 
perceives primary care as a stopping point on the road to specialist care, not as a place 
to receive treatment. 72 Therefore, some hospitals are still overburdened, but are 
comparatively under-financed and unable to secure resources to address historic under-
investment or lead to rationalisation initiatives (Zwi et aI., 2001). 
Not enough attention was paid to the secondary sector, the critical interface 
between primary and secondary care is weak, and the effort to implement 
performance-related contracting has not been successfully implemented. 
C. Financing 
The Yellow Book did not outline a specific vision of a financing system for 
Kosovo, but contained a pledge that the financing alternatives would be studied. It 
speculated that the most likely form of financing would be some form of pre-payment 
system (voluntary or compulsory insurance) but other options would be examined 
including tax revenue, private insurance, and community insurance. Co-payments 
would remain in place, as an important source of income that could also support 
health-policy goals (such as the referral system). An essential-drug list was developed, 
and drugs on this list were to be provided free of charge. Informal payments made to 
staff were also prohibited. 
In 2005, the health system continued to be funded out of the Kosovo 
Consolidated Budget. As more revenue was generated through taxation, the amount of 
money allocated to the health system gradually increased. The health system received 
81 million OM in 2000, 94.6 million OM in 2001,40.8 million Euro in 2002, and 44.4 
million Euro in 2003 (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). However, these amounts 
remained inadequate, and without significant donor resources, the low financial 
capacity of the Kosovo government threatens the sustainability of the reform process. 
According to the Ministry of Health, in 2005 Kosovo spent 6.4 percent of its GOP on 
health, with 2.4 percent from public resources (the Kosovo budget); 0.7 percent from 
donor resources, and 3.2 percent from private sources. Private expenditure through 
out-of-pocket expenses for private services and pharmaceuticals, co-payments, and 
under-the-table payments was higher than public expenditure. Total public-health 
expenditure was about U.S. $28 per capita-in Croatia it is about U.S. S400 per capita 
(Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). 
72 Dr. Sami Rexhepi, District Health Officer, Pristina, Interviewed in Albanian by Fatime Qosaj, 
February 27,2003. 
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These additional costs for individuals attempting to access the health system 
created barriers to healthcare. This inability to access care when needed undermined 
the equity of the system. 
According to WHO, in principle all Kosovars have access to health care 
although in practise this is not the case. The most common barrier to health 
care access is the cost of the service. The most expensive items of expenditure 
for patients are drugs, including those required during hospital treatment, as 
well as more general expenses and informal payments made to staff in order to 
ensure access to health care. (Centre for Administrative Innovation in the Euro-
Mediterranean Region, 2004) 
While the majority of stakeholders interviewed stated that the reforms provided better 
access to healthcare for rural populations and women, they argued that the reforms had 
resulted in less access for poorer populations.73 
Significant challenges faced UNMIK in reforming healthcare financing. 
Kosovo is a poor province, and providing effective healthcare in the face of resource 
constraints was an immense challenge. The World Bank funded a project designed to 
assess the most appropriate system and implement the basis for that system. Sadly, 
this project appeared to be flawed from the outset. The Bank greatly overestimated the 
capacity of the remnants of the Kosovo Health Insurance Fund (HIF), stating: "The top 
management is highly experienced, qualified, and motivated to resurrect Fund 
activities. We believe that the human capacity of the HIF could be easily and quickly 
mobilized ifit were necessary" (World Bank, 2000a). This analysis could not have 
been further from the truth: former HIF officials were in Pristina, but the HIF was 
beyond repair or rejuvenation. Its building was almost destroyed; the HIF 
headquarters was too close to the headquarters of the police in Pristina, and suffered 
extensive collateral damage in the NATO bombing campaign. Its Serb staff had fled, 
while the Albanian staff had been out of the system for ten years. The HIF lacked the 
capacity to undertake basic administrative functions. In addition, the post-conflict 
environment was not appropriate for social insurance, as critical economic 
preconditions were not in place and government capacity to oversee the system was 
weak. 
The World Bank project focused on several issues, including establishing a 
purchaser/provider split to heighten accountability in the system and build the 
foundation for a future health-insurance system. The Health Care Commissioning 
Agency (HCCA) was conceived as a forerunner to an insurance fund. The HCCA 
73 See Appendix Three, Question 31 a, b, and c. 
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would initially exist within the Ministry of Health, with plans to make it an 
independent entity in the future. The HCCA would establish the basis for the 
contracting of services, necessary to split the purchaser and provider functions. 
Performance contracts would be signed with municipalities for primary care, and with 
hospitals for secondary and tertiary care. The HCCA would essentially buy the 
services that these institutions provided, stipUlating the type and quality of service. 
Progress in establishing the HCCA was hampered by the absence of key inputs 
such as accurate data, information and management systems, and reward systems. The 
implementing agency contracted by World Bank to establish the insurance system 
expressed deep frustration: 
Lack of data and information usable for management decision-making 
purposes; Absence of cohesive service contracts constructed on a partnership 
'trust' basis between the Commissioning Agency and provider health care 
institutions; Inadequate local management powers and systems e.g. finance and 
human resources management within which Directors and their teams can 
operate; Serious continuing under-funding and poor reward system, and 
uncertainty about resource prospects for the future (IHSD, 2003b). 
The lack of basic accounting practises also impeded progress. Budgeting systems were 
not detailed enough to hold institutions accountable. Until the summer of2001, 
accounts with the Department of Health were done on Excel spreadsheets, which 
allowed for significant corruption (Percival, 2003). For example, the pharmaceutical 
budget was a single block allocation without separation allocations for hospitals, 
municipalities, and clinical services, and there was no coding structure for goods and 
services throughout the health sector. 
The HCCA began two pilot projects on performance-related contracts, but the 
funding from the World Bank ended before this method of contracting could be 
extended to other regions. A health-insurance law has been prepared, but a general 
health-insurance system will not be introduced until at least 2006.74 
Problems with the co-payment system, small user fees designed to buttress the 
referral system and increase revenue, also indicated the weakness in the collection and 
accountability systems (IHSD, 2003b). 
There is a lack of confidence in and commitment to the current system for 
returning co-payment and other income collected at the hospital level. A 
number of hospitals and municipalities reported having followed procedures in 
banking co-payment income but being unable to recover the funds when they 
74 Dr. Matthias Reinicke, Personal Communication, 26 January 2005. 
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sought to do so because they had been appropriated by other health care 
providers of for other health purposes. (IHSD, 2003c) 
The HCCA was charged with the task of identifying the basket of health 
services that would be provided free of charge. This task was undermined by the lack 
of data on morbidity and mortality, weak health-system activity reporting systems, and 
the lack of basic financial data (IHSD, 2003c). 
The development of any form of financing system, whether taxation-based or 
insurance-based can only prosper if basic operational systems are robust and 
well-developed. In particular, the health information systems which accounts 
for and measures financial resources used in achieving the activities (IHSD, 
2003a). 
The HCCA also suffered from staffing shortages, as they were unable to find 
appropriately trained personnel at the salary levels provided by the Ministry of Health. 
For many months after its inception, the HCCA existed with only one staff member 
(IHSD,2003c). Frequent turnover of key personnel in hospitals and municipal 
structures impeded progress in building HCCA systems (IHSD, 2003c). 
Thus, the emphasis of the World Bank project should have been on establishing 
the building blocks of a future health-financing system such as transparent accounting 
systems throughout healthcare institutions in Kosovo, the training of personnel to run 
these systems, and the gradual transferral to performance-based budgeting practises. 
Health-information and management systems were also critical foundations for a 
transparent and effective financing system, and they were sadly lacking.75 
D. Organisation and Governance 
1. The Central Level 
According to the health-policy framework, the Department of Health (which 
was transformed into the Ministry of Health) was responsible for policy, strategic 
planning, regulation and standard setting, monitoring to ensure adherence to 
regulations, human-resource planning, licensing, quality assurance, and budgeting. 
Municipalities became responsible for the management of primary care, but the 
Ministry of Health would work to ensure that they adhered to central guidelines and 
standards. 
The Department of Health acted initially as the financer (purchaser) of 
healthcare services, the provider of these services, the regulator, and the institution that 
developed policy and programs. Although many governments undertake such tasks, 
75 The European Agency for Reconstruction funded a project to build a health-infonnation system in 
Kosovo. However, this project ran into difficulty and serious issues of sustainability were raised. 
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most ministries have an institutional legacy on which to build. The Department of 
Health had no standardized procedures, was woefully understaffed, and those staff that 
were in place lacked experience working in a ministry of health. Occupying a single 
floor in a dilapidated building in the centre of Pristina, it struggled even to administer 
the chaotic healthcare system. Daily challenges included oversight of service 
provision, setting budgets and providing payroll to health institutions, management of 
co-payments, procurement of capital goods and drugs, and coordination of non-
governmental actors in the health sector. They were also forced to address 
complicated issues such as coordination of donors, UN procurement rules, assessing 
human-resource challenges, building financing systems, and dealing with emerging 
health issues such as outbreaks of infectious disease. 
By the summer of 200 1, the Department of Health faced three main tasks. 
First, it had to continue to administer the health system. Second, it had to build the 
foundation for a future Ministry of Health that was to be established after the province-
wide elections in the fall of 200 1. This required building managerial and technical 
capacity within the Department of Health, establishing a regulatory framework for the 
future Ministry of Health, developing a health-financing strategy, establishing human-
resource policies, exercising quality control, oversight of the pharmaceutical sector, 
and regulating the quickly growing private sector. And third, it had to implement the 
health-reform program described above. 
After the central elections in November 2001, the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government (PISG) were established and the Ministry of Health was put in place. 
Under the Constitutional Framework, the PISG holds almost full authority in the health 
sector. The Ministry of Health has the mandate to monitor the health situation and 
implement appropriate measures to prevent and control healthcare problems, develop 
policies and implement legislation, coordinate activities in the health sector including 
the management of healthcare infrastructure, develop and implement norms and 
standards, and oversee adherence to such standards. It was staffed by civil servants 
and led by an official appointed by the Prime Minister. Internationals were 
transformed from positions of authority within the Ministry to advisory roles (see 
Figure Eleven). 
The Constitutional Framework also guaranteed that representatives from 
minority communities would be awarded Ministries-one Ministry for someone from 
the Serbian community and one Ministry for someone from non-Serb minorities. The 
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Ministry of Health was awarded to a representative of a non-Serb minority party.76 
This sparked criticism from donors, who saw a critical Ministry in which they had 
invested millions awarded to a Minister on the basis of ethnicity, rather than on the 
basis of qualifications for the difficult task of overseeing and reforming the health 
sector. 
There is no real hann in appointing a minister according to political (or even 
ethnic) criteria when the public service is well established. But Kosovo has a 
small, low paid public cadre, relatively inexperienced in public administration, 
and such a policy can be hannful. And, in a ministry run by an acting minister 
and an interim (international) pennanent secretary, any attempt to build 
sustainable capacity is at risk. International donors invested nearly E80 million 
in the public health sector between 1999 and 2002. This investment is at risk 
and needs to be secured. The authorities (the Government and, where and 
when necessary, UNMIK) must ensure that users of public health facilities can 
expect to get out of these facilities in better condition than when they enter. 
(Reinicke, 2003) 
In the first year of its existence (2002), the Ministry was wracked by political disputes. 
The first Minister was dismissed, as he did not fully respect the Ministry's hiring 
procedures and had made political appointments to the civil service. His cooperation 
with donors was minimal and sometimes hostile, and he obstructed some key 
developments such as the appointment of the Pennanent Secretary-the highest civil 
servant within the Ministry of Health. 77 The dismissal of the Minister invoked a 
political crisis, which further disrupted the already slow progress in fully establishing 
the Ministry. 
In the summer of 2003, the Ministry was poorly organized, with a lack of 
leadership and management capacity. It had few monitoring or enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure that laws were implemented and ministerial directives followed. 
Moreover, the Ministry lacked basic internal structures. There were few fonnal staff 
meetings and planning sessions. Key members of the Ministry remained 'out of the 
loop' on major policy decisions (International Crisis Group, 2003b). 
Partly as a result of these disruptions, there was little activity in the Ministry of 
Health on implementing the Yellow Book program for refonn. Apart from ongoing 
donor initiatives such as training of family-medicine physicians and the establishment 
of a health-insurance system, little attention was paid to the Yellow Book. The 
76 The Constitution Framework stipulated that one Ministry be held by a member of a non-Serb 
minority. Constitutional Framework, Chapter 9.3.5 (a). 
77 The position of Permanent Secretary is the highest rank in the civil service. 
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Ministry was preoccupied with keeping itself afloat amidst scandal and a lack of 
leadership. 
In 2005, the capacity of the Ministry was growing. Staffing of key positions 
was complete, and key members of its national staff were internationally trained, with 
significant experience working in international organisations. 
2. The Local Level 
Responsibility for primary healthcare passed from the central level to the 
municipalities after municipal elections were held in October 2000. To ensure that this 
did not result in a deterioration of services, the Department of Health (later Ministry of 
Health) took three steps. First, the Department established six District Health 
Authorities to provide support, monitoring, and control for the municipalities. These 
offices were located in Pristina, Mitrovica, Peja, Prizren, Gjakova, and Gjilan and 
monitored, supervised, and supported secondary healthcare institutions, as well as 
primary healthcare institutions. The district authorities also ensured coordination 
between primary and secondary healthcare services (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 
2004). 
Second, the Department negotiated with the Central Fiscal Authority and the 
Department of Public Services an agreement that defined the rights and duties of the 
municipalities. Under this agreement, the municipalities have to provide health 
promotion and education, health prevention, immunisation, basic curative services, 
oral health, mental health, supply of essential drugs, safe drinking water and sanitation, 
and food safety and nutrition. And third, to help build the capacity of municipalities, 
the Department of Health developed model organisational charts for the Municipal 
Health Directorates and model job descriptions for primary care personnel (Kosovo 
Ministry of Health, 2005). 
The results of decentralisation are mixed. In some municipalities with strong 
leadership and where politics are less contentious, decentralisation has not resulted in a 
deterioration of primary care services. Municipal control of primary care has led to 
closer observation over health services to ensure that they are more responsive to local 
needs. In other areas, where the capacity of municipal councils is weak, critics allege 
that that decentralisation has led to heightened corruption and reduced access to 
healthcare, particularly for minority communities (International Crisis Group, 2003a). 
The majority of stakeholders believed that the decentralisation of primary care services 
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had either made no change or had worsened the delivery of care.78 One stakeholder 
stated, "Municipalities do not have the capacity to take on these responsibilities. The 
centre does not have the capacity to monitor municipalities and they are left to 
themselves.,,79 Some stakeholders believed that responsibilities should have been 
transferred gradually, when municipalities developed management capabilities.8o 
E. Other Key Reform Objectives 
1. Public Health 
The health-policy document outlined a vision for public health. The Institute of 
Public Health (IPH) would be modernized, shutting down duplicative regional 
operations and upgrading its laboratory and health-systems capacity. Reform would 
concentrate on three areas: communicable disease control, health promotion, and water 
and food safety. The IPH would act as the technical arm of the Ministry of Health, 
providing it with timely and accurate information on public-health issues. In addition, 
the IPH would guide and supervise public-health activities at the district and municipal 
levels. The World Health Organization undertook a capacity-building project at the 
IPH to assist in transforming its role. 
Progress has been made. Public health was made a municipal responsibility, 
and municipal public-health inspectors have been hired. Responsibility for 
immunisation was transferred from the IPH to primary care facilities (Kosovo Ministry 
of Health, 2005). While technical capacity at the IPH undoubtedly improved, its 
ability to provide analysis on key public-health issues to the Ministry has been 
impeded by the failure to establish a health-information system. The Ministry of 
Health has stated that: 
A good quality information system is essential for the monitoring of the health 
strategy. Therefore, continuous development of a functional and unique 
Kosovo Health Information System will have one of the highest priority places 
in the Ministry of Health's agenda. The monitoring strategy will include the 
evaluation of existing data, the collection of additional data if necessary, data 
analysis and interpretation with result-based policy formulation. The Ministry 
of Health will actively support the development and implementation of new 
information technologies into the health sector and in particular in the Kosovo 
health information system. The Ministry of Health recognizes the poor current 
situation in respect to the lack of reliable information, the poor information 
flow and the quality of information generation, it is essential to embrace new 
78 See Appendix Three, Question 35. 
79 Fakrije Hasani, Development of Nursing Program (NGO), Pristina, Interviewed in Albanian by 
Fatime Qosaj, March 5, 2003. 
80 Dr. Sami Rexhepi, District Health Officer, Pristina, Interviewed in Albanian by Fatime Qosaj, 27 
February 2003. 
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and affordable information technologies in order to establish functional health 
information systems. (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005) 
Efforts to put in place this health-information system have been plagued with 
problems. 
In 2002, a health-management information system became operational, and is 
functioning in thirty facilities. 81 Analysts at the IPH have been provided with software 
and have been trained in its use. However, it is not clear how the information will be 
taken from the Health Information System by the IPH and transformed into 
information suitable for policy and decision making at the Ministry of Health (HLSP, 
2004). Moreover, a consultant assessing the health-information system found gaping 
holes in the system. Basic information about the system was missing, such as how the 
system functions, how the processes work, how to fix user problems, how to use 
specialized tools for support of information systems, how to install and deploy the 
application, how to import and export data into the central database, how to design 
reports, and how to perform quality control of the imported data. No comprehensive 
checklists were designed to maintain the processing system. And crucial 
documentation needed to maintain the system was not available (Dataguard, 2005). 
While the original consultant working on the system challenged these findings, he did 
acknowledge that the health information system was developed in too short a time span 
to ensure a sustainable system was established (Reinicke, 2005). Moreover, the 
majority of stakeholders believed that the decentralisation of primary care services had 
made no change or had worsened the delivery of care. 82 
2. Mental Health 
The foundation ofKosovo's mental-health program was community-based 
mental-health care, organized out of family-medicine centres. For acute cases, 
inpatient psychiatric care would be provided in hospitals. By 2005, community 
mental-health facilities had been established in many cities in Kosovo and mental-
health staff had been trained (Simpson and Maxhuni, 2003, Kosovo Ministry of 
Health, 2005). 
However, Mental Disability Rights International found that serious concerns 
remain with the treatment of mental illness in Kosovo. The program to build 
community-based mental-health care was very slow to be established. More 
~I Dr. Matthias Reinicke, Personal Communication, 26 January 2005. 
82 See Appendix Three. Question 36. 
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disturbing, the report documented serious physical and sexual abuse that was taking 
place at Kosovo' s main psychiatric institute (Rosenthal and Szeli, 2002). 
F. Impact on Health Status 
Available indicators suggest that by 2005 Kosovo had experienced gains in 
health status. Maternal health had improved: In 1999,23 women died per 100,000 live 
births; between 2000 and 2002, the Kosovo Obstetric and Gynaecological Association 
estimated the average rate at 21 deaths per 100,000 live births (Kosovo Ministry of 
Health,2005). Perinatal mortality, which includes stillbirths and deaths oflive-bom 
infants during the first seven days of life, decreased steadily to 28.7 per 1,000 births in 
2001, and 27.1 per 1,000 in 2002 (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). 
The fight against communicable diseases had also been relatively successful. 
In 2002, the WHO estimated that immunisation against measles was only 67 percent 
coverage. A vaccination campaign in 2003 raised that to 99-percent coverage for 
children aged 1 to 15 (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). With the introduction of 
Directly Observed Treatment for Tuberculosis (DOTS), the annual incidence rate of 
tuberculosis dropped by 11 percent between 2001 and 2002. Kosovo' s treatment 
success rate of 87 percent exceeded the WHO goal of 85 percent (Kosovo Ministry of 
Health, 2005). 
Non-communicable diseases were more challenging. Cardiovascular diseases 
were the leading cause of death, accounting for about 48 percent of total mortality 
(Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). Cancer was the second leading cause of death, and 
the most common causes of cancer-related deaths were lung and stomach cancer in 
men and stomach and breast cancer in women (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). 
Despite these gains, in 2005 health status in Kosovo remained among the worst 
in Europe, and the lack of a fully functioning health-information system meant that 
continual monitoring of health status was extremely difficult. 
II. REFORM OUTCOMES: MEETING THE OBJECTIVES OF HEALTH REFORM? 
Table Nine outlines the objectives of health reform as presented in the Yellow 
Book, and summarizes progress made towards meeting these objectives. 
T bl N· a e me: P . M f H Ith R ~ rogress 10 ee 109 ea - e orm G I oa s 
Reform Objectives Reform Progress 
Primary Care • Location and services • The WHO established a 
offered by family-medicine facility master plan based on 
centres would be based on capitation, which guided 
population. rehabilitation and staffing. In 
• Family doctors would have minority areas, some facilities 
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Reform Objectives Reform Progress 
patient lists, and be were opened that were not 
responsible for diagnoses included on the master plan. 
and curative care, • Family-medicine training 
reproductive, maternal and established with a two-year 
child health, and emergency specialisation program. 
care and stabilisation. Nurses are also trained in 
Family doctors would be family medicine. 
responsible for coordinating • Serious impediments exist: 
specialist and tertiary-care patient registration is not 
servIces. universal, gate-keeping role of 
• Private practise would be primary care underdeveloped, 
allowed, and physicians and resistance from specialists. 
would be allowed to • Ministry lacks the capacity to 
practise in both the public regulate the private sector, and 
and private sectors, but there are accounts of 
institutions must be physicians redirecting patients 
approved and regulated and from the public sector to their 
oversight established to private clinics. 
prevent abuse. 
Secondary • Patients would receive • Patients often bypass the 
and Tertiary specialist care and primary care level to receive 
Care hospitalisation upon referral direct treatment by specialists. 
only, except in emergencies. Analysts have estimated that 
• Hospital Master Plans will up to eighty percent of patients 
establish a vision for at Pristina University Hospital 
increasing the efficiency of could have been treated at the 
hospitals. primary care level. This 
means that hospitals are 
overburdened. 
• While Master Plans were 
developed, the Ministry has 
lacked the resources and 
commitment from donors to 
implement these plans. 
Mental Health • Foundation of community- • Community mental-health 
based mental-health care centres have been established 
organized out of family- throughout Kosovo. 
medicine centres. Inpatient • Mental Disability Rights 
psychiatric care for acute International has been critical 
cases. of the slow pace of the 
establishment of community 
mental-health facilities and 
documented physical and 
sexual abuse in Kosovo' s main 
psychiatric institute. 
Public Health • The Institute of Public • Oversight of public health was 
Health would focus on transferred to municipalities, 
communicable disease and public-health inspectors 
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Reform Objectives Reform Progress 
control, health promotion, operate at the municipal level. 
and water safety. Responsibility for 
• The institute would operate immunisation was transferred 
as the technical arm of the to primary care. 
Department of Health, • The ability of the Institute of 
providing it with Public Health to provide 
information on public- timely and accurate analysis to 
health issues. the Ministry of Health has 
been impeded by the lack of a 
functioning information 
system. While a health-
information system exists, its 
sustainability is questionable. 
Healthcare • No commitment was made • Equity is marred by the 
Financing to any financing system, but significant private 
a pledge was made to study expenditures (including under-
the merits of various the-table payments) that the 
alternatives. Some form of public has to make to access 
pre-payment system would healthcare. 
be established through • System continues to be funded 
compulsory or voluntary out of the Kosovo 
insurance. Co-payments Consolidated Budget, but a 
would be maintained. precursor to a social-insurance 
system, the Health Care 
Commissioning Agency 
(HCCA), has been established 
and is beginning the process of 
establishing performance-
based contracts. 
• The establishment of the 
HCCA and performance-based 
contracting has been 
undermined by the absence of 
accurate data, information and 
management systems, and 
reward systems. Moreover, 
the failure to establish a 
transparent accounting system 
prior to the HCCA has slowed 
efforts to implement health-
financing reforms. 
• The H CCA struggled to 
identify the basket of health 
services that would be 
provided free of charge. 
Organisation • The Ministry of Health • The UNMIK-Ied Department 
and would be responsible for of Health was expected to 
Governance policy, strategic planning, administer the health system, 
and regulation and standard prepare for the transition from 
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Reform Objectives Reform Progress 
setting. international to local control, 
• Responsibility for primary and manage the reform 
care would be decentralized process. It faced serious 
to municipal level. capacity shortfalls. 
• The Ministry has been 
undermined by political 
turmoil, including changes of 
Minister and controversy 
surrounding the appointment 
of the most senior civil 
servant. This turmoil 
undermined its capacity to 
implement reforms. 
• Oversight for primary care 
became the responsibility of 
the municipalities in 2001. 
Municipalities were slow to 
establish oversight structures, 
and capacity of municipalities 
varies. Ministry of Health set 
up District Health Authorities 
to monitor municipalities, 
creating animosity and 
confusion. 
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III. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH STRATEGY: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN? 
Table Nine clearly demonstrates that by 2005 many objectives of reform had 
not been met, and the health system continued to suffer from inequity and variable 
quality of care. Moreover, the Ministry of Health was unable to make much progress 
on implementing the reform program. 
To focus the efforts of the Ministry of Health on reform, in early 2005 the 
Ministry released an ambitious strategy document. This strategy was an effort to 
establish an implementation plan for the health-reform process. Below we assess the 
strategy released by the Ministry of Health. 
A. Objectives of the Ministry of Health 
The Ministry of Health established seven goals, with several objectives for 
each goal, which are outlined in Table Ten. As seen in this table, the goals, objectives, 
and targets set for these objectives are highly ambitious. 
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Table T MO ° fH h 
- - -- ~ - ----- -- J -
- -- --..... 
- -~-- _-.1.1--'. ""_L7 
Goal Ob.iectives (by 2014) 
l. Reduce the incidence and a. Reduce the incidence of infectious diseases including TB (by 40%) and AIDS (halt spread) and 
adverse impact from reduce their impact; 
major communicable and b. Reduce the incidence and impact of cardiovascular diseases (reduce mortality by 15%); 
non-communicable c. Reduce the incidence and impact of cancer (reduce death rate by 100/0 and late diagnosis by 250/0); 
diseases. d. Reduce the incidence and impact of diabetes (halve increase of type II diabetes); 
e. Improve oral health (stabilize incidence of cavities}. 
2. Enhance child and mother a. Reduce under-five mortality and morbidity (by two thirds); 
health. b. Reduce maternal mortality and morbidity (by 500;(»); 
c. Improve immunisation (coverage rates of95% for mandatory vaccines). 
3. Strengthen health- a. Reduce smoking (by 10%); 
promotion activities and b. Improve nutrition (decrease prevalence of vitamin A deficiency and anaemia by 50%); 
advance healthy lifestyles. c. Increase levels of physical activity; 
d. Prevent drug addiction and risky behaviours, with special emphasis on youth. 
4. Reduce inequalities in a. Ensure accessible and appropriate health services for people from lower socio-economic groups; 
health status. b. Ensure accessible and appropriate health services for minority populations. 
5. Improve mental health. a. Halt and begin to reduce the incidence and impact of mental illnesses; 
b. Stabilize the incidence rate of suicides and suicide attempts. 
6. Support a healthy a. Enhance healthy physical environment; 
environment and injury- b. Enhance healthy social environment; 
prevention program. c. Reduce the incidence rate of accidents. 
7. Introduce institutional a. Strengthen primary healthcare services through family-medicine approach; 
reforms and improvement b. Improve public-health services through reorganisation of public-health institutions; 
of management practises c. Improve management of human resources; 
in healthcare services. d. Improve financial management; 
e. Strengthen legal and regulatory framework; 
f. Improve management of drugs and medical supplies; 
g. Strengthen policy and planning capacity research and quality of healthcare services; 
h. Integrate health services in minority areas. 
---
Source: (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005) 
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The Ministry of Health also issued a primary care strategy document in 
September 2004. In this strategy, the Ministry committed itself to ensuring that eighty 
to ninety percent of health care needs are addressed at the primary care level. The 
primary care strategy acknowledges that for the primary care system to function 
effectively, more work is needed to develop basic infrastructure for the system. Items 
essential to the functioning of a healthcare system are lacking, such as basic medical 
records, patient registration with a family physician, the referral system, and a quality-
improvement system (to ensure minimum standards in healthcare are met, including 
clinical management, clinical guidelines, quality assurance, and licensing and re-
licensing (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2004). The strategy also acknowledges that 
more information is needed on the numbers and qualifications of healthcare workers, 
and continuing professional education is required, including continuing training in 
family medicine for both doctors and nurses. 
The strategy emphasizes that the Ministry of Health is working to identify and 
update the basic package of health services, develop human resources, improve 
infrastructure and equipment, identify and develop needed regulation, and develop 
sustainable financing (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2004). The Ministry intends to 
utilise financial incentives through contracting of services with municipalities to 
ensure that the system of family medicine is maintained and supported. The Ministry 
also acknowledges that further financial resources are required to support primary care 
(Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2004). 
B. Strengths and Weakness of the Healthcare Strategies 
The development and publication of these strategies was critically important. It 
was the first time since the release of the Yellow Book in 2001 that the Ministry had 
outlined any strategic vision. Moreover, these strategies were the product of the 
Kosovo government, not the international community, and were written primarily by 
experts from Kosovo. They reflected the continuation of the vision of a primary care-
based system outlined in the Yellow Book and the development of analytical and 
strategic capacity within the Ministry of Health. With these strategies, the Ministry 
attempted to provide a focused plan to implement the health-policy vision outlined 
within the Yellow Book and ensure the sustainability of that vision. 
Moreover, the two strategy documents accurately reflect the healthcare issues 
facing Kosovo. Controlling both communicable and non-communicable diseases, 
improving mother and child health, and addressing variable access to healthcare and 
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variable quality of care are all critical healthcare problems. The Ministry of Health's 
overarching strategy outlines specific targets that the Ministry should meet by 2014, as 
well as initiatives that the Ministry will undertake to meet those targets, which are 
important steps towards developing accountable and transparent institutions. 
However, these documents suffer from some serious weaknesses. First, the 
strategy outlines too many priorities for the Ministry of Health while not providing 
information on how the Ministry will develop the capacity to address these problems. 
F or example, the Ministry commits itself to developing action plans for all of the 
objectives identified in the health strategy, and twenty-seven such objectives exist. 
Developing and enacting twenty-seven action plans is a difficult task for any 
institution, let alone a Ministry of Health only four years old. 
Second, the strategy identifies priorities without supporting evidence. For 
example, countering diabetes is identified as a key objective for the Ministry (see 
Table Ten: goal 1, objective d), but there is no specific data outlining the incidence rate 
of diabetes, the risk factors for the disease, and why it is a priority for the Ministry. In 
its effort to address inequalities in health status, the Ministry also strays into policy 
areas outside its mandate such as reducing income disparities between socio-economic 
groups, reducing unemployment, supporting community development, and promoting 
equal opportunities in education (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). Socio-economic 
policy has an important impact on public health, however the Ministry should focus on 
areas within its purview and address factors over which it has some influence and 
control. 
The ability of the Ministry to meet these targets is questionable, and few 
specific strategies are offered. It commits to reducing mortality rates from 
cardiovascular diseases by fifteen percent (see Table Ten, goal 1, objective b), but is 
that realistic in the absence of information and analysis of factors driving these 
diseases? The Ministry also pledges to reduce by two-thirds the under-five mortality 
rate (see Table Ten goal 2, objective a), yet provides little evidence of the causes of 
high mortality rates in this age group. It identifies some specific initiatives, such as 
implementing Integration Management of Childhood Illnesses (lMCI) and Promoting 
Effective Perinatal Care (PEPC); establishing early breastfeeding in delivery units; 
developing and applying clinical guidelines and protocols for child care; and regular 
monitoring of growth and development for children in Primary Health Care (Kosovo 
Ministry of Health, 2005). However, some of the initiatives are very vague, including 
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a promise to develop specific policies and strategies for child and adolescent health. It 
is unclear whether these interventions are appropriate without an accurate diagnosis of 
the causes of under-five mortality. 
Critical gaps also plague these strategy documents. As part of its injury-
prevention program, the Ministry would like to stabilize and reduce the rate of 
accidents, accident-related deaths, and disabilities (see Table Ten, goal 6, objective c.) 
(Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2005). The leading causes of accident morbidity and 
mortality are not identified-i.e. vehicle accidents, workplace accidents, or other 
causes. The initiatives to meet this target do not include simple, cost-effective 
solutions such as public health initiatives to promote seatbelts and speed limits. The 
Ministry also does not identify partners within the government and civil society with 
whom they will work to meet these goals. 
This lack of attention to injury prevention is particularly critical for child 
health. In other countries in South Eastern Europe, injury is the most common cause 
of death among children. In the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, the childhood 
death rate from injuries is 2.5 times higher than in the EU, and the two most common 
causes of childhood death are traffic injuries and drowning. Studies in Bosnia and 
Macedonia demonstrate that children's knowledge of traffic rules and dangers from 
traffic are very low (Rechel and McKee, 2003). The health strategy misses this crucial 
area of cost-effective interventions, such as the promotion of child car seats, water 
safety, and injury-prevention initiatives in the home. 
Initiatives regarding maternal health-another key health-status issue in 
Kosovo-are also poorly developed and not based on data or evidence. The strategy 
for primary care states that the Ministry of Health will, " .. .increase information 
regarding family planning methods, especially for women, considering family planning 
as one of the most effective methods of improvement of mother and child health" 
(Kosovo Ministry of Health, 2004). While the general strategy for the Ministry of 
Health pledges to develop and apply clinical guidelines to reduce maternal mortality 
by fifty percent, efforts to identify the barriers to accessing pre-natal and antenatal care 
are not outlined. The strategy does not address critical issues such as mother and child 
nutrition and raising awareness of the risks of smoking and alcohol consumption 
during pregnancy. 
The critical question of how the Ministry of Health will finance these activities 
is also not examined. While the strategy commits to improving financial management 
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systems, the issue of healthcare financing is not addressed. The strategy is also silent 
on the initiative to separate purchaser and provider functions in the Ministry through 
the contracting of services via the Health Care Commissioning Agency. No 
information is provided on how health-financing mechanisms, such as performance-
related contracts, will be utilized to meet these objectives (Kosovo Ministry of Health, 
2005). The strategy states that oncology services should be supported with diagnostic 
and treatment equipment, but does not identify revenue sources to pay for this 
expensive treatment. 
While the strategy commits to the importance of a health-information system, it 
remains unclear that this information will be used to enhance decision-making. The 
Ministry commits to specific health targets, but it is unclear how these targets were 
identified in the absence of a fully functioning health-information system, or how 
information systems will be used to monitor progress in achieving these goals. 
The Ministry of Health has not reflected on why Kosovo has failed to make 
progress in implementing the health-reform program. Reform objectives have been 
stymied by political turmoil, economic weakness, and serious capacity problems. 
Moreover, the foundation for ambitious reform efforts such as family medicine, health 
financing, and public health was not established prior to these reforms being 
attempted. The weakness of the health-information system, the failure to put in place a 
patient-registration system, and the failure to have sufficiently robust and transparent 
accounting in place prior to the establishment of the Health Care Commissioning 
Agency have undermined the ease and speed of the reform process. 
Therefore, while the Ministry of Health's strategy is a step in the right 
direction, there is a danger that it ignores some of the basic hurdles that the Ministry 
needs to overcome to implement health reform. Below we evaluate what went right in 
Kosovo's health-reform program, as well as what went wrong. 
IV. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: A SUMMARY 
Some progress has been made in implementing Kosovo's health policy: the 
Ministry of Health has maintained the overarching objectives of reform in its strategy 
documents, family doctors have been trained, responsibility for primary care has been 
transferred to the municipal level, immunisation coverage has increased, and some 
maternal and child health indicators have improved. Moreover, the Ministry has 
developed a strategy outlining the objectives of reform. 
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Yet there is also cause for concern. As outlined above, some key reform 
initiatives, such as building the strength of primary care and establishing an effective 
health-financing system, have been problematic. Moreover, the Ministry of Health 
strategy to implement health reform contains serious flaws, and there is little indication 
that it has adequately identified the barriers to reform. 
It is still too early to fully judge Kosovo' s health-reform program, and not 
enough data is available to assess the judiciousness of certain reform decisions, such as 
the establishment of the Health Care Commissioning Agency. Health reform is a 
complex undertaking, and it can take years of resources and effort to produce 
meaningful change. Yet trends in health reform can be evaluated, i.e. what elements of 
the reform program have gone well, what has been problematic, and how effectively 
the Ministry of Health is overcoming obstacles to reform. 
The conceptual framework applied to Kosovo clarifies the reform process as 
well as reform outcomes, enabling analysis of the factors shaping the reform measures 
and their implementation. Figure Fifteen applies the conceptual framework for health 
reform to the Kosovo case. 
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Figure Fifteen: Application of the Conceptual Framework to Kosovo Case 
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The reform measures as outlined in the Yellow Book were selected to reflect 
population-health challenges and to address the dilapidated infrastructure of the public 
health system. However, as outlined above, these measures were also driven by 
external pressures and resources from the WHO and international donors. The 
socioeconomic and political context-namely the ambitious efforts of the international 
community to build liberal-democratic institutions as part of their post-conflict 
peacebuilding efforts-also shaped the reforms. The implementation of the reform 
measures was impacted not only by these three factors (the health context, the external 
pressures for reform, and the socio-economic and political context), but, importantly, 
by the weak capacity of the Kosovo Ministry of Health. All of these factors impacted 
on the ability of the reforms to meet their objectives of establishing a primary care-
based system with functioning family-medicine teams, referral to the secondary and 
tertiary levels of care, community-based mental-health care, an Institute of Public 
Health that operates as the technical arm of the government, sustainable healthcare 
financing, and governance structures that reflected the European Union's principle of 
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subsidiarity with a Ministry of Health-provided policy, strategic planning, and 
regulation and standard setting. 
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CONCLUSION: PROVING THE HYPOTHESIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
OTHER HEALTH-REFORM EFFORTS 
The research hypothesis-generated after the development of the conceptual 
framework and an analysis of the failures of health reform in Central and Eastern 
Europe-tested in this thesis is that the post-conflict social, economic, and political 
context and its impact on state capacity, the externally driven nature of the health-
reform process, and the compressed timeframe for reforms together impact on the 
ability of post-conflict health-reform programs to achieve their objectives. This 
conclusion summarizes the analysis above to prove that this hypothesis is correct, and 
assesses the implication for future research. The successes of the Kosovo reform effort 
are highlighted below. 
I. WHAT WENT RIGHT 
Important lessons from other post-conflict contexts were applied in the case of 
Kosovo. The WHO assumed a coordination function and established a strategic-
planning document (the Blue Book) to guide investments in the health sector. A 
facility master plan guided the rehabilitation of health facilities. Weekly coordination 
meetings were held. These important developments took place in a difficult context 
with a multiplicity of donors and NOOs and a weak government in the form of 
UNMIK. 
Moreover, Kosovo's health policy provided all stakeholders in the health 
sector, donors, international agencies, non-governmental organisations, and Kosovo 
health professionals with an opportunity to outline a shared vision for the health sector. 
The WHO was wise to begin formulating health policy soon after the conflict ended. 
Donor funds were then used to build the foundation for health reform. 
The vision of the reform process, first articulated in the Yellow Book and 
repeated in the strategy of the Ministry of Health, has traction within Kosovo. Despite 
the pessimism generally expressed by stakeholders, all were optimistic that in fifteen 
years the health system would reflect the vision outlined in the health-policy 
document. 83 The health policy has guided donor responses and ensured a degree of 
coherence in rehabilitation and reform efforts. After the authority for the health sector 
was passed from UNMIK to the Kosovo provisional government, the Ministry of 
Health maintained adherence to these policy goals in its strategy documents. Training 
83 See Appendix Three, Question 37. 
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of family doctors has begun, family-medicine centres have been established, some 
community mental-health services have been created, and the Health Care 
Commissioning Agency was established to act as the precursor to a health-insurance 
fund. And responsibility for primary care and public health has been decentralized to 
the local level. While much has been accomplished, reforms largely failed to meet 
their objectives. 
II. WHAT WENT WRONG: PROVING THE HYPOTHESIS 
A. External Pressures for Reform 
Kosovo's donors generously provided more than one hundred million Euros to 
rehabilitate and reform the health sector. Without this assistance, many health 
facilities would have remained in a state of disrepair and bereft of equipment. 
Physicians were trained in family medicine, specialists upgraded their skills, and 
public-health infrastructure was upgraded. 
However, donors made several critical errors. First, donors did not commit to a 
sector-wide approach early in the process, and donor coordination was more often like 
competition. Donors often undertook their programming based on their own national 
objectives rather than on a solid assessment of needs on the ground. Second, donors 
overestimated the window of opportunity for reform and the indigenous capacity 
within Kosovo to achieve reform objectives. And third, donors did not focus enough 
attention in the critical early stages of the reform process on the crucial problem of the 
state's capacity to undertake reform efforts. 
B. Post-Conflict Political and Socio-Economic Context 
As described above, the health system was politically charged. Many of 
Kosovo's leading politicians are physicians. The health sector was a key battleground 
for Kosovo's autonomy, and Albanians were justifiably proud of their 
accomplishments in establishing a parallel health system and medical school during the 
1990s. After the international community arrived in Kosovo, the health system 
continued to be an important arena for political struggle. The KLA appointed heads of 
hospitals and primary clinics immediately after the war, but many of these 
appointments were changed after the rival LDK won elections at the municipal level. 
After the central elections in 2001, the new Minister of Health introduced political 
appointments in the Ministry and throughout the health system, which resulted in his 
dismissal. This politicisation distracted Kosovo officials from the reform program and 
impeded progress towards meeting reform goals. 
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Kosovo also suffered from extreme economic weakness. While billions of 
dollars poured into the province, with approximately a hundred million Euro given to 
the reform effort, this money was quickly absorbed by the need to refurbish and equip 
health facilities and training programs. Resources were not sufficient to provide 
adequate financial incentives to support reform goals, and the reforms did not generate 
a financing strategy effectively to address Kosovo's resource challenges. 
C. Weak Government Capacity 
The United Nations Department of Health, and later the Kosovo Ministry of 
Health, was expected to undertake three objectives: first, coordinate donors and NGOs 
during the rehabilitation program; second, oversee the administration of the health 
system; and third, implement an ambitious program of reform. The Department was 
expected to meet these three goals with few resources. It was initially short-staffed 
and completely overstretched. While international staff provided competent technical 
advice on public-health issues, they lacked experience working within government and 
could not guide the transformation of the Department into a government ministry. 
Because of these weaknesses, the Department lacked the capacity to exercise a strong 
planning role. There was no sector-wide planning approach, and no implementation 
plan for the Yellow Book was developed. 
When the Department of Health was transformed into a Ministry, political 
problems undermined the transition process. The first Minister of Health was 
dismissed for incompetence, and the most senior civil-servant post in the Ministry-
the Permanent Secretary-remained unfilled for many months. This political 
instability also contributed to slowing down the implementation of reforms. 
While there are promising signs that the Ministry of Health has overcome some 
of these difficulties, the strategic-planning documents released by the Ministry to guide 
the reform process have key weaknesses, outlined above. Weaknesses include a 
multiplicity of objectives with few specific strategies on how these objectives will be 
achieved, targets and priorities identified without supporting evidence, critical gaps in 
the areas of child and maternal health, and no information on financing and payment 
systems. 
D. Compressed Nature of the Reform Process 
Donors and the WHO argued that an important window of opportunity existed 
for reform. This window existed for two reasons: first, there was little resistance from 
stakeholders eager to block reform, and second, there was a massive influx of donor 
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resources. However, the capacity needed for this type of radical change was seriously 
underestimated. According to the agency attempting to implement the health-
insurance system, the rate of change was too much for these weak institutions. 
The health system has experienced constant change especially at the centre .... 
The rate of change has created significant pressures on the Ministry of Health 
and its capacity to set policy and manage the health system. The lack of 
capacity within the Ministry, turnover of key personnel, delays to the 
appointment of staff in the permanent secretary post and within the HCCA and 
lack of basic systems for producing health information and financial data, as 
well as the lack of financial accounting and management capacity across health 
institutions, have been significant barriers to the implementation of financing 
reform. (IHSD, 2003b) 
Stakeholders shared this concern that the rate of change was too fast. One doctor 
stated, "The health system changed too quickly from one system to another, and such 
dramatic change was impossible with all the post-war problems.,,84 
The problems posed by the compressed time frame for reform were 
exacerbated by the failure to undertake effective policy planning. While the policy 
document (the Yellow Book) was developed in consultation with donors and health 
professionals, no similar process took place to develop an implementation plan. One 
stakeholder complained that, "there were no preparations for implementation, no 
assessment of financial, human or management resources. ,,85 As a result, there was 
little reflection about the possible impediments to reform, and the necessary steps to 
achieving reform objectives. Health reform cannot be effectively built on a weak 
foundation. 
An implementation plan could have identified the need to establish the 
necessary building blocks of reform. In primary care reforms, efforts to establish 
patient registration, clinical guidelines, the gate-keeping role of the primary care 
sector, and the interface between the primary and secondary care sectors could have 
created a more solid foundation for family medicine. Instead family physicians were 
trained and returned to a health system where family medicine still had not gained full 
acceptance. Efforts to implement financing reforms also experienced similar 
problems: 
R4 Dr. Lumturije Gashi-Luci, Chief Pathologist, Pathology Clinic, Pristina University Hospital, 
Interviewed in Albanian by Fatime Qosaj, February 24, 2003. 
85 Dr. Sebahudin Ahmeti, Health Consultant, Interviewed in Albanian by Fatime Qosaj, March 13. 
2003. 
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Basic conditions and systems necessary to support an insurance based system 
do not exist: payroll tax collection system; patient identification system; a 
health information system to support transaction system; costing/pricing 
management accounting systems; licensing, registration, and accreditation 
systems. (IHSD, 2002b) 
The weak health-information system has meant that accurate and reliable data are not 
available to evaluate the progress and impediments to health reform. 
III. SUMMARY: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF REFORM 
The need to improve the healthcare system in Kosovo is clear. Kosovo' s health 
indicators are among the poorest in Europe. The system is not currently effective or 
equitable. However, the context for implementing the health-reform program in 
Kosovo is daunting. Important health issues must be addressed: high rates of infant 
and maternal mortality, serious child-health concerns, and risk factors for both 
communicable and non-communicable diseases. Demand for healthcare is high, but 
the health system is crumbling, financial barriers to access exist, and there is a 
physician shortage. The highly fragmented nature of Kosovo' s politics, the low 
administrative capacity of the government, and economic weakness undermine 
Kosovo's capacity to implement reform. 
Kosovo was the first of a new kind of international intervention, where the 
international community contributed sufficient troops and resources to undertake a 
massive reform of political, social, and economic institutions. As part of the effort to 
avert a return to war, these reforms had the objective of transforming Kosovo into a 
liberal democracy characterized by a free and open political system, the legal and 
institutional protection of human rights, including minority rights, and an economy 
driven by the private sector. In the healthcare sector, the international community's 
objective was to improve the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness ofKosovo's health 
system. While the objectives were noble, the reality has fallen far short of the grand 
vision outlined in the Yellow Book. And if the trends outlined in Chapter Seven 
persist, Kosovo will continue to struggle to implement its reform goals. 
Below, the predictive and explanatory value of the literature on health 
interventions in situations of conflict, health reform, health reform in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and peacebuilding is reviewed. The additional lessons learned from 
the Kosovo case study are examined, particularly the importance of state capacity and 
the need for an implementation plan outlining realistic reform goals. The chapter 
concludes by outlining a research agenda for post-conflict health reform. 
173 
IV. PREDICTIVE AND EXPLANATORY VALUE OF LITERATURE 
A. Health and Conflict 
There are three stages of health interventions after a conflict has ended: the 
humanitarian, rehabilitation, and reform stages. While the humanitarian phase is 
focused on addressing threats to population health, critics contend that coordination is 
often lacking and agencies neglect the necessary building of local capacities. The 
international community focuses on repairing infrastructure during the rehabilitation 
phase, but analysts have argued that a longer-term health strategy should be developed 
during this time period to ensure that resources are focused on sustainable projects. 
While little assessment has been made of the effort to undertake reforms as part of 
post-conflict peacebuilding operations, an evaluation of East Timor claimed that these 
were really development activities, being implemented with short time horizons. 
In Kosovo, the international community learned important lessons from 
mistakes made in previous post-conflict operations. Coordination systems were 
established, a facility master plan to guide rehabilitation was released, and a policy 
document was written to ensure that investment was channelled in sustainable 
directions. Moreover, the decision by the WHO to establish a policy direction helped 
channel the substantial donor resources available in the post-conflict period into 
sustainable interventions. The problem with the health policy was in its 
implementation. 
B. Health Reform 
Health reform was described in Chapter One as "sustained, purposive change to 
improve the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness of the health sector with the goal of 
improving health status, obtaining greater equity, and obtaining greater cost-
effectiveness for services provided" (Basch, 1999). 
A major analysis of how to design and implement health-reform programs 
identifies tasks critical to produce effective reform. These tasks are to clarify goals; 
carry out an honest diagnosis of problems within the health sector; develop a reform 
plan with the participation of key stakeholders; embrace politics; focus on 
implementation; and build in evaluation systems to learn from mistakes (Roberts et aI., 
2004). In Kosovo, the health-reform effort clarified the goals of reform, i.e. to provide 
a more effective and equitable system; diagnosed-to the extent possible-the 
problems within the health sector; and undertook stakeholder consultations to establish 
a reform plan. However, they failed either to focus effectively on implementation or to 
create an evaluation system to identify and correct problems undermining reform. 
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This examination also outlines 'five control knobs' for health-sector reform. 
However, the state must have the capacity to tum these 'control knobs' to affect 
change. In the case of Kosovo, this capacity did not exist. Moreover, these control 
knobs require institutional infrastructure, such as health-information and financial 
accounting systems. These building blocks of reform were not established prior to the 
attempted implementation of systemic changes. 
C. Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe 
Many Central and Eastern European countries began radical health-reform 
programs after the collapse of communism in the early 1990s. These programs were 
strikingly similar-the reorientation of the health system to primary care, the 
introduction of family medicine, efforts to make the secondary and tertiary sectors 
more efficient, the introduction of financing reforms in the form of social insurance, 
efforts to strengthen public-health systems, and decentralisation. These reforms have 
been undermined by economic instability, the lack of political will and general 
political instability, and unhealthy lifestyles. The reforms themselves have also been 
problematic. Change was introduced too quickly, the implementation of the reforms 
was not planned, there was little enthusiasm for family medicine, governments had 
little capacity to introduce and manage change, health-financing reforms suffered from 
a shortage of funds and problematic efforts to split the purchaser and provider 
functions, and data collection was weak. 
Key lessons emerged from this examination of health reform: 
• Careful attention should be paid to the political, social, and economic environment 
to ensure that the reform effort is in harmony with these external factors. 
• The implementation of reforms should be planned, ambitious reforms should not 
be attempted without building concomitant government capacity, and care should 
be taken that the economy is strong enough to support the reform program. 
• Efforts to introduce a system focused on primary care must address the problems of 
a lack of enthusiasm, the weak interface between primary and secondary care, 
training, and weak data collection. 
The health-reform program in Kosovo was very similar to reform programs 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and suffered from many of the same problems. 
Economic weakness and political instability created a difficult environment in which to 
implement reforms. Little capacity existed to implement change, and data-collection 
systems were weak. Health professionals as well as the general public had little 
enthusiasm for family medicine and the reorientation of the system to primary care. 
While health planners in Kosovo had successfully applied key lessons from analysis of 
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humanitarian and rehabilitation programming, they neglected to examine the problems 
associated with the implementation of similar refonn measures elsewhere in Europe. 
D. Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
The international community undertakes widespread, radical reforms in post-
conflict states to create liberal democracies and prevent a return of hostilities. It 
attempts to compress development in post-conflict states, believing the environment is 
favourable for radical change. Critics warn, however, that the international community 
takes functioning states for granted, and fails to build state institutions prior to holding 
multi-party elections and introducing radical socio-economic refonns. Moreover, 
peacebuilding missions are often characterized by a failure to prioritize critical 
interventions, the lack of local ownership of the refonn program, and the pace of 
refonn being driven by external agendas and timetables. 
The international community undertook sweeping refonns to build a liberal 
democracy in Kosovo. Donors strongly believed that the environment favoured radical 
change. The international community held administrative authority and could put in 
place legislation and regulations reflecting European standards. Donors generously 
contributed resources for the reconstruction and refonn program. Billions of dollars 
were committed to this small province of two million people. 
However, Kosovo was haunted by its past. Investment in Kosovo's 
infrastructure had been minimal, and the highways, the electrical grid, the water 
system, and public buildings were all crumbling. Albanians had been shut out of 
government and public institutions for ten years. And while the conflict was of short 
duration, displacement and destruction were significant. 
Kosovar society emerged from the war weakened and deeply divided. No 
functioning state institutions existed, and the United Nations built a civil 
administration from scratch. However, despite this lack of local institutional, 
administrative, and managerial capacity, the international community pushed ahead 
with a complex refonn effort. The duration of refonn projects and their ongoing 
sustainability was detennined by donor deadlines and availability of funding sources, 
not by any objective sense of the time it would take to implement these reforms in the 
post-conflict environment, or the ability of the Kosovar government to manage them 
into the future. In the health sector, building blocks of refonn such as health-
infonnation systems, patient registration, and transparent financial accounting systems 
were not identified. 
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V. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR HEALTH 
REFORM 
The conceptual framework applied here provides a strong analytical tool to 
assess post-conflict health reform. It situates the effort to reform health systems within 
an analysis of the post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives of the international 
community to build liberal democratic states. It integrates the key findings from the 
literature examining the impetus to reform health systems post-conflict with the 
literature that assesses health reform more generally. The framework guides analysts 
of health reform by demonstrating the issues of key importance to their analysis. 
Applying this framework, analysts can assess the various stages of the reform 
process, and focus on external and internal pressures for reform. The framework also 
assesses the pressures shaping health reforms-external pressures, as well as the health 
context. The quality of the health-reform measures is evaluated, and the factors 
impacting on the implementation of reforms investigated. In addition, analysis also 
focuses on the process of implementation of the reforms and addresses the outcomes of 
reforms. The key value-added of this framework is its focus on the capacity of the 
state to implement reform measures. 
Using this framework, this thesis was able to test and prove the hypothesis that 
post-conflict health reform in Kosovo was largely unable to meet its objectives as a 
result of the externally driven nature of the reform process, the tumultuous post-
conflict socio-economic and political context, the weak capacity of the state, and the 
compressed nature of the reforms. 
As outlined in the Methods section, the objective of case study research is to 
find "the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and the mechanisms 
through which they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those 
conditions and their outcomes arise." (George and Bennett, 2005, p.3l) While single 
case studies have value for testing hypothesis and identifying new variables, the 
generalizability of their conclusions are limited. Therefore, this framework should be 
applied to similar cases of post-conflict health reform (after the formal cessation of 
hostilities, where the international community has significant control). Through these 
cases studies, the generalizability of this hypothesis and the framework could be tested. 
VI. FUTURE AREAS TO EXPLORE TO STRENGTHEN FRAMEWORK 
As the objectives of peacebuilding have expanded, health reforms have become 
an important component of socio-economic transformation implemented as part of 
peacebuilding programs. However, few assessments have been done of the efforts to 
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implement health reforms in post-conflict settings. The study of Kosovo therefore 
provides important insight into the challenges of implementing wide-ranging health 
reforms in a post-conflict environment. Two key lessons emerge: the critical 
importance of building state capacity to implement reforms, and the need for a realistic 
implementation plan for health reform. These factors, outlined below, require further 
exploration through a series of case studies on post-conflict health reform. 
A. State Capacity: The Need for a Visible Hand 
The World Health Organization's Annual Report in 2000 examined health 
systems and argued that government 'stewardship' is the most critical input to 
establish functioning health systems, because "the ultimate responsibility for the 
overall performance of a country's health system must always lie with the 
government" (WHO, 2000b). The report defines stewardship as a "function of a 
government responsible for the welfare of the population, and concerned about the 
trust and legitimacy with which its activities are viewed by the population" (WHO, 
2000b). 
While the WHO emphasis on stewardship was welcome, the state's capacity to 
provide that stewardship is assumed. The WHO argues that states have not provided 
such stewardship because they have been myopic, overly focused on legislation, and 
have turned a blind eye to the evasion of health regulations. The WHO outlined how 
governments could effectively provide this stewardship: 
To discharge [stewardship] requires an inclusive, thought out policy vision that 
recognizes all principal players and assigns them roles. It uses a realistic 
resource scenario and focuses on achieving system goals. Intelligence requires 
a selective information system on key system functions and goal achievement, 
broken down into important population categories, such as income level, age, 
sex and ethnicity. Stewardship also calls for the ability to identify the principal 
policy challenges at any time, and to assess the options for dealing with them. 
Influence requires regulatory and advocacy strategies consistent with health 
system goals, and the capacity to implement them cost-effectively. (WHO, 
2000b) 
The WHO assumes the existence of strong capacity to provide such stewardship. 
However, states do not automatically possess such skills. In post-conflict 
settings state power is often contested and society deeply fragmented. In most cases 
healthcare systems have been shattered by conflict, while the effect of the contlict on 
overall population health means that the demand for health services escalates. 
Governments are forced to coordinate donors and NGOs while attempting to re-
establish health services. The capacity of the state is weakened by war, while the 
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demands on the state at all levels and from all quarters-population, donors, and 
NGOs-increase. While developing a health-policy vision or strategy is important to 
ensure that donor resources are channelled toward long-term objectives, if the state 
does not have the capacity to implement reforms, the sustainability of the health-
reform process will be undermined. 
While the weak capacity of the state to implement health reforms has been 
cited as a reason for reform failure, state capacity has not been defined or explained. 
What is state capacity? How can this concept be operationalised? Recall that to 
function effectively, the state requires the following elements: 
• Human Capital: A sufficient number of well-trained civil servants. 
• Enforcement Capacity: The ability of the state to develop policy guidelines and 
implement this policy. 
• Coherence: The state's ability to implement reform measures in a reasonably equal 
fashion throughout its territory. 
• Fiscal Resources: Sufficient financial resources to administer the system and 
implement reform programs. 
• Reach and Responsiveness: The reform vision of the state should be accepted by 
key stakeholders, and the state should be responsive to their views and inputs. 
• Legitimacy: The moral authority of the state to govern should be recognized by 
social groups. (Homer-Dixon, 1996) 
While this is a useful schematic, the key question remains: how to build capacity? 
Traditional approaches to capacity building include training, technical 
assistance, the development of guidelines and manuals, and study tours to 
foreign countries to see how health systems elsewhere operate. Skills such as 
financial management, legal drafting, and economics are best acquired through 
formal training. But research has found that many of the skills needed to 
implement reforms cannot be taught and are learned through process of trial 
and error. Therefore, reform programmes need to build in opportunities for 
reformers to assess experience and learn from mistakes. (Mills et aI., 2001) 
States could be able to build capacity through the process of successfully implementing 
health-reform programs, but this area needs further research. 
B. Decompressing the Time Frame for Reform 
This thesis demonstrated that in the Kosovo case study, the speed at which the 
health reform program was implemented was extremely problematic. But is there an 
alternative to 'compressed development' in post-conflict environments? Further 
research on this question - the speed at which health reform can successfully be 
implemented and the necessary building blocks for reform - may benefit from an 
examination of the effort to build health systems in developing countries. 
A development project that was implemented at the same time as the 
international community was undertaking health reform in Kosovo provides some 
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important lessons in the time frame necessary for successful health reform. In 
Tanzania, a project sponsored by the Canadian International Development Research 
Centre (lDRC) contributed to lowering child mortality rates by a dramatic forty 
percent in one district (Savigny et aI., 2004). 
This project tested the hypothesis that healthcare spending should be directed 
toward cost-effective interventions targeting the most significant local health issues 
(the largest contributors to the local burden of disease). The project first gathered 
demographic data on local health issues. Policy makers were then provided with 
health-information tools to interpret this data and profile the local burden of disease. 
In the districts where this project was implemented, the major causes of mortality were 
malaria and a cluster of childhood illnesses. 
The local health authority was provided with accounting tools better to manage 
resources in their districts. They were able to focus slightly more resources (less than 
two u.s. dollars per person) on these illnesses. To ensure that the resources were 
spent effectively and to create synergies throughout the health system, the project built 
capacity at primary care clinics. Clinicians were provided with training (specifically 
the Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses) to provide better treatment and 
care (Savigny et aI., 2004). 
The Tanzania project is a good example of building the foundations for reform 
at the same time as efforts are made to improve the system. The use of health-
information and financial-management systems was a critical precondition for 
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the health systems. This example from 
Tanzania also illustrates the effectiveness of planning the implementation process of 
health reform. 
VII. THE RESEARCH AGENDA 
This heuristic case study which applied a conceptual framework of post-
confclit health reform to Kosovo highlighted key factors impacting on the 
implementaton of reforms, namely the pitfalls associated with a post-conflict 
transformational change agenda, the importance of state capacity, and the dangers of a 
compressed timeframe for reform. However, many issues remain to be further 
explored. Similar health reforms are being implemented in many post-conflict 
settings. Why have these particular reform measures risen to prominence? How 
appropriate are these healthcare strategies? What is the evidence for their success? 
Further investigation is needed into state capacity. What are the most effective 
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methods for building this capacity? Are sector-wide programming approaches 
preferable? How can reform programs be implemented in states that are corrupt or 
pernicious? What can other disciplines, such as change management, teach us about 
the implementation of health reform? And what are the long-term consequences of 
failed health-reform efforts for equity? Given the spate of international engagements 
in East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq, moving beyond this heuristic case study to a 
"plausibility probe,,86 that undertakes a structured focused comparison of case studies 
on post-conflict health reform could further investigate these issues to refine the 
conceptual framework and provide a foundation for a theory on post-conflict health 
reform. 
The international community is expanding its activities in post-conflict zones, 
and significant resources are being committed to health reform in these contentious 
environments. While laudable, the results of the Kosovo case study demonstrate that 
much remains to be learned about undertaking dramatic social change in countries 
scarred by war. 
86 Recall that a plausibility probe tests theories on a limited number of cases to assess its . 
generalizability. See GEORGE, A. & BENNETT, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development III 
the Social Sciences, Cambridge, MIT Press .. 
181 
APPENDIX ONE: KEY FINDINGS OF ANALYSIS OF HEALTH-REFORM 
EFFORTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
I. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO HEALTH REFORM 
A. Problems within the Health System 
As parts of the former Soviet Bloc, the pre-transition healthcare systems in 
countries throughout the region were remarkably similar (Ensor, 1993, Rechel and 
McKee,2003). These systems were based on the Semashko model, where the central 
government operated both as the purchaser and the provider of healthcare services 
(Hinkov et aI., 1999, Hlavacka et aI., 2000, Hocevar, 1996). Polyclinics, located in 
major towns and/or municipalities, were theoretically the first point of contact for 
patients. General practitioners, dentists, paediatricians, and gynaecologists all 
practised at these clinics, and physiotherapy and basic diagnostic services were also 
available (Busse, 2000, Karski et aI., 1999, Svab, 1995, Hinkov et aI., 1999, Vulic and 
Healy, 1999). Many factories and other places of work also had health clinics, which 
treated substantial numbers of patients (Mihalyi, 2000). Budgets for primary care 
facilities were determined by hospitals; therefore resource allocation favoured hospital 
care over primary care (Ensor, 1993, Svab, 1995). The main role of primary care 
physicians was to control absence from work due to sickness and act as referral agents 
to the hospital sector (Figueras et aI., 2005). Many patients bypassed the primary care 
system, and specialists gradually became the practitioners of choice (Mihalyi, 2000, 
Shuey et aI., 2003, Svab, 1995). 
The Semashko model initially led to impressive health gains by tackling 
common infectious diseases through state-led public-health initiatives such as 
immunisation and increasing access to healthcare through the proliferation of health 
services. The government expanded the number of health facilities, including clinics 
in workplaces and more hospitals (Figueras et aI., 2005, Mihalyi, 2000). However, the 
claims of socialist countries that they provided free health care access for all were 
exaggerated. Certain groups received priority treatment, including factory workers, 
students, and politicians. Those who were self-employed such as farmers often lacked 
coverage under social-insurance schemes (Mihalyi, 2000). 
This model of delivering healthcare suffered from several weaknesses, which 
became more apparent over time as advances in medicine pushed healthcare costs 
higher, and the economy weakened. The healthcare system was under-funded and 
inefficient (Fister and McKee, 2005, Figueras et aI., 2005). The system was focused 
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on secondary and tertiary services; while hospitals suffered from excess capacity, 
primary care was underutilised and under-funded. Physicians placed a high value on 
specialist training that mirrored the emphasis that the healthcare system placed on 
hospital and curative care. Nurses were marginalized and received very little training. 
Few incentives were in place to ensure high-quality, efficient services that responded 
to the needs of patients. Public-health services focused on immunisation, with little 
attention paid to health education and promotion efforts, environmental health, and 
occupational risks (Basch, 1999). 
B. Poor Health Status 
Partly as a result of problems within the health system, and partly a result of 
economic problems as well as environmental and lifestyle factors, the health of the 
popUlation was worse in Central and Eastern Europe than in the rest of the continent. 
The region was characterized by high smoking rates, poor diet, high alcohol intake, 
and high rates of non-infectious diseases, such as cardiovascular disease, cancer, and 
diabetes. Infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, were also on the rise (Field and 
Twigg, 2000, Rechel and McKee, 2003). The deterioration of population health and 
the general corrosion of healthcare services signalled that these health systems 
desperately needed to change (Fister and McKee, 2005, Ensor, 1993). These factors 
combined with the political and economic winds of change sweeping across Europe to 
contribute to the impetus for sweeping health reform. 
C. Political and Economic Forces Contributing to Reform 
As communism gave way to liberal market economies throughout the region, 
international agencies such as the W orId Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the European Union provided significant resources to the newly elected democratic 
governments to reform and modernize government institutions. This reform effort 
included the badly tarnished health sector. 
The key international players that supported the development and 
implementation of reform programs remained remarkably constant throughout the 
countries of the region. These players were the W orId Health Organization, the W orId 
87 . 9 V I' Bank, and the European Community's PHARE program (Hmkov et aI., 199, u IC 
and Healy, 1999, Nuri and Healy, 1999). The focus of the EU's PHARE program was 
to prepare countries for accession to the European Union (Rechel and McKee, 2003), 
87 The PHARE program is the main channel for the European Union's financial and technical 
cooperation to develop pre-accession strategies, 
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These agencies advocated the implementation of similar health-reform 
programs across the region-i.e. an emphasis away from secondary- and tertiary-based 
systems towards primary care, and reforming public health away from the traditional 
emphasis on immunisation. While these reforms were designed to ensure that the 
health systems of Central and Eastern European countries met European standards and 
were cost-effective, reforms also had an ideological basis. Health reform was part of 
the liberalisation of these economies. 
II. HEALTH-REFORM MEASURES IMPLEMENTED 
Most countries in the region have introduced similar reform programs, albeit 
with varying starting dates and pace of implementation. Reformers focused on four of 
the five mechanisms outlined earlier. Efforts were made to change the organisation of 
the system, reform the system of financing, as well as the mechanism through which 
payments were delivered to health professionals, and put in place new regulations. 
Less emphasis was placed on influencing individual behaviour. Typical reform 
measures, outlined in detail below, included reorganizing the system, which included a 
reorientation of the health system to primary care, reforming secondary and tertiary 
care, upgrading training for healthcare staff, decentralizing responsibilities for some 
healthcare services to the local level, and modernizing the public health system. 
Reforms also restructured the financing of the healthcare system. 
A. Reorganizing and Regulating the Healthcare System 
1. Reorientation to Primary Care 
Much of the focus of reforms was on health care restructuring, supported with 
regulatory changes. Since the Declaration of Alma Ata in 1978, donors and 
international organisations have emphasized the health benefits and cost-effectiveness 
of primary care-based health systems. Common to all reforms in Eastern Europe is the 
reorientation of health services toward primary care (Gaal et aI., 1999, Saltman and 
Figueras, 1997, Saltman and Figueras, 1998, Saltman et aI., 1998, Ensor, 1993). 
In primary-care systems, patients' first point of contact in the healthcare system 
is with general practitioners or family-medicine specialists who act as 'gate-keepers,' 
coordinating further health-related services, ifrequired, for the patient. These doctors 
also provide public-health activities such as immunisation and ensure that basic health-
promotion messages are communicated to their patients. This provides better tracking 
of patient health and ensures that higher-cost resources-such as specialists, lab 
testing, and hospitals-are used efficiently. 
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2. Reform of Secondary and Tertiary Care 
The Semashko model of health care delivery favoured secondary and tertiary 
levels of care, and therefore hospitals received more funding than primary care. 
However, despite the preferential treatment granted to hospitals, they suffered from 
similar problems of inefficiency and poor management that plagued primary care. 
Hospital care under the Semashko model was highly fragmented. Hospitals 
were classified according to diseases they treated as well as the occupations of their 
patients. This produced many different hospitals-or hospitals with several separate 
buildings-but with few horizontal linkages. This system resulted in a duplication of 
services and highly vertical programs. While secondary and tertiary hospitals often 
had too much capacity given the population size, closing facilities was highly 
problematic. In the absence of community programs in mental health, geriatric care, 
and occupational health, these facilities became the main providers of social care 
(McKee, 2004, McKee and Fidler, 2004). 
As part of the reform effort, countries in the region attempted to upgrade the 
organisation, efficiency, and performance of hospital services. Management was 
decentralized, hospital beds were cut, the average length of stay for patients reduced, 
and facilities were amalgamated to increase the cost-effectiveness of the system 
(Figueras et aI., 2004). 
3. Strengthening Public Health 
Under the Semashko system, public health was organized according to the San-
Epid model. San-Epid institutions undertook monitoring, public-health inspections, 
prevention, and research. Departments in San-Epid institutions included 
environmental health, general health, occupational health, nutrition and food hygiene, 
child and adolescent health, and communicable disease control. While this system was 
reasonably successful at vaccination and communicable disease control, it failed to 
address issues such as environmental pollution, occupational hazards, and non-
communicable diseases (Bobak et aI., 2004). Moreover, these institutions rarely 
provided policy guidance to governments. 
Proposed reforms had the objective to ensure that public-health institutions 
were better able to respond to public-health challenges. They included decentralisation 
of some public-health functions to the local level, transferring public-health initiatives 
such as immunisation to primary care institutions, modernizing health-infonnation 
systems, and strengthening health-promotion activities (Bobak et al.. 2004). 
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4. Human Resources and the Quality of Care 
Many countries undertook human-resource planning to create or upgrade skills 
in family medicine, public health, and management expertise. Continuing education 
programs were developed to ensure professional skill sets were maintained and 
enhanced, while professional standards and accreditation mechanisms were put into 
place. Reforms also included accreditation of physicians and the establishment of 
professional associations for health professionals (Borowitz et aI., 2004). 
5. Decentralisation 
While pre-transition health systems were highly centralized, reforms followed 
the European Union principal of subsidiarity, meaning that activities should be 
undertaken by the lowest competent authority. As a result, reforms made local levels 
of government responsible for significant areas of the health sector such as primary 
care, hospital oversight, and public health. 
There are two mains forms of decentralisation. Deconcentration is when 
administrative responsibilities are transferred to local levels within the central 
bureaucracy (civil service). Devolution, a more extreme form of decentralisation, is 
when decision-making is transferred to the local level of government. The central 
government relinquishes decision-making authority to organisations outside their 
direct control. 
Decentralized institutions allow local communities greater involvement in the 
management of their healthcare. These institutions should benefit from faster 
decision-making processes, ensure that local concerns are taken into consideration in 
these decisions, and be more innovative in their responses to changing circumstances 
on the ground. Through decentralisation, local institutions should have higher morale, 
more commitment, and greater productivity, as workers have more control over 
decisions that impact on their organisation. Moreover, the central administration is 
released from operational responsibilities and is able to concentrate on the role of 
policy development and coordination (Hunter et aI., 1998). 
B. Healthcare Financing and Payments 
Prior to the implementation of health-financing reforms, health systems in the 
region were largely funded using social insurance, with little distinction between 
purchaser and provider. The insurance fund received revenue from state-o\vned 
enterprises, supplemented by tax revenue from the government. The main objective of 
these funds was to track absences from work (Mihalyi, 2000). Social-insurance funds 
186 
were not independent from the government, and the Ministries of Health or Finance 
controlled the insurance organisation. Money channelled to healthcare was the 
outcome of political negotiations, and healthcare was often not prioritized. As a result, 
a steady revenue stream for the health sector was not guaranteed (Dixon et aI., 2004); 
(Field and Twigg, 2000). 
Many countries in the region introduced decentralised, contract-based social 
health insurance, complemented by voluntary insurance. The objective of the refonns 
was to protect the amount of health care funding available, split the purchaser and 
provider functions so the government was not both the owner and financer of health 
services, and prompt greater efficiency and responsiveness to local needs (Figueras et 
aI., 2004). While national pooling was maintained to ensure equity between rich and 
poor regions, international advocates of reform pushed for regional purchasers to issue 
performance-related contracts as part of an effort to reform "payments" and enhance 
the quality and efficiency of interventions. Such contracting would theoretically 
improve efficiency by making providers more accountable for their resources and 
increase the responsibility of individuals for their own healthcare (Dixon et aI., 2004). 
While the split between purchaser and provider functions reflected ideological 
concerns about the role of the state, it also supported the effort to heighten cost-
effectiveness of health interventions. Population-health priorities can be built into 
healthcare payments-purchasing decisions-allowing the health system to be more 
responsive to health trends. Purchasers have financial levers and other incentives to 
improve performance of providers, including outlining explicit targets for providers. 
Contestability or competition among providers can be introduced, also increasing 
efficiency and introducing patient choice (Dixon et aI., 2004). 
Performance-related purchasing was a distinct shift from historical line-item 
budgeting and included capitation for primary care services and new hospital payment 
systems linked to defined units of hospital outputs. However, for such contracting to 
be effective, it requires information on performance outcomes, which are available 
from information systems. Unfortunately, such information systems were often not 
operational (Dixon et aI., 2004, Figueras et aI., 2004). 
C. Behaviour 
The health-reform programs emphasised reorganisation of the system. Little 
attention was paid to broad public-health messages designed for behavioural change to 
reduce individual risk factors for poor health. 
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III. THE OUTCOMES OF THE HEALTH-REFORM PROGRAM 
The impact of refonns on popUlation health as well as the degree to which the 
refonn program was successfully implemented is considered below. 
A. The Organisation of the Healthcare System 
1. Reorientation to Primary Care 
Under the Semashko model, patients relied on specialists for the majority of 
medical treatment. The transition from a specialist-oriented system to a primary care-
based system has proven difficult. Specialists have resisted the changes, budgets have 
not necessarily provided primary care with sufficient resources, and primary care does 
not necessarily have the human resources to make it function properly. In Moldova, 
primary care facilities are so under-resourced that they are frequently unable to provide 
the minimum package of free medical assistance (MacLehose, 2004). 
As a result of these problems, the referral system often does not function as it 
should. Many patients are referred to specialists with conditions that could be treated 
in a primary care facility (McKee and Fidler, 2004). In Albania, fees imposed on those 
who bypass the referral system have had little impact, and the referral system does not 
function adequately. As doctors receive under-the-table payments, specialists have 
incentives to discourage patients from using the primary care system (Tragakes, 2003). 
In Romania, the frequency of primary care consultations has decreased, and the 
referral system is also often bypassed. The number of hospital admissions is higher 
than in most European countries, as patients are directly admitted to hospital without 
the proper care at the primary care level (Vladescu, 2002). 
Discharge from hospitals is also problematic, with patients often returning to 
the community without proper medical oversight in place (McKee and Fidler, 2004). 
Even in Slovenia, whose health system functions reasonably well, primary and 
secondary levels of care do not cooperate fully on case management (Albreht, 2002). 
Strengthening primary care requires long-tenn human-resource planning. 
Physicians have been retrained and introduced to the concept of family medicine 
(Busse, 2000, McKee and Fidler, 2004, Nuri and Healy, 1999). However, simply 
retraining general practitioners or specialists has not produced the required shift in 
mentality. Doctors at the primary care level should be addressing the majority of 
patient complaints, but instead they often act as referral agents to the secondary levc I 
of care (McKee and Fidler, 2004). Therefore, complete training in family medicine is 
required, and medical schools throughout the region have established family-medicine 
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specialist programs. In Bulgaria, undergraduate medical training includes ninety hours 
of teaching in family medicine (Koulaksazov et aI., 2003). 
For primary care physicians to act as effective gatekeepers and for the system 
to operate cost-effectively, the range of functions and services provided at the primary 
care level should be expanded (McKee and Fidler, 2004). Some countries, such as 
Bulgaria, guarantee citizens free choice of family doctor, and eighty-seven percent of 
Bulgarians have chosen a family physician for primary care (Koulaksazov et al., 2003). 
However, in other countries like Macedonia, "primary care" includes specialists 
working at local health centres such as paediatricians, gynaecologists, and 
obstetricians, among others. Thus, while the reform program focuses on reorienting 
the system towards primary care, much of this is accomplished by labelling specialists 
as primary care providers (Hajioff, 2002). 
2. Reform of Secondary and Tertiary Care 
Despite the efforts of reform programs to reorient the health system to focus 
more on primary care, secondary and tertiary medicine continues to dominate health 
systems in many countries. 
As part of its reform program, Albania closed many hospitals and converted 
them into primary care centres. In 1992, Albania had 160 hospitals, while it now has 
only fifty-one. Hospitals were consolidated, with some district hospitals being 
upgraded to regional hospitals to provide a more complete range of secondary services 
(Tragakes, 2003). The hospital restructuring program in Moldova resulted in many 
hospitals being closed, but occupancy rates for remaining hospital beds remain very 
high. This suggests that the tradition of excessive hospitalisation continues 
(MacLehose,2004). In other countries, such as Bulgaria, the number of hospital beds 
remains high, and inpatient services are often a substitute for social care for the 
infirmed (Koulaksazov et aI., 2003). 
Because reform programs throughout the region focused much of their 
attention on primary care and financing issues, secondary levels of care were often 
neglected. Hospitals are not efficient, while quality of care is often sub-optimal. In 
Macedonia, hospitals do not practise economies of scale with regions offering every 
specialty possible. Programs to rationalize healthcare delivery have not been 
established. Moreover, hospital directors lack management skills and financing of 
hospitc;tls remains based on line-item budgeting (Hajioff, 2002). 
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Secondary care remains out of reach in some areas, despite being publicly 
funded. Patients in Macedonia have to pay 'hotel' charges, which can reach almost 
U.S. $150 per month (Hajioff, 2002). In Albania, patients often cannot afford to make 
the under-the-table payments for medical care, and even drugs on the essential-drugs 
list are often available only through private pharmacies. Combined with poor quality 
of care and unsanitary conditions, patients are discouraged from hospitalisation 
(Tragakes, 2003). 
3. Strengthening Public Health 
Population-health indicators in Central and Eastern Europe compare 
unfavourably to Western Europe or North America. The region's high rates of 
mortality, morbidity, and disability undermine economic prosperity (Bobak et aI., 
2004). 
At the end of the 1990s, the difference between the European countries with the 
highest and lowest life expectancies at birth was more than 10 years in both 
men and women; virtually all countries with low life expectancy are in the 
CEEINIS [Central and Eastern EuropelNewly Independent States]. Even at age 
45, there is an eight-year difference in male life expectancy between the best 
and the worst European countries (data from WHO health for all database). 
(Bobak et aI., 2004) 
Most of this difference is caused by high disease incidence, not substantially 
higher case-fatality rates (Bobak et aI., 2004). High smoking rates, poor nutrition, 
including a high intake of saturated fats, low levels of physical activity, and a high 
prevalence of obesity contribute to poor health. In addition, the dramatic social and 
economic changes that took place in the 1990s, where unemployment rose and 
inequalities worsened, contributed to lifestyle choices-such as substance abuse-
which increased mortality rates (Bobak et aI., 2004). 
Prioritizing public health in Eastern Europe has proven difficult. While 
attempting to modernize public-health practise, decentralisation of some public-health 
responsibilities has removed public health from the various ministries' radar screens, 
and public-health activities subsequently have not receive the funding needed. Health-
information systems were not fully functioning, and the quality of data was often low, 
impeding the capacity of public-health specialists to provide policy advice to 
governments. Medical schools also failed to prioritize public-health training, and 
maintained their traditional focus on communicable disease control. Health promotion 
remained responsive, not focusing on lifestyle issues that seriously undennined 
population health (Bobak et aI., 2004). 
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Public health continues to emphasize control of communicable diseases 
through vaccination, rather than prevention of diseases and injury (Rechel and McKee, 
2003). These vaccination programs are quite successful-in Albania, over ninety 
percent of children are immunized against a range of infectious diseases (Tragakes, 
2003). However, health-promotion activities such as programs to reduce childhood 
injury and death are not prioritized. Improvement of road safety and programs to teach 
children to swim are cost-effective mechanisms to reduce childhood mortality. 
Enforcement of speed limits, ensuring that children wear seatbelts or child restraints , 
establishment of pedestrian crossings, and strict enforcement of drinking-and-driving 
rules are examples of important public-health initiatives largely absent in Central and 
Eastern Europe (Rechel and McKee, 2003). 
4. Human Resources and the Quality oleare 
The challenge of reform is to put evidence-based guidelines into routine 
clinical practise, so that health interventions reflect the best scientific evidence 
available (Figueras et aI., 2004). However, reform measures have predominantly 
focused on increasing financing and improving efficiency without sufficient focus on 
quality of care delivered. Ineffective treatments and inefficient use of human resources 
continue to undermine the quality of care (Borowitz et aI., 2004). While clinical 
guidelines have been produced, they have not always been implemented, as little 
incentive exists to put these guidelines into practise. Reforms have not included 
incentives to change behaviour at the patient-practitioner level. A legacy of 
underinvestment and the lack of resources in the healthcare system have worked to 
undermine the quality of health care (Borowitz et aI., 2004). One analyst summarized 
the situation: 
... the promotion of high-quality care in the CEE and NIS is made difficult by 
the lack of resources, the failing infrastructure and inappropriate managem~nt 
structures inherited from the communist models. Nevertheless, even allowmg 
for these constraints, it is apparent that the quality of care provided is often 
much worse than it need be (Figueras et aI., 2004). 
In Albania, most doctors working in primary healthcare facilities are not trained family 
doctors. There is no accreditation system for physicians, and no provisions for 
continuing medical education. Nurse numbers have been declining, despite the 
creation of a Faculty of Nursing and a College of Nurses. In addition, emigration is 
causing a brain drain, which is impacting on the ability of the health system to provide 
quality care (Tragakes, 2003). 
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5. Decentralisation 
For decentralisation to function well, local levels of government must have 
administrative and managerial capacity to manage their new responsibilities. 
Countries with successful local government administration of health care typically haye 
had it for a long time. Moreover, decentralisation can lead to fragmented services, 
weakened central health departments, political manipulation to favour particular 
interests, and a weakening of the public sector (Hunter et aI., 1998). 
Decentralisation can also increase inequity by limiting the sharing of 
resources-both human and financial-among regions and contributing to regional 
imbalances. Healthcare requires significant revenue, while the possibilities for local 
government to raise this revenue are limited. Decentralisation can impede adequate 
pooling of resources, with some rich areas reluctant to allocate resources to poorer 
areas (Dixon et aI., 2004). In Bulgaria, municipalities became responsible for most 
healthcare provision following decentralisation in 1992, and continued to provide 
financing for hospitals after the social-insurance system was established in 1999. The 
regional distribution of healthcare funds was often inequitable and lacked transparency 
and accountability (Koulaksazov et aI., 2003). 
In many Central and Eastern European countries, decentralisation only took 
place on paper. Albania's Ministry of Health remains the main funder and provider of 
healthcare services. Efforts to decentralize have been slow, with the creation of the 
Tirana Regional Health Authority in 2000 to manage primary care and public health 
services (Tragakes, 2003). 
6. Regulation 
While reformers attempted to put in place regulations supporting the reform 
effort, constant turnovers in government and in the civil service undermined the reform 
process. In addition, reform analysts neglected to assess governance capacity for 
implementing reforms. States lacked the capacity to implement these regulations. 
B. Reforming Healthcare Financing and Payment Systems 
Health-insurance systems have been hindered by weak economies with low 
employment levels and little formal activity within labour markets. As a result, social-
insurance schemes in most countries have a narrow revenue base. While a large 
informal economy exists in most countries, those operating within it evade 
contributions. Insurance schemes have been further undermined by the inability of 
unemployment and pension funds to transfer the required resources to health 
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insurance. High levels of corruption within the insurance organisations have also 
hindered progress (Dixon et aI., 2004, Figueras et al., 2004). In Macedonia 
, 
revelations of corruption in the health-insurance fund contributed to the government 
being voted out of office in 2002 (International Crisis Group, 2002c). 
As a result of these factors, in most countries in Eastern Europe social 
insurance has failed to generate enough revenue to finance the health system. 
Healthcare is instead funded by a combination of taxation, social insurance, voluntary 
insurance, and out-of-pocket payments. The income of the Bulgaria National Health 
Insurance Fund was limited by the low tax base, and is only able to fund outpatient 
care, outpatient pharmaceuticals, and twenty percent of inpatient care (Koulaksazov et 
aI., 2003). In Albania, the Health Insurance Institute was established in 1995, but still 
receives the majority of its funding from the state budget (Tragakes, 2003). 
The limited success in implementing social insurance has generated serious 
equity issues. While entitlement is theoretically universal, there are substantial 
differences between the ability of certain population groups, including the poor, rural 
communities, and some ethnic groups such as the Roma, to access services (Dixon et 
aI., 2004). Bulgaria has institutionalized co-payments to buttress the referral system, 
but also to provide additional funds to the health sector. Such cost-sharing has had an 
impact on equity, as co-payments are not affordable for lower-income groups 
(Koulaksazov et al., 2003). 
Under-the-table payments are common throughout Central and Eastern Europe. 
Informal payments are highest for inpatient (hospital) care. They are a result of 
cultural practises, the lack of a cash economy, poor salaries, lack of drugs and basic 
equipment, and weak governance (Dixon et aI., 2004). A household survey in Albania 
estimated that private payments to providers, including under-the-table payments, to be 
just under twenty-five percent of total out-of-pocket expenditure (Tragakes, 2003). 
Expenditure for private healthcare is also significant in some countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The existence of private clinics siphons resources away 
from the public sector. Moreover, some countries are unable to regulate these clinics, 
effectively leading to quality-control issues. 
While some countries in the region have made efforts to identify a distinct 
package of health benefits, this has been a difficult process. In Bulgaria, the National 
Health Insurance Fund guarantees the financing of basic health services. but the scope 
of these services is subject to annual revision (Koulaksazov et al., 2003). 
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Governments struggle to clarify what should be publicly funded for several reasons. 
Infonnation about the cost-effectives of health interventions is not available due to the 
weakness of health-infonnation and management systems. Citizens also see healthcare 
as a right, and do not want any cuts in benefits. Providers also oppose any cuts in 
entitlements (Dixon et al., 2004). As a result of this failure to define a basic benefits 
package, the boundaries between public and private insurance are not clear (Dixon et 
al.,2004). 
Efforts were made to increase efficiency by discontinuing line-item budgeting 
and implementing perfonnance-based contracts in most regions, yet some countries 
have been unable to implement this system. In Ukraine, financing has retained the 
Soviet tax-based approach, and budget allocation remains based on a list of permitted 
line items, detennined on the basis of hospital capacity (Lekhan et al., 2005). 
In perfonnance-based systems, budgets of primary care facilities are often 
established through a capitation system, with some countries experimenting with fee-
for-service and other incentives to attract physicians to rural placements. In secondary-
care facilities, performance-based systems are based on per diem and per-case or fee-
for-service payment. These methods of financing secondary care have sometimes 
driven up the volume of cases admitted. Under some fee-for-service models, perverse 
incentives can exist for secondary facilities to treat patients, costing purchasing 
organisations too much money and also undermining efforts to enhance primary care. 
In Croatia, a capitation system was utilized at the primary care level, while specialists 
were paid on the basis of a fee-for-service system. As a result, both primary care 
physicians (who received funding based on the amount of people they had on their 
patient list, not for the services they provided) and specialists (who received money for 
services provided) had an incentive to manage patients at the secondary level (Dixon et 
al.,2004). 
The establishment of contracts has often proven difficult. Without functioning 
health-information systems, the data necessary to establish these contracts is just not 
available. Technical and management skills to implement these contracts are also 
lacking. Moreover, the inadequate and unpredictable funding flowing from social-
insurance organisations means that insurers cannot pay all providers' bills. In 
Bulgaria, the National Health Insurance Fund does establish performance-based 
contracts with hospitals, but only has the resources to cover twenty percent of inpatient 
care (Koulaksazov et al., 2003). With so many actors allocating funds and attempting 
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to control these funds (the social-insurance organisation, commercial insurers, central 
and local authorities) resource pooling is fragmented, and establishing perfonnance-
based contracts and planning service delivery is undermined (Dixon et aI., 2004). 
C. The Impact of Reform on Population Health 
There is much regional variation in popUlation health throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe. While deaths from injuries and violence increased across the region, 
mortality from communicable and non-communicable diseases varied dramatically by 
region. While some countries such as the Czech RepUblic experienced improvements 
in life expectancy, in others life-expectancy rates fell and a health crisis unfolded 
(McKee and Fidler, 2004, McKee, 2004). 
One of the objectives of health reform is to improve popUlation health. By that 
measure, the reform process received failing grades in the states of the fonner Soviet 
Union. In 1993, Russia was the first industrial nation to experience a sharp decrease in 
its population for reasons other than war, famine, or disease epidemic (Field and 
Twigg, 2000). By the year 2000, life expectancy for men in Russia was two years 
lower, while for women it was three quarters of a year lower than life expectancy in 
1980 (Field and Twigg, 2000). Russia was not alone. In Bulgaria, life expectancy for 
women dropped from 75.l years in 1989 to 74.6 years in 2000, while male life 
expectancy fell from 68.6 years in 1989 to 67.6 years in 2000. Mortality from chronic 
conditions increased, caused by unhealthy lifestyles, unbalanced nutrition, poor 
environmental conditions, and increased poverty (Koulaksazov et aI., 2003). 
The MONEE project [Monitoring in Central and Eastern Europe] estimates that 
'excess mortality' in the region over 1990-99 totalled some 3.26 million deaths. 
These are the deaths that would not have occurred if mortality rates had stayed 
at the 1989 levels (taking into account the changes each year in the age 
structure and size of the population). Of these deaths, 72 percent were to 
males, and three-quarters to persons aged over 25 and under 60--the crisis has 
predominantly been one affecting adult men. (The Monee Project, 2001) 
Several factors contributed to this mortality crisis. The transition from 
communism to liberal democracy caused significant social and economic stress. 
Higher rates of unemployment and the dismantling of the social safety nets caused 
lower household income and higher poverty. The resulting psychosocial stress 
contributed to higher rates of cardiovascular disease and increased substance abuse 
(The Monee Project, 2001). Smoking rates, alcoholism, and other forms of substance 
abuse rose dramatically. Increased rates of injection drug use contributed to the spread 
of HI VIA IDS. Although infant mortality appeared to fall, malnutrition rates among 
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children were alarmingly high. And an increase in violent crime led to more deaths 
from homicide, while suicide also became more prevalent (The Monee Project, 2001, 
Field and Twigg, 2000, McKee and Fidler, 2004, McKee, 2004). 
Thus the social contract that was struck between the state and the people und 
h 
.. er 
t e commumst regIme has been to a large extent abrogated, leading to what 
some have called 'state desertion' and leaving millions of people stranded in 
despair, poverty, and destitution. It has been estimated that the top 10 percent 
of the population possesses half of the nation's wealth, and the bottom 40 
percent less than 20 percent of that wealth. Somewhere around 40 or more 
million people live below the poverty line, currently defined at about $30 per 
month. Privatisation has also led to a flight of capital abroad estimated at 
$200-500 billion, paralleling a stark decrease in production, both industrial and 
agricultural, and thus a decline of the gross domestic product. The famous, and 
now notorious 'shock therapy' became more shock than therapy, leading to 
political instability, corruption, and criminalisation at the highest levels of 
government. (Field and Twigg, 2000) 
While many factors external to the healthcare system impacted on popUlation 
health, the deteriorating state of the health system-and the failure of the health-reform 
process-should also be considered a contributing factor. 
Deaths from causes amenable to health care have been falling faster than 
overall mortality in Westen1 Europe since the mid-1960s. In contrast, in the 
USSR, deaths from these causes remained steady, contributing to the widening 
mortality gap with the west. (McKee, 2004) 
The lack of access to pharmaceuticals as well as the failure to implement evidence-
based medicine reduced the ability of the health system to provide timely and 
appropriate interventions (McKee, 2004). 
The poor state of the health system also undermined the response to public-
health issues such as rising tuberculosis cases and the spread of HI VIA IDS. The 
incidence of tuberculosis rose by about fifty percent in the region in the decade 
following 1989. The worst outbreaks were found in Kyrgyzstan, while Russia also 
experienced rising case numbers. The situation was compounded by the appearance of 
drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis. Economic recession, poverty, social upheaval, 
malnutrition, overcrowded prisons, and increased homelessness, combined with the 
lack of appropriate drug therapy, contributed to drug resistance (The Monee Project. 
2001). 
The response to the rising incidence of HI VIA IDS was similarly inadequate 
(Rechel and McKee, 2003). The region has the fastest growth in HIV cases in the 
world. In most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, risk factors exist for a 
devastating epidemic of HI VIA IDS. High rates of intravenous drug use and unsafe SeX 
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practises among the heterosexual popUlation are driving the epidemic. Women are 
accounting for an increasing share of new HIV infections, increasing the risk of 
mother-child transmission. Because of cultural attitudes towards men who have sex 
with men, there are fears of hidden epidemics among that popUlation (UNAIDS, 2004). 
Yet the response from governments is slow: Ukraine, the country with the highest per-
capita prevalence of HI V infection within Europe, lacks a public-health information 
service and sex education in schools, and has no national dissemination strategy for 
prevention of HIV / AIDS (DeBell and Carter, 2005). 
Inequity has also risen, with barriers to access for poor and minority groups as 
a result of under-the-table payments and general discrimination (Rechel and McKee, 
2003). 
Since informal payments bypass the official system, they in effect reinforce 
their cause: the scarcity of public financial resources. They also interfere with 
incentives to provide health care more efficiently and effectively. If unofficial 
payments make up a significant proportion of the incomes of doctors and others 
working in the health sector, then the effect of any reform in the official wage 
system is diluted. In some cases, incentives could even be contradictory. (The 
Monee Project, 2001) 
While current trends are not promising, it has been little more than a decade 
since the beginning of the transition period. Reform, particularly the retraining of 
physicians and the restructuring of health centres, is a lengthy process. Years may 
pass before widespread health benefits are seen. 
197 
APPENDIX TWO: THE PATH TO WAR IN KOSOVO 
Kosovo lies in the heart of the Balkans and at the crossroads between Europe 
and the Middle East. Although only 10,686 square kilometres in size (smaller than 
Connecticut), Kosovo was historically important as a trading route, as well as a critical 
source of natural resources. Economic migration and various wars ensured that its 
population was heterogeneous, including Albanians and Serbs, with smaller numbers 
of Turks, Roma, and Jews. While Serbs and Albanians lived peacefully together for 
much of the last several centuries, their coexistence has also been marred by periods of 
bitter violence. 
Kosovo has been the site of many conflicts over the centuries, including the 
infamous battle of 1389 on the fields of Kosovo Polje (also known as the Field of 
Blackbirds) between a Serbian-led coalition and the Ottoman Empire. The defeat of 
the Serbian army during this battle marked the beginning of over five hundred years of 
Ottoman rule, an occupation marked by periods of revolt, but which lasted until 1912 
when Serbian armies reclaimed Kosovo. After the end of the First World War, Serbian 
control over Kosovo was consolidated (Malcolm, 1998, Judah, 2000). 
Kosovo is symbolically important to both the Serbian and Albanian 
populations. It contains many historically significant Serbian Orthodox sites, such as 
the Gracanica Monastery, the Pec Patriarchy, the Decani Monastery, and the 
Monastery of the Holy Archangels in Prizren. Serbs undertook repeated uprisings 
against Turkish domination, and the Serbian religion and culture withstood centuries of 
Ottoman rule. This survival in the face of adversity attained mythical status, and as 
result Kosovo became a rallying cry for Serbian nationalists as a symbol of the 
resilience of Serbian culture (Malcolm, 1998, Judah, 2000). 
For Albanians, who now form the significant majority of the province's 
population, Kosovo has been their home for centuries. Under the Ottoman Empire, 
many previously Catholic Albanians converted to Islam, and over time the Albanian 
aristocracy received important administrative positions and some rose to prominence 
in the Ottoman bureaucracy. In the 1800s, Albanians in Kosovo began to struggle for 
recognition of their cultural, linguistic, and religious rights within the Ottoman Empire. 
This struggle continued as Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes after World War One, and as part of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia after World War Two. While Josip Tito, the leader of Yugoslavia, did not 
. b t nomous province of the grant Kosovo the status of a republIc, Kosovo ecame an au 0 
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Republic of Serbia under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. This meant it could \vrite 
its own Constitution and have its own Parliament. As a result, Albanians gained 
political tools to protect their language and culture, opening an Albanian language 
university in Pristina (Malcolm, 1998, Judah, 2000). 
I. WHERE IT STARTED AND ENDED: Kosovo AND THE DISSOLUTION OF 
YUGOSLAVIA 
Josip Tito died in 1980, and his death was a harbinger for the break-up of 
Yugoslavia. Kosovo was the place where the dissolution of Yugoslavia began (in 
1989), and where it will most likely end, if Kosovo achieves its independence. 
In 1981, Yugoslavia was in a period of economic decline. Real incomes had 
fallen, as inflation skyrocketed. Between 1979 and 1989, inflation averaged 123 
percent annually (Kunitz, 2004). The standard of living of ordinary citizens was 
declining precipitously. In Kosovo, many Albanians felt that despite the province's 
autonomous status, power rested with Serbs or with pro-Serb Albanians. Kosovo was 
the poorest region in the Yugoslav federation with a 1979 annual per capita income of 
only $795, while the Yugoslav average was $2,635. Unemployment among the 
Albanian popUlation ran high. Serbs and Montenegrins, who formed fifteen percent of 
the population, held thirty percent of the jobs (Malcolm, 1998). A student protest over 
the poor quality of food that began in the canteen of Pristina University (in the capital 
city) transformed into days of street demonstrations, unleashing pent-up Albanian 
frustration. Demonstrators demanded that Kosovo become its own republic or unite 
with Albania. Authorities panicked, and a severe crackdown on the protestors ensued. 
While casualty figures were never released, hundreds were injured and dozens killed. 
More than two thousand were arrested and given sentences ranging from one month to 
fifteen years. Top officials in the communist party in Kosovo were dismissed from 
their posts (Malcolm, 1998). The lasting legacy of these demonstrations was the 
resurgence of overt ethnic enmity between the Serbian and Albanian communities. 
Partly because of the poor state of the economy and partly because of tension 
with the Albanian community, many Serbs were leaving the province. Serbian 
nationalists began to publish accounts of harassment of Serbs in Kosovo, and cited the 
exodus of Serbs from the province as the result of ill treatment. This culminated in a 
1986 Memorandum written by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, which 
claimed that two hundred thousand Serbs had been forced from Kosovo in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and which argued that Albanians had literally declared war on Serbs 
(Judah, 2000). 
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Slobodan Milosevic, who rose to become the head of the Serbian Communist 
Party in 1986 and officially became President of the Serbian Republic in 1989, 
exploited the grievances of Kosovo' s Serbs as part of his political ambitions. In 1987, 
he told Serbian demonstrators who were clashing with Albanian police officers outside 
Pristina (a demonstration he had organized) that, "no-one dare beat you." In March 
1989, he arranged for the Kosovo Parliament to rescind Kosovo's autonomy. And in 
June 1989, on the six hundredth anniversary of the Serb defeat against the Turks in 
1389, he addressed a million Serbs gathered at the site of the battle, stating, "After 
many decades, Serbia has her state, national, and spiritual integrity back .... Six 
centuries later, we are in battles and in quarrels. They are not armed battles, though 
such things should not yet be excluded" (as quoted by (Judah, 2000)). 
A spate of laws was passed in the early 1990s that further curtailed Albanian 
rights. To stem the exodus of Serbs from the province, a prohibition on land sales 
from Serbs to Albanians was introduced. Many Albanians who worked in state 
institutions and state enterprises (including teachers, doctors, and factory workers) lost 
their jobs, Belgrade imposed its curriculum on schools, and publicly funded primary 
and secondary education was provided only in Serbian. Pristina University became a 
Serbian-language institution. 
Albanians reacted furiously to these measures. However, unlike their 
neighbours in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, they did not immediately take up arms 
against the Serbian government. Instead, they began a campaign of passive resistance. 
The political party known as the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was formed, 
whose leadership was composed mainly of Albanian intellectuals. In 1991, Albanians 
held a referendum on independence for Kosovo. The vote was not recognised by 
Serbian authorities, but was not blocked, either. Voters overwhelming chose the 
option of independence. In 1992, Albanians held a second vote to form a parallel 
government and elected Ibrahim Rugova as president. A parallel education system 
was established, including primary, secondary, and university education; basic 
healthcare was provided by the Mother Theresa network; and a taxation system 
collected funds to support this parallel government and social structures. Throughout 
this difficult time, remittances from Albanians living outside the province financially 
supported both the government as well as Albanians who had lost their jobs (Judah, 
2000). 
200 
While the campaign of passive resistance avoided war, the political objectives 
of independence or even autonomy were not realized. And the situation in Kosovo 
was far from calm. Serbian authorities regularly accused Albanian extremists of 
attacks against police. Human-rights organisations reported human-rights abuses 
ranging from intimidation of Albanian political activists to police attacks on Albanian 
civilians. Impatience with the status quo grew. After the issue of Kosovo was not 
addressed at the Dayton Peace Conference in 1995, many Albanians believed that the 
international community was not rewarding Kosovo' s peaceful approach. Albanian 
support for the campaign of passive resistance eroded, and animosity grew between 
those who wanted to continue resisting peacefully and those who wanted to oust 
Serbian rule by force (Judah, 2000). 
II. FROM SIMMERING CONFLICT TO ALL-OUT WAR 
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed in 1993, aligned with a 
political party with Marxist leanings known as the LPK (the Popular Movement for 
Kosovo). The KLA lacked a central command structure and its various regional 
commanders operated semi-autonomously. They remained relatively unknown, with 
little military might until the collapse of the pyramid schemes in Albania in 1997. One 
of the results of the chaos that accompanied the collapse of these schemes was the 
opening of government arms caches. Albania became awash with Kalashnikovs, and 
the KLA acquired from Albania the weapons that they needed to scale up their 
guerrilla activities. Therefore, in 1998 the KLA emerged as a significant if 
uncoordinated guerrilla force, undertaking frequent strikes on Serbian police and army 
checkpoints (Judah, 2000). 
The Serbian army reacted harshly, undertaking brutal retaliatory attacks on 
villages where KLA members were suspected of hiding. Paramilitary units were also 
established. In one important turning point in March 1998, police attacked the 
"Jashari" family compound, whose patriarch, Adem Jashari, was a member of the 
KLA. In total, fifty-eight people were killed, including eighteen women and ten 
children under the age of sixteen (Judah, 2000). The village in which they lived was 
razed to the ground. The period of intense civil strife began with the deaths of the 
Jashari family. 
The most intense fighting was in Central Kosovo (known as Drenica) and 
Western Kosovo. The pattern of the conflict was similar in many villages across 
Kosovo. KLA members undertook attacks on Serbian police and military checkpoints. 
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attempted to gain control of the territory, and intimidated the local Serbian civilian 
population (often by kidnapping or killing civilians suspected of Serbian paramilitary 
activity) in an effort to get them to leave. The military responded with brutal 
retaliatory attacks on Albanian villages, resulting in civilian deaths and a flood of 
internally displaced people. In one such attack on January 15 in Racak, forty-five 
Albanian civilians were killed in an apparent Serbian police raid. 
As the conflict intensified, so did the divide in the Albanian community 
between those who supported the KLA and those who supported the campaign of non-
violent resistance led by the LDK. Those who were associated with the KLA tended to 
be rural-based, while those associated with the LDK were more urban.88 This divide 
continues to haunt Kosovo. 
III. THE NATO INTERVENTION 
Efforts to broker a peace agreement between the Kosovo Liberation Army and 
the Yugoslav government collapsed, with Yugoslavia's failure to sign the Rambouillet 
Agreement, which had outlined an arrangement for autonomous self-government in 
Kosovo. On March 24, 1999, a NATO-led coalition began a 78-day aerial bombing 
campaign. The objective, as outlined by President Clinton, was as follows: 
We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting 
military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at 
the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with 
catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By 
acting now we are upholding our values, protecting our interests and advancing 
the cause of peace. (Clinton, 1998) 
NATO fully expected the air campaign to last only a few days, seriously 
underestimating the Serbian commitment to Kosovo. Milosevic anticipated that the 
bombing campaign would be short, believing that the coalition would break down, 
underestimating NATO's commitment to winning the war. 
With the initiation of aerial bombardments by NATO, the Yugoslav army and 
paramilitary forces initiated a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo known as 
"Operation Horseshoe. ,,89 Over a million Albanians were driven from their homes, 
with 800,000 refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries and an estimated 400,000 
88 In the face of the assault on Albanian villages by the Serbian military, the LDK eventually sponsored 
its own army, known as FARK (Armed Forces of the Republic of Koso va), FARK \~'as unable ~o 
operate effectively, and many of its members joined the KLA, JUDAH. T. (2000) Jim' and Re\enge, 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 'Lttl' 
89 There is controversy over whether or not this was an official plan by the SerbIan govemme~t I t: 
" 'II" fi t' sented during the bombmg proof eXIsted of thIS plan beyond western mte Igence m orma IOn pre 
campaign, 
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displaced within Kosovo (Leaning, 2003). Politicians, human-rights activists, and 
other prominent Albanians were abducted and killed. An estimated 10,500 Albanians 
died at the hands of both paramilitary and military forces (American Bar Association 
and AAAS, 2000). 
Albanian houses were also destroyed as part of this campaign of ethnic 
cleansing. The European Commission reported that out of a housing stock of 250,000 
houses, almost half (approximately 120,000 homes) sustained war-related damage. 
Out of the 120,000 damaged houses, 41,000 were not seriously damaged, or sustained 
moderate damage (5 to 40 percent damage); 32,000 were badly damaged (41 to 60 
percent damage); while 47,000 were effectively destroyed with only the foundation 
remaining (61 to 100 percent damage). The houses of approximately 500,000 people 
fell into IMG damage categories III and IV (European Agency for Reconstruction, 
1999). 
Several factors led to the end of the bombing campaign. The aerial 
bombardments were taking a toll on the civilian infrastructure in Serbia, and the 
Yugoslav government's appetite for continuing the war was fading. Milosevic was 
indicted for war crimes on May 24, 1999, and he realized that unless he agreed to a 
peace deal his days in power would be numbered. The KLA were continuing their 
offensive in Kosovo, and combined with NATO bombing, the Yugoslav army was 
suffering casualties. NATO countries began preparing for a ground offensive, which 
Milosevic knew would drive him from office. And the international community feared 
the consequences of failure, sending mediators Victor Chernomyrdin and Marti 
Ahtisaari to begin a process of mediation using a G8 gathering in Cologne to outline 
the basic principles of a settlement (Judah, 2000). 
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APPENDIX THREE: STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS 
I. THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The obje~tive of the stake?older interviews was to gather and examine data to test the 
hypothesIs that the followmg three factors would impact on the reform process: 
• External pressures for reform, and the extent to which this impacts on the 
legitimacy of the health-reform process; 
• The socio-economic and political environment that weakened the capacity of the 
state to oversee reforms; 
• Compressed nature of the reform process, which impacted on the progress and 
sustainability of reform. 
Stakeholder questions were therefore designed to assess the following factors: 
• External pressures for reform, which impact on the legitimacy of the reform 
process; 
• The capacity of the state to oversee and implement the reform process, including 
the ability of the government to communicate its vision for reform and respond to 
concerns; 
• The compressed time frame for reform, impacting on the progress of reform and 
perceived sustainability of the reform process; 
• Information on the progress of health reform was also gathered. 
The results of stakeholder interviews were to be combined with health data and 
management data to ascertain the degree to which health reform had been 
implemented, the capacity of the state to oversee the health sector and implement the 
reform process, and the degree to which key stakeholders agreed with the reform 
process. 
The interviews and data gathered would also investigate regional differences in reform 
implementation, focusing on three regions: Pristina (Central), Gjilan (South East), and 
Prizren (South West). These three regions were selected as they were the least 
damaged by the war and lacked the minority politics that plagued other regions. Please 
refer to the Kosovo map in Appendix Four. 
The questionnaire was tested on three people prior to interviewing stakeholders: two 
international and one Albanian. Closed questions were developed, with an open 
question at the end to provide for clarification of response and explanations of 
position. The questionnaire was translated into Albanian and then backt~ansla~ed for 
verification. Stakeholders provided consent for the interviews and were mtervlewed 
by one physician in Albanian, without the author present to reduce bias. T~e author 
met with the physician conducting the interview regularly during the int~r\,le\: process 
to ensure that the interviews were going smoothly. The results of these mterVIews 
were translated into English. 
II. INFORMATION SHEET AND CONSENT FORM 
The following information sheet and consent form were provided to stakeholdl?rs 
participating in the study. 
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Study Title: 
Inves tiga tor: 
INFORMATION SHEET 
Analysis of Health Reform in Kosovo 
Valerie Percival 
number: (+377) 044 161 215 
email: val--percival@hotmail.com 
Purpose of Study: Research for a Doctorate in Public Health 
London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine 
Objective of Study: 
This study will analyse the ambitious health reform program that the 
international community is undertaking in Kosovo. The study will focus on 
how to evaluate health reform, the capacity of the government to implement 
reforms, and how the reform program has impacted on minority communities. 
Key stakeholders will be interviewed, including Kosovars working in the 
Ministry of Health, the Institute of Public Health, the District Health Offices, 
and in health facilities. Internationals working with the Ministry of Health, the 
World Health Organization, and other United Nations Agencies will also be 
interviewed. 
The goal of these interviews is to understand both international and 
Kosovar opinions on the reform process. During this interview, you will be 
asked for your opinion on key issues such as how the international community 
has discussed the process of reform with Kosovars, why the reform process is 
happening, how the reforms are being implemented, how the provision of 
health care has changed since the reform program began, and whether the 
reforms have improved the delivery of health services. 
This research is not for profit. It is hoped that the results of the study will 
facilitate the health reform process in other countries. 
Confidentiality: 
During the interview, answers to questions will be recorded on ~he 
questionnaire. Before the interview begins, you will be asked to read SIgn a 
consent form. This form signifies that you understand the purpose of the 
. I Ii' interview and that you agree to have your comments used in written artic es. J 
you require or prefer confidentiality; your comments will be cited but no 
reference will be made to your name or your position. 
205 
CONSENT FORM 
Study Title: Analysis of Health Reform in Kosovo 
Investigator's Name:Valerie Percival 
Contact Number: (+377) 044155675 
Contact email: val-percival@hotmail.com 
I have read the information sheet concerning this study and I understand that the 
opinions expressed during my interview will be recorded on paper. 
If I agree to have my name cited, I understand that my name may appear in the thesis 
or in other articles resulting from this research. If I do not agree to have my name 
cited, I understand that my comments may be included in the thesis and other articles 
resulting from this research, but no reference will be made to my name or my position. 
I give/ do not give (please circle one) my consent to have my name cited in any articles 
or written work arising from this study. 
Valerie Percival has answered my questions concerning this study. 
I understand that at any time I may withdraw from this study by contacting Val 
Percival at the contact number/email address above. I understand that after July 1 S\ 
2003, Val Percival will no longer be living in Kosovo and I will contact her by email. 
I agree to take part in this study. 
Signed: 
Date: 
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III. SELECTION OF STAKEHOLDERS 
Stakeholders were selected based on the following criteria: 
• Active involvement in the health sector; 
• Senior positions in the health sector; and 
• Impacted by the reform process. 
An effort was made to incorporate regional perspectives to ensure that the results were 
representative, and not skewed in favour of the capital region. 
A. 
1. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
2. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
List of Stakeholders 
Central Level Stakeholders 
Dr. Pleurat Sejdiu, Permanent Secretary (most senior civil servant), Kosovo 
Ministry of Health (February 24,2003). Shortform in transcript below: Sejdiu. 
Fetije Huruglica, Head of Nursing, Kosovo Ministry of Health, (March 7, 
2003). Shortform in transcript below: Huruglica. 
Dr. F erid Agani, Head of Strategic Planning, Kosovo Ministry of Health 
(March 7,2003). Shortform in transcript below: Agani. 
Fekrije Hasani, Development of Nursing Program (NGO), Pristina (March 5, 
2003). Shortform in transcript below: Hasani. 
Dr. Driton Ukmata, Head of Mission, Handicap International (NGO), Pristina 
(March 17,2003). Shortform in transcript below: Ukmata. 
Dr. Naser Ramadani, Epidemiologist, National Institute of Public Health, 
(March 27, 2003). Shortform in transcript below: Ramadani. 
Dr. Lumturije Gashi, Chief Pathologist, Pathology Clinic, Pristina University 
Hospital (February 24,2003). Shortform in transcript below: Luma. 
Dr. Sebahudin Ahmeti, Health Consultant (Member of Health Law Working 
Group), March 13,2003. Shortform in transcript below: Ahmeti. 
Dr. Ilir Begolli, Head of Social Medicine Department, National Institute of 
Public Health (March 24,2003). Shortform in transcript below: Begolli. 
Dr. Genc Ymerhalili, Director of Family Medicine Development Centre, 
Kosovo Ministry of Health (Pristina) (February 28,2003). Shortform in 
transcript below: Y merhalili. 
Regional Stakeholders 
Dr. Sami Rexhepi, District Health Officer, Pristina (February 27,2003). 
Shortform in transcript below: Rexhepi. 
Dr. Erdina Kabashi, Public Health Coordinator, Prizren (February 24, 2003). 
Shortform in transcript below: Kabashi. 
Dr. Sadije Sllamniku, Family Medicine Specialist, Gjilan (March 20, 2003). 
Shortform in transcript below: Sllamniku. 
Dr. Hajriz Shaqrir, Family Medicine Specialist, Gjilan (March 19, 2003). 
Shortform in transcript below: Shaqrir. 
Dr. Myrvete Ajete, Family Medicine Specialist, Pristina (March 4, 2003). 
Shortform in transcript below: Ajete. " 
Dr. Fadil Bajraktari, Family Medicine Specialist, Prizren (February 24. 200j). 
Shortform in transcript below: Bajraktari. ,..' 
Dr. Hajriz Ibrahimi, Family Medicine Specialist, Directo~, CYJtlan Famdy. . 
Medicine Centre (March 20, 2003). Shortform in transcnpt below: IbrahIml. 
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18. Dr. ~~dullah Hoti, Family Medicine Specialis~, Director, Pristina Family 
Medlcme Centre (March 5, 2003). Shortform III transcript below: Hoti. 
19. Dr. Blerim Qosaj, Orthopaedic Surgeon, University Clinical Centre Pristina 
(March 24, 2003). Shortform in transcript below: Qosaj. ' 
20. Dr. Rrahman Hajdari, Clinical Director, Gjilan Hospital, (March 20, 2003). 
Shortform in transcript below: Hajdari. 
2l. Dr. Refki Selaj, In~emal Me?icine Specialist, Prizren Hospital (February 24, 
2003). Shortform m transcnpt below: Selaj. 
22. Dr. Uke Tahirukaj, Paediatrician, Pristina Family Medicine Centre (March 4, 
2003). Shortform in transcript below: Tahirukaj. 
23. Arijeta Bicku, Nurse, Main Family Medicine Centre (February 24,2003). 
Shortform in transcript below: Bicku. 
24. Blerina Morina, Headnurse, Main Family Medicine Centre, Prizren (February 
24, 2003). Shortform in transcript below: Morina. 
25. Myrvete Sopi, Main Nurse, Main Family Medicine Centre, Pristina (March 3, 
2003). Shortform in transcript below: Sopi. 
26. Hanife Hoxha Telaku, Headnurse, Family Medicine Centre Prizren (February 
24, 2003). Shortform in transcript below: Telaku. 
IV. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
Generally, the interviews were too long and the questions too complicated, and the 
same questions should have been given to all stakeholders. Moreover, some of the 
questions about health-system performance were ambiguous, particularly questions 30 
and 31, as it was not clear to what the reformed healthcare system should be 
compared-the war-time health system, the health system in the 1990s (either the 
Serbian health system or the Mother Theresa Network), or the health system in the 
1980s. In Question 34, the option of continuing the health reform was not included. 
Health data and management data were largely unavailable in 2003. Data was only 
available for a limited number of centres involved in pilot projects with the European 
Agency for Reconstruction. 
Given this lack of health data, the original objective of assessing regional variations in 
health-reform implementation was not possible. 
V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
A. The Process 
Transcribed: The interviews were conducted in Albanian by one interviewer, and were 
transcribed into English by a second interpreter. The interview results were then 
consolidated and formatted by the author. 
Coding: The following codes were used: 
• External Pressures 
• Legitimacy 
• Capacity 
• CommunicatelRespond 
• Compressed Time Frame 
• Progress 
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• Sustainability 
Discarded Results: Interviews were conducted with patients at various health ~ '1" 
h ., d' d db laCl ltles. T ese mterviews were Iscar e ecause the patients did not demonstrate sufficient 
knowledge of the health-reform process. 
Significance: Responses were deemed significant in a majority of cases. If the 
majority response was gained with only with one or two stakeholders, the responses 
were judged to be split, and not significant. 
Lessons Learned: The int~rvie~s were too long and complicated, attempting to gather 
too ~uch data. The questIOnnaIreS should have contained no more than twenty 
questIOns. 
B. The Results 
External Pressures for Reform: 
• Question 4: All central stakeholders identified post-conflict political pressure or 
economic reasons as driving reform. 
• Question 4b: Regional-level stakeholders identified health issues as driving the 
reform process. 
• Question 4c: The majority of regional stakeholders believed international donors 
and UNMIKIWHO were behind the reforms. 
• Question 9: Most stakeholders indicated that Kosovars had moderate input; in their 
verbal comments they expressed concern that reforms were ready-made. 
• Question 10: Almost half of stakeholders indicated that the opinions of Kosovars 
surrounding the reform process did not significantly alter the Health Policy. They 
argued again that the reforms had been 'ready-made' by internationals. 
The Legitimacy of the Reform Process: 
• Question 4: The fact that external pressure drove the reform process may have 
undermined its legitimacy. 
• Question 9: Because Kosovars had moderate input into the reform process, its 
legitimacy may have been undermined. 
• Question 10: As the views ofKosovars did not significantly alter the Health Policy, 
this may have undermined the legitimacy of the reforms. 
• Question 11: The majority of stakeholders stated that information was provided in 
the correct language. Most regional-level stakeholders stated that only 
'sometimes' was the information provided in the correct language. This perhaps 
indicating the differential resources available for translation in the regions. 
• Question 13: Most central-level stakeholders expressed doubt as to the level of 
commitment from Kosovars to the reform process. 
• Question 14: Most stakeholders believed that the international comm~~ity :was 
only somewhat or not very committed to the reform process, undenmnmg l~S . 
legitimacy. Stakeholders expressed concern that the international commumty IS 
not committed for the long-term. . 
• Question 24: The majority of stakeholders believed that the concept of famIly 
medicine has only been "tolerated," not received enthusiastically. 
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The Capacity of the State to Oversee and Implement the Reform Process: 
• Question 12: .The maj~rity of stakeholders believed that the Ministry of Health did 
not act sufficIently to Implement reforms. This view was particularly marked 
among central-level stakeholders. 
• Que~tion .17: ~ost .stakeholders believe~ that national standards for professional 
quahficatIOns III pnmary care health faCIlities are enforced. 
• Question 21: All stakeholders indicated that national standards reflect the 
objectives of the reform program. 
• Question 22: All but three stakeholders agreed that the state was not able to enforce 
its standards in private clinics. 
• Question 23: The majority of stakeholders believed that the services available at 
primary care health facilities did not meet the guidelines set out in Kosovo' s 
health-policy document. 
• Question 25a: The majority of regional stakeholders stated that family-medicine 
teams did not function in their areas of responsibility. 
• Question 27: When asked an open-ended question about the problems faced in the 
implementation of family medicine, six of seven central-level stakeholders who 
answered this question mentioned human resource-related issues-lack of trained 
doctors, the need for more training. 
The Ability of the New Kosovo Government to Communicate Its Vision for 
Reform and Respond to Concerns: 
• Question 5: The majority of stakeholders indicated that discussion of the reforms 
with Kosovo health professionals was moderate or infrequent. The majority of 
stakeholders expressed concern with the lack of discussion surrounding reforms-
particularly after the initial Yellow Book consultation. 
• Question 6: In female-dominated health sectors (nurses and midwives), all but one 
stakeholder indicated that discussion had been moderate or infrequent. 
• Question 7: Stakeholders agreed that the reforms were not sufficiently 
communicated to the public; however, some stakeholders argued that this was all 
that was possible or necessary at the time. 
• Question 11: The majority of stakeholders stated that information was provided in 
the correct language. Most regional-level stakeholders stated that only 
'sometimes' was the information provided in the correct language. 
The Compressed Timeframe for Reform: 
• Question 3: While stakeholders were divided in their opinions of whether or not 
reform had been introduced too quickly, only two of eight central-level 
stakeholders who responded to the open-ended question provided positiv~ 
feedback. The others stressed that change was too rapid, the system was m c,haos, 
insufficient data existed to take reform decisions, and there were no preparatIOns 
for reform implementation. 
The Progress of Reform: 
• Question 22: All but three stakeholders agreed that the state was not able to enforce 
its standards in private clinics. 
• Question 23: The majority of stakeholders believed that services, available ~t 
primary care health facilities did not meet the guidelines set out m Kosovo s 
health-policy document. , i' ' 
• Question 25a: The majority of regional stakeholders stated that family-mel Icme 
teams did not function in their areas of responsibility. 
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• Question 27: When asked to identify three main problems faced in the 
implementation of family medicine, the one factor commonly referred to was 
human resources-mentioned by six out of seven stakeholders. 
• Question 31a: Most stakeholders believed that rural popUlations were better served 
after the reforms. 
• Question 31 b: Most stakeholders believed that the poor were not served as well 
after the reforms. 
• Question 31c: Most stakeholders believed that women were better served after the 
reforms. 
• Question 35: Most stakeholders believed that decentralisation of primary care 
responsibility has made no change or worsened the delivery of care. 
• Question 36: Most stakeholders believed that decentralisation of public-health 
responsibility has made no change or has worsened the delivery of care. 
Perceived Sustainability of the Reform Process: 
• Question 13: Most central-level stakeholders expressed doubt as to the level of 
commitment from Kosovars to the reform process. 
• Question 14: Most stakeholders believed that the international community was 
only somewhat or not very committed to the reform process, undermining its 
legitimacy. Stakeholders expressed concern that the international community is 
not committed for the long term. 
• Question 15: All stakeholders clearly believe that, without the active involvement 
and financing of the international community, the reform program will not succeed. 
• Question 16: The majority of stakeholders did not believe that Kosovo has the 
necessary funds to implement the reform program. 
• Question 24: Stakeholders indicated that there is not much support for family 
medicine-a response particularly marked among regional stakeholders. 
• Question 26: Stakeholders were all optimistic for the future of family medicine 
under the right conditions. 
Regional Differences: 
There were no discemable differences in the responses from stakeholders from 
different regions (i.e. Gjilan and Prizren). On some questions-namely the driving 
force behind reforms and the use of the appropriate language to deliver health-reform 
information-there were differences between central-level and regional stakeholders. 
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VI. STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES 
Note: CS=CentraI Stakehold RS=R . 1 Stakehold , 
- - :.l:L-
--
I Question la: In the fall of 1999, the World Health Organization began the process ofrefonning the Kosovo health system 
Regional-Level Stakeholders to a primary care-based system. Do you understand the process of healthcare refonn that is occurring in 
Only Kosovo? 
a. Understand it completely. 
b. Understand some elements. 
c. Confused b-'y the ~rocess. 
Indicator/Anal£sis A B C Comments 
" CommunicatelResQond 9 5 1 • I was informed late about the reform. (Kabashi) 
i Validity problem: the verbal • Internationals working in Kosovo were working for very short periods of time; they 
I comments do not match the did not know the culture, traditions, and problems in this country. Though they were 
multiple-choice answer. experienced, they did not know what can be implemented and accepted in Kosovo. 
There may have been a bias (Rexhepi) 
in response-to impress the 
• Nurses at smaller facilities were not informed of the health policy. (Sopi) 
intervi ewer. 
• Some levels of reform are not clearly defined. (Morina) 
• I was not interested, as I am a specialist in secondary care. (Selaj) 
Question Ib: In the fall of 1999, the World Health Organization began the process of reforming the Kosovo health system 
to a primary care-based system. In November 2000 they published a policy document. Have you read the 
health-policy document? 
a. Yes. \ ". 
b. No. 
In dicator/ AnalJ7.sis A B C Comments 
CommunicatelResQond 19 6 
The majority of those CS: CS: 
interviewed had read the 11 ; 1· , 
health-policy document-not RS: RS: 
necessarily significant given 8 5 
that all those interviewed 
were in relatively senior 
positions. 
-
Question 2: 
--
Did J'Pu attend anJ!... discussions about the reform or implementation of the health program? 
---
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I ndicatorl Analysis 
CommunicatelRespond 
Most had attended 
discussions, but this is not 
necessarily significant given 
that all those interviewed 
were in relatively senior 
~ositions. 
Question 3: 
Central-Level Stakeholders 
Only 
I ndicatorl Ana~sis 
Indicator: Compressed Time 
Frame 
Analysis: Significant. While 
stakeholders divided in their 
opinion, some of the 
comments provide insight 
into stakeholder reactions to 
the reform timeline. 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
A B Comments 
19 6 
CS: CS: 
10' , 2' ,
RS: RS: 
8 4 
In your opinion, was the idea of reform: 
a. too quickly introduced? 
b. introduced in timely fashion? 
c. too slowly introduced? 
W4Y? 
A IB C 
6 I 4 
Comments 
• Changed too quickly from one system to another-not possible with post-war 
problems. (Luma) 
• There were no preparations for implementation-i.e. financial, human, and 
management resources. (Ahmeti) 
• There was an emptiness in the health sector, and it was the right time to do the job. 
(Begolli) 
• They should have taken more time to analyse the data. (Ukmata) 
• The post-war was the right time to try and reorganize the health system. It was a 
reasonable, timely attempt and positive attempt. (Hasani) 
• There was no constitution; the system was in total chaos, so we didn't know what is a 
good system. (Sedjiu) 
• There was not enough data to take reform decisions in health. Population and health 
staff were not informed enough about the benefits of reform. It was the post-war 
period, and people were surviving economically, trying to find incomes, having vital 
problems, and most of the people were oriented in business and privatisation. 
(Huruglica) 
• People did not know about thc concept offamiIy mcdicine. (YmcrhaliJL __ 
213 
Question 4a: 
Central-Level Stakeholders 
Only 
In dicator/Anaf£.sis 
External Pressure 
Legitimacy 
Analysis: Significant. All 
stakeholders identified either 
political pressure or 
economic reasons as the 
driving factors behind 
reform. 
Question 4b: 
Regional-Level Stakeholders 
Only 
I ndicatorl Ana/xsis 
External Pressure 
Significant. Interesting that 
the key reason for reform 
given by regional 
stakeholders-heal th 
reasons-was not mentioned 
by central stakeholders. 
Question 4c: 
Regional-Level Stakeholders 
On'" 
In your opinion, what was the driving force behind the refonn'? 
A I B I C I Comments 
• Driving force behind reforms was political pressure from the United Nations, 
economic. (Luma) 
• Economic and political reasons. (Ahmeti) 
• Post-war situation and Kosovars' enthusiasm. (Begolli) 
• After the war, there was political momentum, and the inherited communist healthcare 
system had to be advanced to prepare for regional and European integration. 
(Ukmata) 
• Economic reasons. (Hasani) 
• Politics after the war. (Agani) 
• Attempt to distance from previous system. (Sedjiu) 
• Economic reasons, as services were reorganized to be cost-effective. (Huruglica) 
• Economic reasons-the services are reorganized to be cost-effective (Y merhalil) 
These reforms are happening for: 
a) Economic reasons. 
b) Health reasons. 
c) Political reasons. 
A I B I C I Comments 
6 I 10 I 2 I. To offer better services to the patients. (Kabashi) 
• To improve Kosovo health system quantitatively and qualitatively. (Rexhepi) 
• All three reasons: Treatment of patients will be cheaper, one doctor from the 
beginning. (Sopi) 
• All three reasons-economic reasons-treatment with family medicine is cheaper for 
the state. (Bajraktari) 
Who do you believe is behind the reforms? 
a) International donors. 
b) UNMIK and WHO. 
c) Kosovars. 
___ ~____ ~ ___ -L __ W---=-h:..Ly-=-? ______________________ _ 
-~-----
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Indicator/Analysis A B C Comments 
External Pressure 7 10 5 • Because of the experience of the WHO in other states, and the situation in Kosovo Significant. The majority of after the war. (Kabashi) 
regional stakeholders 
• We have something that internationals do not have-experience here in Kosovo, lots 
indicated that internationals of courage, and are very self-confident. (Rexhepi) 
(donors or UNMIKlWHO) 
• UNMIK, donors and Kosovars are all behind the reforms. (Bicku) 
were behind the reform 
• Kosovars were only workers for the internationals. (Tahirukaj) process. 
• Donors were the initiators of reform. (Hajdari) 
• Without Kosovars you cannot iIIlQlement reforms. (Bajraktaril 
Question 5: In your opinion, discussion of the reforms with Kosovar health professionals has been: 
a. frequent. 
b. moderate. 
c. infrequent. 
Why? 
I ndicatorl Anal~sis A B C Comments 
CommunicatelRes.Qond 3 13 8 • Kosovars critical of reform progress, didn't engage, and response of local experts was 
Analysis: Significant. In CS: CS: CS: weak. (Luma) 
their verbal comments, the l' , 7' , 4; • All healthcare professionals were not included, just more accredited ones. (Ahemti) 
majority of stakeholders RS: RS: RS: • All actors such as NGOs and full representation from the National Institute of Public 
expressed concern with the 2 6 4 Health were not included. (Ramadani) 
lack of discussion-
• It was the maximum amount of dialogue possible at the time. (Begolli) particularly after the initial 
• Although the internationals were the minority in health discussions, they were able to Yellow Book consultation. dominate discussions with nationals. That is my experience as representative of 
This indicates that the ability Handicap International. (Ukmata) 
of the government to 'share 
• There were discussions, but they were not enough. When I talk to Regional Health its vision' was weak, and the Officers I have the impression that they do not know the policy and the non-family 
legitimacy of the reforms was medicine specialists oppose this strategy as it is based in family medicine. This is due 
undermined. to a conflict of interest-less patients for specialists. (Hasani) 
• There were no conferences organized-no feedback conferences. (Agani) 
• The changes should start from the ground level to the top people-but they thought 
that this would take too much time. They didn't recognize how important are these 
chanzes, so they didn't want to be involved in the reforms in the beginning. (Sedjiu) 
215 
I • There were discussions, but many personnel changes have occurred, and appointments were made after the central and local elections. More discussions 
needed to be held. (Huruglica) 
• People were passive at that time. It was the immediate post-war period, and people 
had other economic problems, and more time was needed to introduce that policy. 
(Y merhalil) 
• They still have started implementation, and the media has not done anything to help. 
People are still going to their family doctor, and asking for a paediatrician. (Kabashi) 
• We were informed through the press. (Tahirukaj) 
• Not enough contact has been made with Kosovo health professionals, especially in 
the last year. (Ibrahimi) 
• We did not hear anything about reforms before the health-policy document was 
released. (Shaqiri) 
Question 6: Discussion of the reforms with Kosovars in female dominated health sectors (i.e. nurses and midwives) has 
been: 
a. frequent. 
b. moderate. 
c. infrequent. 
Why? 
I ndicatorl Analysis A B C Comments 
CommunicatelResQond I 10 9 • Professional associations of nurses were quite weak-were not organized, and had not 
Analysis: Significant. Most CS: CS: CS: political support. (Luma) 
stakeholders felt that the I,' 5· , 5,· • It would prolong the process. (Ahmeti) 
discussion wi th female- RS: RS: RS: • Post-war situation and they were unorganized. (Begolli) 
dominated health sectors was 0 5 4 
• They were listened to as much as was needed, the reforms were imposed for our 
infrequent. (Kosovars') benefit. (Ukmata) 
• They are not well organized associations. (Agani) 
• Most of them did not understand the strategy, and they were not well organized. 
(Sedjiu) 
• During a presentation at the health-policy conference, the nurses agreed with the 
policy, but emphasized that the nurses should have academic education. This was 
incorporated into the YeHow Book. (Huruglica) 
• Only head nurses have been informed. (Kabashi) 
--- .. - ----------
--
--- --- ----
2In 
• They were not so organized. (Rexhepi) 
• At the time of discussions about health reform, nurses were not organized. Our 
superiors did not inform us of the policy. If discussions had been frequent, I would 
have heard about it. (Sopi) 
• They didn't find it necess~ to inform us 1nurse~.1Morina) 
Question 7: Discussion of the reforms with the Kosovar public has been: 
a. frequent. 
b. moderate. 
c. infrequent. 
Why? 
Indicator/ Anal£sis A B C Comments 
CommunicatelRes~ond 7 16 • Kosovo society not accustomed to public debates. (Luma) 
Analysis: Significant. CS: CS: • I cannot say that the public was not consulted, but it was moderate consultation, and 
Stakeholders agreed that the 4' 7' the maximum amount possible for that time considering the post-war situation and , ,
reforms were not sufficiently RS: RS: donor pressure to have a policy in place. (Begolli) 
communicated, which 3 9 • It was a post-war situation, and the key issues were survival and rapid decision-
reflects on the legitimacy of making. (Ukmata) 
the reforms and the ability of 
• Population does not understand the concept of family medicine and the services that 
the government to share its they can get. The Ministry did not promote this policy enough to the population. 
reform vision. (Hasani) 
• Lack of initiative from the Department of Health. (Agani) 
• There was not enough interest in the media, and the public was occupied with the 
election. (Sedjiu) 
• The time that the document had to be finished did not allow for extensive discussion. 
(Huruglica) 
• Health workers did not take any initiative to discuss it-people were not used to say 
openly what they think and this is inherited from the previous system. (Ymerhalil) 
• The media had some information about reforms, but this did not continue. (Kabashi) 
• It was difficult for the media to have much interest in such issues-the people in the 
I media were no so specialized, professionally. Health was presented in media mainly I 
because of the lack of equipment and daily problems, but not for their health strategy. 
(Rexhepi) 
• Media have to inform about other Rfoblems. (Morinal 
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Question 8: 
Indicator/Analysis 
CommunicatelRespond 
Many did not answer this 
question-therefore, no clear 
findings. 
Question 9: 
I ndicator/ A na/ysis 
Legitima~ 
• There was little information in the media. (Selaj) 
• Absence of education-we didn't offer the public much information, and they didn't 
take initiatives to find out information. (Hajdari) 
• The media did not inform public about the reforms-they focused on political 
~bl~ll!s.lQ9~) 
Discussion of the reforms with the Kosovar minority popUlation has been: 
a. frequent. 
b. moderate. 
c. infrequent. 
W4Y? 
A IB 
3 5 
CS: CS: 
2' 3' J J 
RS: RS: 
1 2 
C 
7 
CS: 
3; 
RS: 
4 
Comments 
• Serbs are not interested to be part of this society. (Luma) 
• WHO went to see Serb health representatives, but unclear what happened. (Begolli) 
• In the nursing project of the Ministry of Health, Serbs are included in training and 
they received a lecture on the Kosovo Health Strategy. (Hasani) 
• Lack of political will from the Serbian side. (Agani) 
• Efforts were made, and at the beginning Serbs participated, but stopped as they had 
pressure from Belgrade. (Huruglica) 
• They rejected invitations to discuss reforms. (Ymerhalili) 
• With minorities, except the Serb minority. (Kabashi) 
• I had contacts, but not enough. They (Serbs) have shown resistance more for political 
rather than professional reasons. Once we tried, they made contacts impossible. 
Internationals did not trust Albanians to make contacts with Serbs. If the locals were 
trusted, we could find some common language-at least at the professionalleveI. 
(Rexhepi) 
In discussions of health reforms, in your opinion Kosovars had: 
a. significant input. 
b. moderate input. 
c. insignificant input. 
Why? 
I A I B I c I Comments - u~ __ 
2 \ 19 \ 2 I. During some discussions, Kosovo health professionals were able to rHls~the~~ __ -J 
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External Pressure cs: cs: CS: points/influence some decisions. (Luma) , 
Analysis: Significant. Most l' 10; l' • Even if we were better prepared with proposals, the policy framework was ready and , , 
stakeholders indicated that RS: RS: RS: we were brought into the final act. (Begolli) 
I Kosovars only had moderate 1 9 1 • I think that reforms and decision making for Kosovars was something new, and 
input, and in their comments therefore Kosovars cannot blame the internationals. Though I am sure that there was 
they expressed concern that need for greater influence, but Kosovars aspirations are high-and we would propose 
the reforms came 'ready- the space shuttle. (Ukmata) 
made.' 
• The content was defined by internationals and the decision makers were 
internationals. This is not something wrong-it was positive, as we did not have a 
brighter vision. We were isolated for a decade. (Hasani) 
• Executive power is still in the hands of the internationals, four years after the war. 
(Agani) 
• There was much discussion at the experts' level and not at the institutional level, 
maybe because the institutions did not show enough interest. That is one of the 
reasons why we have so many problems in post-wartime period. (Sedjiu) 
• The policies were developed by internationals and the consultation time was too 
short-we did not have enough time to give our inputs. The biggest pressure came 
from donors. NGOs come and implement their programs for a certain period of time, 
and they have to spend that money no matter how it is implemented, the quality is not 
important. It was the same with policy. (Huruglica) 
• If Kosovars had shown more interest, been more active, and taken more 
responsibility, then they could have more significant input. (Ymerhalili) 
• There are now working groups for reforms. (Kabashi) 
• I insisted and it did not happen-I said that the strategy should be presented to the 
population, but the internationals said first we have to make a policy, then present it. 
Strategy formulation did not start well. But there are also other problems that 
bothered people at that time. People were not able to evaluate whether the old or new 
system is better for them, as they were not informed about how the old systcm 
functioned. (Rexhepi) 
Question 10: In your opinion, Kosovar input: 
a. was taken seriously, and altered the Health Policy. 
b. was listened to, and incorporated into thc Health Policy. 
c. was listened to, but did not significantly alter the Health Policy. 
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Indicator/Analysis 
Legitimacy 
External Pressure 
Analysis: Significant. 
Stakeholders again indicated 
that the views of Kosovars 
were incorporated, but did 
not significantly alter the 
health policy. Moreover, in 
their verbal comments they 
expressed concern that the 
health policy came 'ready-
made,' and that their input 
was minimal. 
Question 11: 
Indicator/ Anal£si .... ' 
Legitimacy 
Analysis: Significant. The 
majority of respondents 
indicated that the information 
was communicated in the 
Wh~? 
A IB C Comments 
15 
CS: 
8,' 
RS: 
7 
13 
CS: 
3' , 
RS: 
10 
• If internationals did not accept some ideas, they didn't incorporate them into the 
health policy, and nobody can change that. (Luma) 
• The health policy was 80% determined outside of the working group. (Ahmeti) 
• In the first group, local experts were listened to more as the working group was 
smaller and was more effective. In the second working group, local experts' 
suggestions were not considered as much as they had been previously. (Begolli) 
• I know that Mr. Ahmeti's proposals were incorporated. (Ukmata) 
• Kosovars lacked knowledge in health policy, so they listened more. Ifwe found the 
health-policy ideas reasonable, we accepted them, but we were not able to implement 
the reforms. (Sedjiu) 
• If Kosovars had made more effort and had more experience, they would have had 
more input. (Ymerhalili) 
• They adapted the reform to the situation-but there is some confusion, as the 
Ministry continues to give new specialisations. (Kabashi) 
• Most internationals came here with their prejudice, and they were preoccupied to 
realize the project, and less implement it. Once you gave a suggestion, internationals 
were afraid they would be lost. The internationals planned the strategy before. 
(Rexhepi) 
• It was previously prepared and served to us, more or less. (Selaj) 
• Most of the important work was done by international experts, because we didn't 
have enouEh experience .... Nothing is prepared special for our conditions. (Qosaj) 
During discussions and communications about health policy and health reform: 
A 
13 
CS: 
6; 
RS: 
7 
a. an effort was made to communicate this information in the appropriate language. 
b. sometimes the information was communicated in the appropriate language. 
c. the information was rarely communicated in the appropriate language. 
B I C I Comments 
9 1 
CS: CS: 
5: 1; 
RS: RS: 
4 () 
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correct langu~e. 
Question 12: 
I ndicatorl Analysis 
Capacity 
Analysis: Significant. Most 
felt that the Ministry of 
Health did not act sufficiently 
to implement reforms. 
This response was 
particularly marked among 
central stakeholders. 
Since the introduction of the health-reform program by the WHO, the DepartmentIMinistry of Health is 
responsible for its implementation. In your opinion, did the Ministry: 
a. attempt to implement the program? 
b. pay only lip service to implementation? 
c. ignore reforms? 
Wh~? 
A IB C 
9 I 13 I 
Comments 
• Ministry did not develop a plan of action, which is the first step to implementation, 
but nothing is done. (Luma) 
• Each office at the Ministry had an international and local professional and they could 
not implement the policy either because they did not know or were not interested. 
(Ahmeti) 
• I think that the Ministry murdered its own reforms as it signed 700 specialisations 
other than family medicine. (Begolli) 
• They did not have capacity or will to implement the policy. They have designed 
administrative instruction as they needed, or as the things came up, they did not have 
any systematic plan in promoting health policy officially. The right people were not 
in the right places. (Ukmata) 
• According to a study, the nurses trained were going back to their facilities and worked 
in the manner they used to work. A nurse trained in family medicine works in the 
laboratory. The ministry did not do anything to systematize through an administrative 
instruction those nurses to work together with a family-medicine doctor. Earlier it 
was more difficult, but now it is easier, as almost all directors are trained in family 
medicine and they support us more. (Hasan i) 
• No technical capacity, lack of human resources. (Agani) 
• The structures have to implement reforms, as well. (Sejdiu) 
• The Ministry is always trying to contribute to the five health-policy goals through its 
programs and offices. (Huruglica) 
• Based on this policy, the ministry formed structures, established the PHC unit at the 
Ministry, and family-medicine development centre. (Ymerhalil) 
• They said one thing, and then did something else. (Kabashi) 
• The Mini~ is different from the UN Department of Health who was very 
221 
-- -
dedicated to implementing the health policy. The new minister was very political "mf 1 
attempted a different strategy. Also problem with civil servants, who should serve in 
Ministry-not be political. (Rexhepi) 
• While they made many trainings, trained personnel came back to the same old 
positions with the same way of work. (Sopi) 
• They signed nurses' licenses, but for other aspects of the reforms, I do not know. 
(Bicku) 
• Nobody from the Ministry ever came to see us to ask what our problems are. 
(Tahirukaj) 
• Unclear if the Ministry had the competence to do the implementation. Also there were 
political influences in the Ministry. (Selaj) 
• Except for one program about organisation in hospitals, we didn't have any further 
support from the Ministry. (Haidari) 
Question 13: How committed are Kosovars working in the health system to the implementation of these reforms? 
Central-Level Stakeholders a. Committed. 
Only b. Somewhat committed. 
c. Not very committed. 
Why? 
I ndicatorl Analysis A B C Comments 
Legitimacy 2 6 3 • In the first year, Kosovars were very committed. Since then, their enthusiasm has 
Sustainability dropped and they start to care only about personal interest. (Luma) 
Analysis: Significant. Most • Reforms are crucial for financial security in the health sector. (Ahmeti) 
stakeholders expressed doubt • They said yes to reforms, but when it came to work, they do not do much. (Ramadani) 
as to the level of commitment 
• Kosovars wanted the reforms, but they did not have the capacity and time to 
from Kosovars to the reform understand them, they just followed them. (Ukmata) 
process. 
• We are a poor country and we are trying to implement with all our knowledge and 
forces. The main reason that we are doing this is that we believe the system will 
serve the population, but we are lacking motivation. (Hasani) 
• They put individual interest higher than collective interest, they did not understand 
the reforms, and did not know the strategy. (Sejdiu) 
• We look to doctors as the main driving force in the health sector, and they arc more 
interested in private practise. (Huruglica) 
• Lack of incentives. (Ymcrhalili) 
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Question 14: How committed is the international community working in the health system to the reform program'? 
Central-Level Stakeholders a. Committed. 
Only 
Indicator/Analysis 
Legitimacy 
Sustainability 
Analysis: Significant. Most 
stakeholders believed that the 
international community was 
only somewhat or not very 
committed. Stakeholders 
expressed concern that the 
international community is 
not committed for the long 
term. 
Question 15: 
C(!l1tral-L(!vel Stakeholders 
Onlt' 
I ndicutor!4 nalysis 
Sustainabi Iity 
Analysis: Significant 
('kar that stakeholders 
helicvc that without thc 
involvement of the 
L _________ _ 
b. Somewhat committed. 
c. Not very committed. 
Why? 
A IB C 
3 15 1 
Comments 
• The international community came, and did what they wanted to do, but did not care 
if the reform program was sustainable. (Luma) 
• Some internationals were not qualified for the work they did and did not have 
experience working at the governance level. There was no coordination at the 
Ministry level. (Ahmeti) 
• There was no continuity among the international community besides the institutions. 
Donors were very dynamic and it was impossible to cope with all of this. (Ukmata) 
• They are waiting for more initiatives from Kosovars and Kosovar institutions 
(Hasani) 
• Some donors wanted to do something, but were in the long run indifferent. Most of 
them were in Kosovo to undertake one project, without a broad perspective. (Sejdiu) 
• Donors are always available and interested. They give money, but when the 
memorandum cannot be signed, the donor cannot do much. EAR was going to give 
money for a nursing college. This has not happened since 2001. The donor has made 
the best out of it, and gave money for licensing nurses and nursing conferences. 
(Huruglica) 
How important is donor commitment to the reforms? 
a. Very important. 
b. Important. 
c. Not very important. 
Why? 
A I B C 
9 
---.~---. 
Comments 
• 
• 
• 
Kosovo needs more economic and professional support for thc reform program, 
(Luma) 
Hospital investments and technical support is needed. (Ahmcti) 
The reforms are positively imposed by the international community, and their 
financial and technical support is really important. (UkJ11a~ __ _ 
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, international community, the 
refonn process will not 
proceed. 
Question 16: 
Indicator/Analysis 
Sustainability 
Analysis: Significant. 
Most stakeholders believe 
that Kosovo does not have 
money for refonns. 
Question 17: 
I ndicator/ Analysis 
Capacity 
Analysis: Significant. Most 
believed that these standards 
are enforced. 
• Unly It we are organIZed will donors provide money. (Hasani) 
• There is little budget resources for capital investments. (Agani) 
• Without financial aid, we cannot incorporate as a region. (~ejdiu) 
Does the health system have the funds necessary to implement the refonn program? 
A 
6 
CS: 
3; 
RS: 
3 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
B 
17 
CS: 
8,· 
RS: 
9 
C Comments 
• Kosovo's budget is very small, we don't have enough funds. (Luma) 
• The reforms should save money and not increase the expenditures of the budget. If 
people were interested, they could save money. (Ukmata) 
• Funds are not available due to bad fmancial management. (Hugulica) 
• Although the budget is small, if we are smart and efficient with this budget, I think 
we can have more. (Kabashi) 
• The health budget is too low, and we still need donor support. (Sopi) 
• Lack of equipment, low motivation among patients, specialists are moving to the 
mivat~ectouHoti) 
Are national standards for professional qualifications in primary care health facilities enforced? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
Why? 
A IB 
13 8 
CS: CS: 
4; 6; 
RS: RS: 
9 2 
C Comments 
• There are no standards-no law, no implementation. (Luma) 
• No enforcement capacity for standards. (Ahmeti) 
• Kosovo is a small country and people know each other. (Ukmata) 
• There are regulations, but no one respects them. (Sedjui) 
• The licensing process is going on with Nurses Association and the Ministry of Health. 
(Huruglica) 
• Licensing of doctors is done in all of Kosovo, through the Kosovo Medical 
Association and Ministry of Health. (Ymerhalili) 
• They licensed doctors and nurses. (Kabashi) 
• Every nurse has graduated and has a diploma. (Sopi) 
• While licensing has been conducted, more rigorous control is Ilcccs<;ary. (I loti) __ -J 
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Question 18: Do national facility standards exist? 
a. Yes. 
a. No. 
Indicator/Analysis A B C Comments 
Capacity 14 8 • Partially. (Ukmata) 
Analysis: While most stated CS: CS: • For primary care health centres. (Huruglica) 
that facility standards exist, 6: 4: • Some standards exist, but not all. (Kabashi) 
some gave mixed responses RS: RS: 
as to their implementation. 8 4 
Si2nificance unclear. 
Question 19: Are they enforced in primary care health facilities? 
Central-Level Stakeholders a. Yes. 
Onlv b. No. 
Indicator/Analysis A B C Comments 
Capacity 3 4 • Partially implemented-no enforcement capacity. (Ahmeti) 
Analysis: Divided responses. • Partially. (Ukmata) 
Sh!nificance unclear. 
Question 20: Are there any impediments to enforcing national facilities standards? If yes, is it due to: 
a. Lack of equipment? 
b. Funding? 
c. Training? 
d. Enforcement capacity? 
I ndicator/ Analysis A B C D Comments 
Capacity 6 7 6 8 • All. (Luma) 
Analysis: Insufficient CS: CS: CS: CS: • All. (Agani) 
response. 0: l' 0: 5' • All. (Sedjiu) 
RS: RS: RS: RS: 
• Budget lines are not allowing anything to be done well, and organisation is not so 
6 6 6 3 good. (Kabashi) 
• Lack of legislation is also problematic. (Rexhepi) 
• Lack of motivation. (Morina) 
• Lack of education/training to support reform. (Tahirukai). 
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I - J / /. All of these things impede reforms. (Ibrahimi) 
Ouestion 21: Do these national standards reflect the objectives of the reform program? 
Central stakeholders only a. Yes. 
b. No. 
Why? 
I ndicatorl Analysis A B C Comments 
Capacity 6 • The same reforms as other states in transition and European standards. (Ahmeti) 
Analysis: Significant. All • The standards are dedicated to family-medicine centres-these standards should be 
respondents indicated "yes." enforced from the municipalities, and the municipalities do not have any clue. 
However, if the standards are (Huruglica) 
not implemented, it does not 
matter if they reflect the 
reforms. 
Question 22: Are national standards for professional qualifications and facility qualifications enforced in private clinics? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
Why? 
I ndicatorl Analysis A B C Comments 
Capacity 3 17 • There is no control, no human capacities. Corruption is present in institutions and the 
Analysis: Significant. Clear CS: CS: private sector. (Ahmeti) 
that standards are not O· , 10' , • There is no legislation and no control. Pharmacies are a disaster. (Ukmata) 
enforced in private clinics. RS: RS: • No regulation for the private sector has been approved. (Agani) 
3 7 
• There is no legislation, and nobody checks the private clinics. (Sejdiu) 
• No inspection or other controls have been organized. (Kabashi) 
• Standards are not respected. (Selaj) 
• The private sector is not controlled. (Hajdari) 
• There is no legislation to control the private sector. (Hoti) 
• There is no control of the private sector. I know doctors without license who are 
working privately. (Shaqiri) 
• There have been inspections in the last four to five months. (Silamniku) 
--
Question 23: Do the services available at primary care health facilities generally meet the guidelines set out in Kosovo's 
health-policy document? 
a. Yes. 
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-r r r· All of these things impede reforms. (Ibrahimi) 1 Question 21: Do these national standards reflect the objectives of the reform program? 
Central stakeholders only a. Yes. 
b. No. 
Why? 
Indicator/Analysis A B C Comments 
Capacity 6 • The same reforms as other states in transition and European standards. (Ahmeti) 
Analysis: Significant. All • The standards are dedicated to family-medicine centres-these standards should be 
respondents indicated "yes." enforced from the municipalities, and the municipalities do not have any clue. 
However, if the standards are (Huruglica) 
not implemented, it does not 
matter if they reflect the 
reforms. 
Question 22: Are national standards for professional qualifications and facility qualifications enforced in private clinics? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
Why? 
Indicator/Analysis A B C Comments 
Capacity 3 17 • There is no control, no human capacities. Corruption is present in institutions and the 
Analysis: Significant. Clear CS: CS: private sector. (Ahmeti) 
that standards are not O· , 10· , • There is no legislation and no control. Pharmacies are a disaster. (Ukmata) 
enforced in private clinics. RS: RS: • No regulation for the private sector has been approved. (Agani) 
3 7 
• There is no legislation, and nobody checks the private clinics. (Sejdiu) 
• No inspection or other controls have been organized. (Kabashi) 
• Standards are not respected. (Selaj) 
• The private sector is not controlled. (Hajdari) 
• There is no legislation to control the private sector. (Hoti) 
• There is no control of the private sector. I know doctors without license who are 
working privately. (Shaqiri) 
• There have been inspections in the last four to five months. (Silamniku) 
Question 23: Do the services available at primary care health facilities generally meet the guidelines set out in Kosovo's 
health-policy document? 
a. Yes. 
- -
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b. No. 
Why? 
I ndicatorl Analysis A B C Comments 
Capacity 7 16 • Some of the centres function well, but the villages still don't have doctors and 
Analysis: Significant. CS: CS: patients need to travel. (Luma) 
Majority of stakeholders did 3; 7' , • Human resources planning has failed, there is lack of motivation among doctors. 
not feel that services RS: RS: (Ahmeti) 
available at primary care 4 9 • While the services meet guidelines, much is needed to improve quality of care. 
health facilities reflect the (Ukmata) 
reform guidelines. Clear 
• There is no control and enforcement. (Hasani) 
concern in regard to quality. 
• Still not enough family-medicine doctors. (Agani) 
• Services have just started to meet these guidelines. (Huruglica) 
• Lack of legislation, doctors, lack of health cards, lack of functioning referral system. 
(Y merhalili) 
• We have a lack of equipment and human resources. (Kashi) 
• We don't have enough resources-not enough doctors, and no incentives to get them. 
In some municipalities in Gjilan region, doctors are going to the private sector. 
(Rexhepi) 
• There is no definition of catchment area, no continuity of patient follow-up, patients 
come and get the referral from the family-medicine doctor and just go to the 
I specialist. (Sopi) 
• We don't know the healthcare zones, and don't have continuity to follow up on 
patients. (Bicku) 
• There is no organisation, no catchment areas, no essential drugs in pharmacies, no I 
health cards. (Tahirukaj) 
• There are not enough doctors to implement primary care health care like in the 
document, and training on how to implement the health-policy document is also not 
provided. (Qosaj) 
• The main problem is to follow the patient and at the moment we do not know how to 
register all patients. (Hoti) 
• The population is not registered, so we don't know the real numbers of people. 
People don't have insurance, the health-information system is bad. We have started 
with health cards for patients, but this is in an initial phase. (Shaqiri) 
-~ --- --.--- --
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Question 24: One of the foundations of the health-reform process is the concept of family medicine. This concept has been 
received in Kosovo: 
a. Enthusiastically. 
b. Tolerated. 
c. Resented. 
Why? 
I ndicatorl Analysis A B C Comments 
Legitimacy 5 14 2 • It put doctors who had been isolated from the system back into the system. (Luma) 
Sustainability CS: CS: CS: • Some doctors were enthusiastic, while others resented it. (Ahmeti) 
Analysis: Significant. 4· 5; 1· 
• People did not understand it. (Ukmata) , , 
Stakeholders indicate that RS: RS: RS: 
• Young doctors are enthusiastic, but old doctors resent it. (Hasani) 
there is not much support for 1 9 1 
• Family is the main value/resource of Kosovo society. (Agani) family medicine-
• At the beginning, the concept of family medicine was received enthusiastically, but particularly marked among 
now people say that the Ministry has left us without doctors in rural areas by sending 
regional stakeholders. them into family-medicine specialisation. Villages are left without doctors. 
(Huruglica) 
• Young doctors have embraced family medicine. (Y merhalili) 
• In the beginning, people did not understand that one doctor can do everything. 
(Kabashi) 
• Specialists feel endangered that they will lose their patients. Population also does not 
respect the referral process, and the concept of one family doctor. They are used to 
specialists. (Rexhepi) 
• The population does not know what reform means, and its importance. (Sopi) 
• Some understand it, and some do not. (Morina) 
• It is unclear how the family-medicine concept functions-specialists have 
I 
reservations about the concept of family medicine. (Bicku) 
• Those that participated in family-medicine training admitted that they are not sLlre that i 
I they can resolve these issues with six months or one year of training. (Tahirukaj) 
I 
, 
• People do not understand the family-medicine concept-public-information campaign 
I is missing. (Hajdari) 
• Most of the older-generation doctors are not interested in these reforms because they 
are afraid_to lose patients. (Qosaj) _ 
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• Specialist doctors have opposed the concept of family medicine. (Hoti) 
Question 25: In your area of responsibility, do family-medicine teams function? 
Regional-Level Stakeholders a. Yes. 
Only b. No. 
I ndicatorl Analysis A B C Comments 
Capacity 2 12 • We defined the teams, but we have an absence of family-medicine doctors. (Kabashi) 
Progress • Lack of enforcement-family medicine is a new concept that has to be implemented 
Significant. Regional in old facilities, which are not appropriate for the concept of family medicine. There 
stakeholders did not believe is a lack of protocols. There is no confidence that the concept of family medicine is 
family-medicine teams were sustainable in Kosovo. (Rexhepi) 
functioning. 
• The population is not informed what services it can get-there are no patient and 1 
health cards, no motivation. (Sopi) 
• We have to coordinate the work between doctors and nurses. (Ibrahimi) 
I Question 26: Do you think that the family medicine can be implemented in Kosovo? 
Central-Level Stakeholders a. Yes. 
Only b. No. 
Why? 
I ndicatorl Analysis A B C Comments 
Sustainability 9 • With hard work. (Luma) 
Analysis: Significant. • Standards should be set, with a law supporting these standards-teamwork should be 
Stakeholders all optimistic promoted. Specialists should work in hospitals. (Ahmeti) 
for the future of family • Only with outside investment. (Begolli) 
medicine under the right 
• There is a need, and both the infrastructure and tradition are there. (Ukmata) 
conditions. 
• Need time-in other countries it took ten years. (Sedjiu) 
• Because of enthusiasm and financial support from the Ministry of Health, the Family 
Medicine Development Centre was established. (Huruglica) 
Question 27: What are the three main problems that you face in the implementation of the concept of family medicine? 
Central-Level Stakeholders 
Only 
-----
I nd;cator/ Analvsi't Comments 
Capacity • 1) Referral system does not function; 2) health-service financing and accessihili~v of healthcare facilities 
Progress is a problem; 3) lack of legislation; 4) lack of human resources-family-medicine concept has been 
Analysis: The one commonly 
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referred to factorlissue was 
human resources-
mentioned by six out of 
seven stakeholders. 
Significant. 
Question 28: 
Central-Level Stakeholders 
Only 
I ndicatorl Analysis 
Open-ended question 
designed to see if 
stakeholders mentioned any 
common factors. They did 
not. 
Question 29: 
Central-LeveI5;/akeholders 
On I\' 
imposed by the U.K.-the medical faculty was not involved. Implementing family medicine requires 
human-resources planning and citizen understanding. (Ahmeti) 
• 1) Sustain ability of the program. Family medicine is similar to general medicine----the concept is not bad, 
but the medical faculty and the dean and vice-dean are not doing anything. This program is led by some 
people who think they are qualified to do so, but are not collaborating with relevant institutions. 
(Ramadani) 
• 1) Lack of doctors; low motivation of medical doctors to specialize in family medicine and low MOR 
capacity to attract doctors to specialize in family medicine; the family-medicine program is not serious 
enough. (Ukmata) [Coded under 'human resources. '] 
• 1) No catchment areas defined; 2) no health cards; 3) no standards/protocols; 4) no job descriptions that 
describe the competencies of doctors and nurses. (Hasani) [Coded as 'lack of infrastructure. '] 
• I) Absence of law; 2) training of staff; 3) misunderstanding of family medicine from public and 
professionals; 4) weak referral system. (Sejdiu) [Training coded as 'human resources. '] 
• I) Doctors do not want to work in rural areas-this has to be done through incentives and regulations~ 2) 
trained nurses should come back to work in places where they can implement their training; 3) human-
resources management. (Ruruglica) [All coded under human-resource management.] 
• 1) Lack of legislation; 2) lack of administrative and management staff; 3) low salaries. (Ymerhalili) [Lack 
of administrative and management staff coded as 'human resources. '] 
What causes these problems? 
Comments 
• The program did not start as it should have at the University of Prist ina and Medical Faculty. (Ramadani) 
• There are many programs in the health sector, but there are not many dedicated to the Ministry that would 
enable it to deal with all these programs. (Hasani) 
• 1) Absence of human capacities; 2) absence of law; 3) no motivation; 4) no foundation for work. (Sejdiu) 
• 1) Population does not know what family medicine is, and does not understand its cost-effectiveness; 2) 
lack oflegislation;~ow commitment of health workers because oflow payments. (Huruglical 
What do you think is needed to be support the concept of family medicine? 
Indicalor/·1I1al sis Comments 
~cn~ndcd question • Defined status of stakeholders in health sector; consolidation of the Minist of Health; health law; 
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-designed to see if promotion of the concept of family medicine among health workers and citizens. (Ahmeti) I 
stakeholders mentioned any • Learn from neighbouring countries-when there is the will to implement, it can succeed. (Ukmata) 
common factors. They did • Health-information system so the ministry can develop services that are appropriate to patients. (Hasani) 
not. 
• The law and development of professional capacities. (Sejdiu) 
• The public needs to be educated about the concept of family medicine. (Huruglica) 
• Secondary and tertiary level of health care should see family medicine as something useful; self-initiative 
and more actively involved municipalities, and a health-information system. (Ymerhalili) 
Question 30: In your opinion, have reforms increased or decreased the ability of Kosovo to provide healthcare services to 
Central-Level Stakeholders its population? Why? 
Only 
Indicator/Analysis Comments 
Progress • Decreased-poor services in primary care, bad functioning of referral system, weakens the reforms. 
Two out of five stakeholders (Luma) 
indicated that the • Decreased-lack of motivation among health workers, weak health financing, and incorporation of 
perfonnance of the health private activities in public sector. (Ahmeti) 
system has been weakened. 
• Increased-in comparison with healthcare system during Serbian rule. (Ukmata) 
Problematic question, 
• Increased--due to training of doctors and nurses. (Hasani) because the reference point 
• Increased-they have incorporated some levels of the healthcare system that did not work before. 
was not made clear in the (Sejdiu) 
question-should they 
• Increased-through training the awareness of health workers has increased and they provide services that 
compare to the pre-1990 or are accessible to the population. (Huruglica) I 
post-1990 health system? 
• Increased-through better access. (Ymerhalili) 
Question 31a: Have the reforms: 
a. Provided more access to healthcare for rural populations? 
b. Provided less access for rural populations? 
Why? 
Indicator/Analysis A B C Comments 
Progress 10 5 
Analysis: Significant. Most CS: CS: 
stakeholders believe rural 2' , 4' ,
populations better served. RS: RS: 
I'< 1 
QuestlCUL31 b: a. Provided more access for poorer populations') 
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b. Provided less access for poorer populations? 
Why? 
Indicator/Analysis A B C Comments 
Progress 8 12 
Analysis: Significant. Most CS: CS: 
stakeholders believe that the 3· I 5· I 
poor are not as well served. RS: RS: 
5 7 
Question 31c: a. Provided more access for women? 
b. Provided less access for women? 
Why? 
I ndicator/ Analysis A B C Comments 
Progress 19 2 • No funds for poor population-other questions unknown. (Luma) 
Analysis: Significant. Most CS: CS: • No doctors in villages, corruption and co-payment and poverty reduce access for poor 
stakeholders believe women 6· I 2 people; improved access for women because a number of programs were 
are better served. RS: RS: implemented in public health. (Ahmeti) 
13 0 • There is a shortage of doctors in villages, medicine is going for profits, and there are 
lots of programs to benefit women. (Begolli) 
• Programs have been implemented to help rural populations, poor people's access 
remains the same, lots of programs have increased women's access. (Ukmata) 
• Unknown for rural; more access for poorer populations, and more access for women. 
(Rasani) 
• Should have access to health facilities within ten minutes-but in Kosovo it is forty-
five minutes away. (Sejdiu) 
I • 
There are more PRes in villages, health services are institutionalized, patients that are 
I 
social cases are exempt from co-payments, and there are more maternities. 
(Huruglica) 
! • No doctors for rural areas, no health insurance for poor people, more maternities and 
better services for women's health. (Ymerhalili) 
• Rural populations have doctor visiting a minimum of one to three times per week, 
poor people have access to free medication in the villages, and there have been 
programs on training in women's health. (Kabashi) 
• Rural populations have more access than during the 1990s; QQo~op1e have no 
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-insurance, and there is more emphasis on mother/child services. (Rexhepi) 
Question 32: In the past year, the delivery of primary healthcare services in Kosovo's health centres has: 
I Central-Level Stakeholders a. Increased in quality. 
Only b. Quality is unchanged. 
c. Quality has decreased. 
Why? 
Indicator/Analysis A B C Comments 
Progress 2 1 1 • The reforms did not work-cannot state how they impact on quality. (Luma) 
Insufficient response. • For the moment, the quality of primary care has decreased, but I am sure the quality 
will increase as the programs are institutionalized. (Ukmata) 
• Better training and organisation has increased the quality of care. (Hasani) 
• Training and better equipment. (Sejdiu) 
Question 33: What is your opinion of the importance of health care in the overall public reforms in Kosovo? 
Central-Level Stakeholders a. High importance. 
Only b. Moderate importance. 
c. Low importance. 
Why? 
I ndicator/ Analysis A B C Comments 
Insufficient Response- 4 2 2 • Other political problems overshadow reform. (Luma) 
unclear question. • There are other important problems to concentrate on. (Ukmata) 
• The prime minister gives special importance to health. (Hasani) 
Question 34: If the government in Kosovo is not supportive of the reform process: 
Central-Level Stakeholders a. The reforms will be reversed. 
Only b. The reform process will slow down. 
c. The reform process will stop. 
Why? 
I ndicatori Analysis A B C Comments 
Sustainability I 4 2 • The implementation of reforms depends on Kosovo's institutions-if the govcrnment 
Analysis: Problematic does not promote the reforms, then the interests of different groups will prevail. 
question, because the option (Ukmata) 
oft he reforms process • Without government support, there would be no financial and no legislative support. 
continuing is not available. (Hasani) 
Question 35: In your opinion, the decentralisation of primary healthcare responsibility to the municipalities has: 
• 
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a. Improved the delivery of health care. 
\ b. Made no change to the delivery of health care. 
c. Worsened the delivery of healthcare. 
Why? 
Indicator/Analysis A B C Comments 
Progress 6 10 3 • There is no decentralisation. (Luma) 
Analysis: Significant. Most CS: CS: CS: • Decentralisation has only been done for financing, and the human-resource 
stakeholders believe that 2' 3' 3' implications were not considered. (Ahmeti) , , , 
decentralisation has made no RS: RS: RS: • Responsibilities were given to people who do not have the capacity to deal with the 
change or worsened the 4 7 0 problems. (Begolli) 
delivery of care. 
• The municipality was not ready to take on these responsibilities. The centre does not 
have the capacity to monitor municipalities and they are left to themselves. (Hasani) 
• No clear coordination, weak capacities, bad organisation offmance, central budget 
decisions, municipal workers weak. (Sejdiu) 
• We now have direct contacts between the municipality and the health house. 
(Kabashi) 
• The municipal level was not ready, and did not have capacities to absorb these 
responsibilities-this was only a political change. (Rexhepi) 
• It has improved the supply of medical goods-although now very bureaucratic. (Sopi) 
• Decentralisation has not started yet. (Tahimkaj) 
• We are solving our problems ourselves. (Selaj) 
Question 36: In your opinion, the decentralisation of responsibility for public health services has: 
a. Improved public health services. 
b. Made no change to public health services. 
c. Worsened public health services. 
Why? 
I ndicalor/ A nalrsi .... - A B C Comments 
Progress 2 12 2 • There is no decentralisation. (Luma) 
Analysis: Significant. Most CS: CS: CS: • Same as for Question 35. (Begolli) 
stakeholders believe that the l' , 5; 2' , • We now have regular vaccination, municipalities office have supported this and other 
decision to decentralize RS: RS: RS: programs, such as regular checks of water. (Kabashi) 
public health services either 1 7 0 
• IPH resisted these changes. (Rexhepi) 
made no change or worscncd 
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servIces. 
Question 37: 
I ndicatorl Analvsis 
S ustainability 
Analysis: While stakeholders 
are optimistic in their 
numerical responses, their 
verbal responses reflected 
more concern. Significance 
unclear. 
In your opinion, in fifteen years the health system in Kosovo will: 
a. Reflect closely the vision of a decentralized, primary care-based system that is outlined in the health-
policy document. 
b. Reflect closely the highly specialized system that existed before the conflict. 
c. Be somewhere between the two systems. 
Why? 
A IB 
19 
CS: 
8; 
RS: 
11 
C 
1 
CS: 
0; 
RS: 
1 
Comments 
• Hope that this is what will happen, but the reforms have to be implemented soon. 
(Luma) 
• The healthcare will be worse than before the war and expensive for the population-
the healthcare providers are interested in profits, and there are no mechanisms in 
place to control profit mentality. (Begolli) 
• Kosovo has to fulfil standards, and one of these is health-sector reform. (Ukmata) 
• Young people who are living and working abroad will come back and try to 
implement what they learned. (Hasani) 
• We are in a critical situation-it is the last moment to understand reality and to start 
public discussions, but this will depend very much on the government. (Sejdiu) 
• Somewhere in between all of these, because of multiple problems. (Kabashi) 
• The older generation will retire and the younger generation will work more seriously. 
(Qosaj) 
• We are a poor country and we do not have any other option. r hope that regulated 
functioning of the private sector will raise the quality of care. (Hoti) 
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